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“The Belgian surrealist painter René Magritte wrote, ‘This is not a pipe’, 
under his famous painting of a pipe. One might also write, ‘This is not a 
country’, under a picture of Belgium, playing like Magritte, little games 
with the eyes of the beholder. The picture of Belgium that is drawn in this 
book is, however, not an exercise in irony, but a first-rate analysis of the 
country and its sometimes puzzling and intriguing political institutions 
and practices. Belgium does combine a number of features that makes it at 
first sight quite unique and maybe impossible, but the solid political science 
presented by the contributions in this book explains convincingly why and 
how this is a real country indeed”.
Kris Deschouwer, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium.

BELGIAN EXCEPTIONALISM
This book takes stock of Belgium’s exceptional and – for some foreign 
observers – schizophrenic position in the political world and explains its idio-
syncrasy to a non-Belgian audience.
Offering a broad and comprehensive analysis of Belgian politics, the guiding 
questions throughout each of the chapters of this book are: Is Belgium a politi-
cal enigma, and why? Along which axes is Belgium “exceptional” compared to 
other countries? And what insights does a comparative study of Belgian politics 
have to offer? The book therefore provides a critical assessment of how Belgian 
politics “stands out” internationally, both in good and bad ways – including 
consociationalism, federalism, democratic innovations, Euroscepticism, govern-
ment formation, gender equality, among others – and which factors can explain 
Belgium’s exceptional position.
Based on cutting-edge research findings, the book will be of wide interest to 
scholars and students of Belgian, European and comparative politics.
Didier Caluwaerts is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel, Belgium.
Min Reuchamps is Professor of Political Science at the Université catholique de 
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Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps
0.1 A country on the edge
The idea of this book grew out of a common experience of its editors. At one 
time or another, the two of us were asked to ‘explain’ Belgium to a foreign 
audience. Invariably, all two of us struggled getting the message across about 
Belgium’s institutional idiosyncrasy, its political eccentricity and the inconceiva-
ble pragmatism of its people and elites. After all, how do you explain the political 
system of a country that self-deprecatingly prides itself on the fact that its insti-
tutional complexity is unexplainable? Belgian elites seem to hold the truth to be 
self-evident that as long as people are none the wiser about how Belgian politics 
works, no one is asking for it to be torn apart. Understandably, our international 
audiences were generally more confused after the lecture than before, and we 
had to save face by ending with the joke that the country has lasted as long as it 
did, arguably because of its population’s shared love for football, beer and choc-
olate, not to mention the overwhelming consensus among Belgians that French 
fries are actually Belgian fries.1
Surrealism thus seems to be the glue that holds the country together, and 
common perceptions abroad that Belgium should not be taken too seriously 
on the political stage are, in all honesty, well justif ied. Not even its leaders 
seem to take the country seriously. During the ceremonies of the Belgian 
national holiday in 2007, then Prime Minister Yves Leterme began recit-
ing the French Marseillaise when asked by a journalist whether he knew the 
lyrics to the Belgian national anthem (S.N. 2007). And in the same year, 
he also echoed a much-heard depiction that “Belgium is an accident of his-
tory” (Quatremer 2007). It is a country, he implied, that by all conventional 
standards never should have existed, but the great European powers of the 
early 19th century needed a f ield to wage their battles and drew a couple 
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of random lines on the European map. Voilà, a country was born, delineated 
by artificial borders, and no one in their right mind imagined the newly formed 
state would survive for another 190 years.
After being consecutively ruled by the Habsburgs, the Spanish, the Austrians, 
the Dutch, the French and once again the Dutch in the centuries before, Belgium 
declared independence in 1830. Paintings glorifying the Belgian revolution are 
scarce, potentially exemplifying doubts about its success in the long run. After 
all, the leaders of the revolution soon realized that the new state was fragile, 
and that disintegration constantly lurked beneath the surface. Belgium’s borders 
transcended linguistic, cultural, political, religious and economic divides, soon 
giving rise to centrifugal politics (Deschouwer 2012). Cooperation between var-
ious religious, economic and linguistic groups (the so-called Monster Alliance) 
was necessary for the success of the revolution, but the common ground quickly 
disappeared after independence (Mabille 2011). This is why several tactics were 
used to unify the country, chief among which was the installation of French 
as the official language (Witte, Craeybeckx & Meynen 2010). The idea was 
that imposing one single language would mean that state-building would soon 
turn into nation-building. Even though the ‘one country, one language’ policy 
appeared successful at first, demands for the linguistic recognition of Dutch 
soon followed, leading to several state reforms and a federalization of the coun-
try from the 1960s onward (Deschouwer 2012; Witte, Craeybeckx & Meynen 
2010). For a long time after the revolution, therefore, Belgian politics seemed 
an unlikely and inhospitable breeding ground for a stable democracy. To some, 
it still does.
Fast forward to the 1980s, an international group of scholars specializing in 
small state research started focusing on the so-called Belgian miracle. How is it 
possible, these scholars asked, that Belgian democracy has persevered despite all 
adverse circumstances (Lijphart 1981; McRae 1986; Peters 2006)? How can a 
country survive such deep divisions? The answer lies in its political institutions 
and the pragmatic, incremental nature of its leaders. Belgium, Arend Lijphart 
claimed, was “the most perfect example of a consociation” (Lijphart 1981: 8), a 
democracy in which divides between the linguistic groups are bridged by a pru-
dent elite that recognizes that the costs of nonagreement would be detrimental 
in the long run. They therefore adopted consociational institutions (such as a 
grand coalition, proportionality, veto rights and granting autonomy) in the 1970 
gridlock constitution to appease the conflicts (Deschouwer 2012).
Even though this type of conflict management has been relatively successful, 
the country still carries the weight of history on its shoulders. Despite 150 years 
of ethnolinguistic strife and 50 years of nonstop constitutional engineering, its 
divides have not yet fully been pacified, and its regionalist conflict still paralyzes 
political life every couple of years (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps 2014). Moreover, 
the consociational institutions and their smoke-filled rooms have given rise to 
high levels of partitocracy, civic apathy, long periods of government negotiations 
and political deadlock.
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Because of these political crises, Belgium has drawn some dubious interna-
tional attention in recent years. The Economist claimed that it was ‘Time to call 
it a day’ in 2007 (Economist 2007) and The New York Times called the country 
the ‘world’s wealthiest failed state’ in 2015 (Higgins 2015). At the same time, 
however, Belgium has also received praise on how to overcome deep national, 
economic and linguistic divides, and its model of conflict management has 
been exported to other violence-ridden countries. Moreover, Belgium serves 
as an example for Europe with former prime ministers Herman Van Rompuy 
and Charles Michel being two out of three European presidents. A remarkable 
achievement in that Belgium has only 11.5 million inhabitants and occupies a 
mere 30.689 km2 (or 0.68 percent of the landmass of the European Union [EU]).
This very brief and unavoidably incomplete overview hopefully shows that 
Belgium is anything but an ordinary, middle of the road and rather an uninter-
esting country. Indeed, current-day Belgian politics is caught between political 
realism and surrealism and is both praised and despised for it. On the one hand, 
as the chapters of this book will show, Belgium seems to lead the way in voter 
turnout, e-voting, democratic innovations and gender equality. It is interna-
tionally praised as a laboratory for democracy and politics (Chwalisz 2019; Van 
Reybrouck 2019), as a leading example for other deeply divided, multinational 
and multilingual federations (Deschouwer 2012), and as a model for the future 
governance of the EU (Swenden 2005). On the other hand, its political system 
is characterized by severe government instability, ethnic strife, strong populist 
parties and historically long government negotiations (Devos & Sinardet 2012). 
In 2011, Belgium even broke Iraq’s world record when it took 541 days to form 
a government, and in 2019–2020, the country has been long without a formally 
endorsed government. Belgium is thus both an object of international ridicule 
and a source of inspiration.
To characterize Belgium’s unique position in terms of polity, politics and 
policy, Guy Peters (2006) aptly coined the appropriate term ‘Belgian excep-
tionalism’, and it is on Guy Peters’ shoulders we stand. This book aims to take 
stock of Belgium’s exceptional and – for some foreign observers – even schizo-
phrenic position in the political world and attempts to explain its idiosyncrasy to 
a non-Belgian audience. The guiding questions throughout each of the chapters 
of this book are therefore as follows: is Belgium a political science enigma, and 
why is that the case? And along which axes is Belgium ‘exceptional’ compared 
to other countries?
To be sure, this book is not intended to be academic praise to Belgium’s per-
severance, but a critical assessment of how Belgian politics stands out internation-
ally. It offers insights into the good, the bad and the ludicrous, all the while trying 
to clarify to a broader audience which factors can explain Belgium’s exceptional 
position. It bundles a rich variety of chapters that deal with Belgian politics in 
a holistic manner by not only looking at political parties, elections and govern-
ments but also democratic innovations, federalism, colonialism, populism, gender 
equality policies and Belgium’s relations to the EU and the United Nations.
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This book offers a broad and comprehensive analysis of Belgian politics based 
on cutting-edge research findings and an innovative approach. After all, this 
book is conceived as ‘cross-talks’. Most textbooks on Belgian politics have hith-
erto been written in Dutch or French and only incorporated the Dutch- or 
French-speaking perspective. Our aim is to have both Dutch and French speak-
ers involved to approach the substantive issues from both sides of the linguistic 
divide. Contrary to other studies, it thereby stresses the multi-perspectivity of 
Belgian politics and highlights how different understandings and historical inter-
pretations feed into current-day Belgian politics. We hope it will offer a good 
introduction to Belgian politics both for Belgian and foreign observers, as well 
as the broader public.
0.2 Structure of the book
The book is structured into three main parts. The first part, Belgium on the 
barricades, is grouped around four chapters and each highlights how Belgium – 
instead of following the pack – has led the way in implementing several insti-
tutional innovations that set it apart from most other European countries. First 
of all, Belgium has historically been an early adopter of electoral innovations. 
One of the defining characteristics of the Belgian electoral system is its con-
tinued reliance on compulsory voting. Not only was Belgium the first country 
to adopt compulsory voting in 1893 when the country adopted plural male 
suffrage but it is also one of the few democracies to maintain the system to 
the present day. To understand this particular position, Didier Caluwaerts, 
Sophie Devillers, Nino Junius, Joke Matthieu and Sarah Pauwels will reflect 
on Belgium’s experiences with compulsory voting (Chapter 1). Three ques-
tions are central to this aim: (1) why was compulsory voting adopted and why 
does it still exist, despite the regular ‘flaring up’ of voices asking for its abol-
ishment?; (2) does Belgium do better or worse than comparable countries in 
terms of voter turnout?; and (3) how would abolishing compulsory voting 
affect turnout, voter equality and party strength? In their chapter, the authors 
show that the equality vs. liberty debate continues to guide political parties’ 
positions on the issue, and that the reason for adopting compulsory voting in 
1893 – i.e. as a buffer against a radical electorate – is the same as the reason 
for abolishing it nowadays – i.e. as a way of reducing the electoral strength of 
radical parties. Moreover, the chapter shows that Belgium’s voter turnout – 
despite its decline over time – remains high, and that abolishing compulsory 
voting would increase voter inequality and reshuffle electoral power among 
political parties.
In Chapter 2, Robin Devroe, Silvia Erzeel, Petra Meier and Bram Wauters 
reflect on the long-term consequences of another electoral innovation in Belgium, 
namely gender quotas. Compared to other countries in Europe (and beyond), 
Belgium is often considered to have evolved from a ‘laggard to a leader’ when it 
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comes to the promotion of gender equality in politics (Meier 2012). In the mid-
1990s, Belgium was the first country to adopt legally binding gender quotas 
for all levels of government, and in the following decades, new quota acts were 
progressively adopted and implemented. The 2002 gender quota acts, requir-
ing all Belgian parties to place an equal number of men and women on their 
candidate lists and among the top two positions of each list, were unparalleled 
both in terms of ambition and effectiveness. And more recently, the Walloon 
and Brussels regional governments adopted far-reaching ‘zipper quotas’ for all 
candidate lists in local and regional elections. This offers a unique opportunity 
to better understand the long-term effects of gender quotas on the political 
representation of women. Chapter 2 therefore investigates four aspects of 
descriptive representation. It considers whether gender quotas have led to an 
increase in the number of women elected and also keeps them in politics. It fur-
thermore assesses how gender quotas shape the level of diversity among women 
and men elected and whether quotas stimulate women’s access to positions of 
political power.
In Chapter 3, Régis Dandoy shifts our attention to electronic voting. In 
1991, Belgium was one of the first countries to test electronic voting (e-voting), 
and since then, it has continuously implemented e-voting in all of its elections 
(from the local to the European level). In addition, this implementation has been 
scattered around the country as some municipalities used e-voting, while other 
(sometimes neighboring) municipalities used paper voting. These three elements 
(continuity over almost 30 years, use for all elections at all levels, and implemen-
tation in only some municipalities) make the Belgian case of e-voting unique 
worldwide. The chapter first discusses the adoption and rollout of e-voting in 
Belgium, showing that it was not a smooth process. It retraces this history by 
focusing on the political arguments used for extending and limiting e-voting 
and the technical events (such as the 2014 bug) that led to radical changes. In 
addition, based on a quasi-experimental research design, Chapter 3 tests whether 
voters alter their behavior and vote choice in response to different e-voting tech-
nologies. The analysis of legislative election results for the period 1991–2019 
in two Belgian provinces concludes that turnout is lower in electoral districts 
using e-voting, while paper voting tends to lead to more invalid votes and more 
split-ticket votes.
Finally, Chapter 4 turns to a non-electoral type of innovation. Julien 
Vrydagh, Sophie Devillers, Vincent Jacquet, David Talukder and Jehan Bottin 
analyze the spread of democratic innovations, and in particular deliberative 
minipublics, in Belgium. These forums gather groups of randomly selected 
lay citizens that deliberate in a structured setting and formulate recommen-
dations for policymaking. They are becoming increasingly popular among 
policymakers and the citizenry and have recently been integrated into tra-
ditional institutions (e.g. permanent citizen dialogue in Ostbelgien). Since 
Belgium’s institutional setup has historically not proven to be conducive to 
6 Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps
citizen participation, the seemingly warm embrace of minipublics raises ques-
tions as to the motives for their adoption. In that regard, the authors suggest two 
explanations. On the one hand, the chapter argues that minipublics have been 
adopted as a means of curbing growing public distrust and bridging the gap 
between citizens and elites. Minipublics thus constitute an instrument in fighting 
the legitimacy crisis, which has hit Belgium hard in recent decades. On the other 
hand, the authors emphasize the role of networks lobbying for minipublics. They 
find the presence of a strong advocacy coalition to be conducive to the adoption 
of these types of civic innovations.
Even though Belgium has been at the forefront in adopting several institu-
tional innovations, the country’s political system and its institutions also face 
fundamental problems. In the second part of the book, Belgium, a democracy 
in trouble, we focus on six of these challenges. In Chapter 5, Benjamin Biard 
analyzes the rise of radical right populist parties (RRPPs), and the way Belgian 
elites have dealt with these challenger parties. While an increasing number of 
extreme right parties have recently gotten closer and closer to power, either by 
supporting a minority government – such as in the Netherlands or Denmark – 
or joining a coalition – such as in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia or Switzerland – 
Belgium remains an exception. Despite their electoral results, no RRPP has 
ever exercised power in Belgium. To explain this, Chapter 5 takes stock of one 
of the most important strategies endorsed by mainstream parties toward RRPPs 
in Belgium, the cordon sanitaire, and questions how mainstream parties have 
dealt with it over the years. The analysis shows that the cordon sanitaire is often 
challenged by mainstream parties, particularly since the 2000s and suggests that 
extreme right parties have developed alternative ways to indirectly influence 
policymaking and fight the cordon sanitaire to gain access to power.
A second challenge facing Belgian democracy is related to its party system. 
In their contribution (Chapter 6), Audrey Vandeleene, Maximilien Cogels and 
Chloé Janssen discuss the high level of partitocracy on the Belgian political 
scene. Political parties are indeed dominant actors on all aspects of the social and 
political system, via patronage in parliament, public administration, the judiciary 
and even the civil society. Yet, given the decreasing legitimacy of political par-
ties, one may wonder whether party organizations still manage to hold a strong 
control on their representatives or if the latter are nowadays allowed to behave 
more independently from their party. This chapter disentangles parties’ grip on 
candidates to elected office. Drawing on the Comparative Candidate Survey data 
set, the authors first comparatively assess the leeway let to candidates in terms of 
campaigning and representational style in four partitocratic countries (Belgium, 
Greece, Italy and Portugal) and then strive to explain Belgian candidates’ inde-
pendence toward their party.
Chapters 7 and 8 turn to recent trends in governments and government for-
mation. In Chapter 7, Lieven De Winter and Patrick Dumont focus on coali-
tion dynamics, and specifically, how coalition formation in Belgium has become 
increasingly hard. Since the end of the 1980s, Belgium is truly an exceptionally 
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complex case. Skyrocketing party system fragmentation, due to a multitude of 
cleavages and high electoral volatility, makes government formation a time- 
consuming and failure-ridden bargaining process. Coalitions include a high 
number of parties that require comprehensive coalition agreements, containing 
expensive and ineffective policies. This chapter looks at all these aspects and their 
spillover effects on governance and economic indicators as well as trust in politics 
and satisfaction with democracy.
In the next contribution (Chapter 8), Régis Dandoy and Lorenzo Terrière 
focus on the flip side of the coin. Since coalition formation has become increas-
ingly difficult, the importance of caretaker governments has steadily grown in 
recent years. Belgium holds the world record in the longest government for-
mation (597 days in 2010–2011). Yet, this political deadlock was merely the tip 
of the iceberg, as each federal election as well as other major political crises in 
Belgium led to shorter or longer situations of a federal caretaker government. 
After all, Belgium was governed by a caretaker government for a total of more 
than four years between 2007 and 2020. Caretaker governments therefore seem 
to become the ‘new normal’ in Belgian politics. The authors investigate the main 
characteristics of caretaker governments and analyze the political consequences 
of having a long-lasting caretaker government. They explain how governmen-
tal decision-making continues even under these delicate political circumstances: 
how the federal state apparatus keeps functioning by adopting a temporary but 
guaranteed minimal budget line; how the parliament takes up a larger role by ad 
hoc coalition making in legislative proposals; and how the narrow definition of 
caretaker government is cautiously broadened over time, which allows the cabi-
net to take more proactive policy decisions.
No book on Belgian politics can bypass its consociational model of democ-
racy. In Chapter 9, Laura Pascolo, Daan Vermassen, Min Reuchamps and Didier 
Caluwaerts turn our attention to the process of federalization. To reduce ethno-
linguistic tensions, Belgium has steadily transformed from a unitary into a fed-
eral state through several so-called state reforms. Nevertheless, the federal system 
has come under increasing threat. Even though it proved to be very capable of 
transforming conflict into cooperation in Belgian politics in the past, the authors 
wonder whether this will still be the case in the future. After all, it is widely 
claimed that Belgium is witnessing a paradox of federalism: the process of fed-
eralization has set in motion centrifugal calls for more autonomy. However, the 
authors claim that Belgium has started to experience a reversal of this paradox. 
Indeed, some political elites have increasingly advocated the ‘re-federalization’ 
of some competences. Their analysis does indeed discern the beginnings of a 
reversal of the paradox of federalism, a trend that has not yet been witnessed in 
other federal states.
The final chapter in the second part (Chapter 10) turns our attention to the 
special case of Brussels. Benjamin Blanckaert, Didier Caluwaerts and Silvia 
Erzeel focus on voting patterns in the Brussels Capital Region (BCR). Unlike 
unilingual Flanders and Wallonia, the BCR is officially bilingual and both 
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Flemish and francophone parties can field candidates. Therefore, Brussels voters 
can vote for a party of the other ethnolinguistic group (i.e. cross-ethnic voting) 
if they so desire. However, very little is hitherto known about the extent to 
which cross-ethnic voting takes place in the Brussels region, and which parties 
benefit most from cross-ethnic voting. In Chapter 10, the authors argue that 
cross-ethnic voting does indeed take place, contrary to all expectations because 
the political institutions incentivize co-ethnic voting. Moreover, they find that 
voters who engage in cross-ethnic voting are primarily ‘unserved’ voters, more 
precisely, francophone voters who vote for Flemish right-wing regionalist and 
radical right arguably due to a lack of ‘offer’ of such parties on the francophone 
side.
In the final part of the book, Belgium and the world, we examine Belgium’s 
embeddedness in the international scene. In Chapter 11, Valérie Rosoux inves-
tigates how Belgium has coped with two of the most controversial episodes in 
its past, collaboration with Nazi Germany during the Second World War and 
the colonization of the Congo. The chapter emphasizes three main features: 
an ongoing federalization process, nationalist tendencies that underline par-
ticular narratives of the past to justify the need for independence and the rel-
ative indifference of the federal state, which does not provide a robust national 
counter-narrative. This chapter shows that drawing a line between the past and 
the present is more complex than it might look.
In Chapter 12, Louise Hoon and Gilles Pittoors turn our attention to Europe. 
Since European institutions are largely based in Brussels, the EU has historically 
been strongly interwoven with Belgian politics. Belgium is both literally and 
figuratively at the heart of the EU. The process of European integration has 
also created strong incentives for political parties to reinvent and adapt them-
selves in different ways, both programmatically and organizationally – a process 
often referred to as Europeanization. Belgium, however, is an exceptional case. 
For Belgian parties, the EU is simultaneously ‘near’ in terms of geography, his-
tory and policymaking, and ‘far’ in terms of political and electoral relevance. 
EU-related issues have long been conspicuously absent in electoral competition; 
elections to the European Parliament have nearly always coincided with, and 
overshadowed by, other more salient elections. Eurobarometer surveys also con-
sistently show that the Belgian population is among the least likely to discuss 
European affairs among family or friends. This chapter takes an in-depth look 
at this process of Europeanization for the Belgian parties: why, where and how 
do parties Europeanize, which incentives are at play and does the tendency to 
Europeanize vary across parties?
The final contribution of the book (Chapter 13) moves to the global scene 
and focuses on Belgium’s position in the UN. Having recently completed its 
sixth mandate, Belgium becomes one of the most elected members of the UN 
Security Council, and arguably the most elected small state in the world. It has 
been known for its ardent support of multilateralism and active policy inside 
the Security Council. Focusing on the last two mandates, this chapter aims to 
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explore the performance of Belgium inside the Security Council, particularly 
of its latest term. The analysis according to the five main success criteria sup-
ported by interviews with diplomats demonstrates that Belgium keeps being an 
influential member, sometimes punching above its weight. Belgium’s policy in 
the United Nations Security Council can be defined as, first of all, pragmatic 
and realistic. Instead of always taking the high moral ground at the expense of 
depriving itself of meaningful influence on the outcome, Belgium has prior-
itized a result-driven approach. However, with the help of its high diplomatic 
skills, Belgium has frequently used its realistic approach to promote idealistic 
principles such as multilateralism, human security and protection of civilians, 
women and children. Its active and credible attitude has brought the trust and 
appreciation of international community that this chapter seeks to disentangle 
and explain.
Note
 1 The editors are – of course – critically aware that this first paragraph might be consid-
ered self-deprecating as well.
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Didier Caluwaerts, Sophie Devillers, Nino Junius,  
Joke Matthieu, and Sarah Pauwels
1.1 Introduction
As several of the other contributions in this book will show, Belgium’s electoral 
system is idiosyncratic in many ways but one of its defining characteristics is its 
reliance on compulsory voting (CV). Not only was Belgium the first country 
in the world to adopt CV in 1893 but it is also one of the few democracies to 
maintain the system to the present day. To understand this particular (and even 
peculiar) position, this chapter will reflect on Belgium’s experiences with CV. We 
focus on three central questions: first, why was CV adopted and why does it still 
exist, despite the regular ‘flaring up’ of voices asking for its abolishment? Here, we 
discuss the historical conditions and party-strategic considerations that have led to 
the adoption and endurance of CV, as well as the arguments in favor of or against 
CV. Second, we focus on how voter turnout in Belgium compares to other coun-
tries with and without CV. Does Belgium do better or worse than comparable 
countries? A third and final question focuses on the potential effects of abolish-
ment. Would we see a drop in turnout if CV were abolished? How would it affect 
political equality? And would it electorally benefit some parties more than others?
In the remainder of this chapter, we first discuss the historical roots of CV 
in Belgium, before turning to current debates on CV. The third section puts 
Belgium in a comparative perspective and determines whether CV actually leads 
to high levels of voter turnout. Finally, we discuss the consequences of CV on 
individuals’ voting behavior, on voter equality, and on party political strength.
1.2 The historical roots of compulsory voting in Belgium
Belgium adopted CV in 1893 as the first country in the world. Nevertheless, 
this electoral innovation had been the object of a long and challenging ideo-
logical battle between conservative liberals on the one hand and the Catholics 
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and the more progressive liberals on the other. The debate essentially boiled 
down to different opinions on citizens’ capacities to participate politically. The 
conservative forces claimed that citizens were not interested in politics and 
should ideally be kept away from participating in elections. After all, it was 
believed that politics was too complex for ordinary citizens and was best left 
to those who had the knowledge and skills to engage with political issues. The 
more progressive voices, on the other hand, advocated the introduction of CV 
as a way of elevating the masses. They agreed that citizens were not necessar-
ily politically interested, but they believed that CV could act as a catalyst for 
citizens’ political engagement. By forcing citizens to vote, CV could fuel voter 
turnout, political interest, and political knowledge (Malkopoulou, 2016; Pilet, 
2011, p. 127). This would in turn lead to a better reflection of the ‘volonté 
nationale’ in parliament according to Prime Minister Beernaert (Pilet, 2011, 
pp. 127–128).
Despite this ongoing debate, CV was finally embraced in 1893. Its approval 
can be explained by the other changes that were proposed to the electoral 
system. Under pressure of the ‘radical’ Socialist Workers Party (the Belgische 
Werkliedenpartij), a system of universal male suffrage and plural voting was 
adopted. This meant that every man over 25 years of age could cast at least 
one vote, but supplementary votes were given to men who paid at least five 
Belgian francs in taxes, who received higher education, or who were heads of 
families. The conservatives’ fear was, however, that especially men belong-
ing to the lower classes, concentrated in urban areas, would turn out to vote 
and that they would support the socialist party. As such, CV was considered 
an antidote to radicalization among the electorate: it would oblige moderate 
voters to go to the polling station, which in turn would limit the electoral 
strength of the more radical voters who would vote for the workers party 
(Pilet, 2011, p. 127). In addition, there were also leftist MPs who were in 
favor of CV, since it would discourage employers and industrial leaders to dis-
suade their employees to vote (Kużelewska, 2016, p. 40; Malkopoulou, 2011, 
pp. 138–140; Pilet, 2011, p. 128). CV was therefore also a device ensuring the 
integrity of the elections.
One of the more contentious issues in the adoption process concerned the 
sanctions that could be implemented (Malkopoulou, 2016, pp. 20–22). Some 
proposed financial punishments. Others proposed to deprive citizens of their 
political rights if they did not turn out. And the Catholic party advocated 
‘moral’ penalties, such as publishing the names of those citizens who stayed away 
from the polling station. In the end, the decision was made to combine all three: 
fines were imposed, absentees would lose their voting rights, and their names 
would be published. Moreover, it was decided that if voters abstain four times, 
they were unable to apply for employment or promotion in the public sector 
(Nerincx, 1901, p. 277; Reed, 1925, p. 335). These severe sanctions did not miss 
their effect since voter turnout rose from 73% in 1890 to 93.5% in the 1894 elec-
tions (Mabille, 2011; Witte et al., 2009).
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1.3 Enduring debates on compulsory voting
Even though CV was adopted in 1893, it continued to propel fierce political 
debates, even to this very day. Some political parties remain strong advocates 
of the system, whereas others seek to abolish it. However, our analysis of press 
articles and party manifestos from the 1970s to present day demonstrates great 
stability in parties’ framing of CV (see Table 1.1).
Ever since 1893, the socialist parties have always been staunch advocates 
of the measure as a way of politically empowering the urban proletariat, and 
CV was also supported by the Christian democratic parties for most of their 
existence. Regionalist and nationalist parties are historical opponents, and 
this remains true in the cases of Flemish radical right and regionalist parties 
(Vlaams Belang and N-VA) today. The liberal family continues to be divided. 
While the Flemish Open VLD is the most vocal critic of CV, claiming that 
the system limits citizens’ fundamental freedom to choose whether or not to vote, 
the Francophone Mouvement Réformateur (MR) has officially favored the rule 
since the late 1980s. However, the newly elected party president (2020), Georges-
Louis Bouchez, seems determined to shift that position and to support abolishing 
CV. Finally, the Green parties have witnessed changes in position over time: both 
the French-speaking Ecolo and the Dutch-speaking Groen were against CV in 
the 1980s and 1990s but are now supporters. Support for CV therefore does not 
follow the traditional linguistic cleavage with Flemish and Walloon parties oppos-
ing each other on the issue. The debate rather follows an ideological rationale.
Most parties’ positions have not fundamentally changed over time, and nei-
ther have their arguments (Pilet, 2011). Three main arguments persist in sup-
port of CV. First, advocates argue that only CV can guarantee a representative 
political system that is appropriately legitimized by all voters. CV thus increases 
the legitimacy of the political system by involving all affected citizens. A sec-
ond claim is that a well-functioning democracy can only work when individual 
liberties are linked to collective duties. The right to vote therefore implies the 
moral and democratic duty to enter the voting booth. Third, proponents worry 
TABLE 1.1 Political parties’ positions on compulsory voting
Pro CV Contra CV
1893 Progressive liberals, BWP, catholic 
progressive
Doctrinal liberals, catholic 
conservatives
1970–2000 Flemish and Walloon socialists, 
Flemish and Walloon Christian 
democrats, Walloon liberals
Flemish liberals, Walloon 
regionalists, Flemish radical  
right, Flemish regionalists,  
Flemish and Walloon Greens
2000–2020 Flemish and Walloon socialists, 
Flemish and Walloon Christian 
democrats, Flemish and Walloon 
Greens, Walloon radical left, 
Brussels’ regionalists
Flemish liberals, Flemish 
regionalists, Flemish radical  
right
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that the abolition of CV will raise political inequality among citizens. After all, 
citizens with less economic and political capital risk losing their political voice. 
This would then lead to policies at the disadvantage of the less well-off. At 
present, these are still the most widely used arguments invoked to defend CV. 
Arguments reminding citizens of the historical struggle for universal suffrage 
and the need to mobilize party’s voters for the progressive cause have steadily 
faded from the debate over the years.
On the opponent’s side, much hasn’t changed either. The argument that CV 
restrains citizens’ individual liberties resounds as loud today as it did in 1893. 
According to its most vocal representatives, CV takes away citizens’ fundamental 
freedom to decide whether or not they want to vote. Additionally, some parties 
critique the sanctions to enforce CV. From the outset, the efficient imposition 
of sanctions has been problematic. The argument then goes that an unenforced 
CV law is an absurdity.
Even though the arguments and positions are characterized by stability, the 
debate on CV regained momentum since the 1990s. This can best be understood 
in the light of two broader societal evolutions: the alleged crisis of representative 
democracy and the increased mobilization of the linguistic cleavage. In the early 
1990s, democracy allegedly went through a crisis in Western European countries, 
and Belgium was no exception (De Koster et al., 2010). The electoral victories of 
anti-establishment parties (Vlaams Blok and Rossem) during the 1991 federal elec-
tion confirmed the increasingly large gap between citizens and politicians. In the 
wake of this election, a group of parties consisting of the Green parties, the region-
alist parties, and the Flemish liberal party called for democratic renewal with CV 
spearheading the debate. It was believed that abolishing CV would require politi-
cians to be more sensitive to citizens’ demands and could bring politicians and the 
people closer together. Moreover, they believed that abolishment would prevent 
frustrated citizens from casting an anti-political vote for the radical right populist 
parties. The recent repositioning of the Green parties builds on this democratic 
renewal frame. Stepping away from the idea that CV is an obstacle for citizen par-
ticipation, they now claim that it can stimulate democratic renewal. After all, vot-
ing is a first important step to deeper and more meaningful citizen participation.
A second societal evolution that influenced the contemporary debate to a lesser 
extent is the increased mobilization of the linguistic cleavage. Flemish national-
ists and federalist voices in French-speaking Belgium increasingly invoke iden-
tity arguments in the CV debate, bringing new arguments into the discussion. 
For instance, Walloon Christian democrats and the Brussels’ regionalist party 
(CDH and DEFI) have explicitly referred to Belgium’s unity in their defense 
of CV. In the press, CDH states that “lifting the obligation to participate in the 
choice of representatives is a democratic step backwards, a measure that goes 
completely against what the National Union is demanding”.1 Flemish national-
ists in contrast refer to CV as an antiquated Belgian absurdity. The abolishment 
of the rule would lead to low turnout, thereby confirming that Belgium is a 
dysfunctional democracy. Even though these are novel arguments, they are not 
that salient in the current debate.
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1.4 Compulsory voting and voter turnout
CV is evidently closely related to voter turnout, which is often considered a 
thermometer for a healthy democracy. Low electoral turnout is considered 
dangerous because when the election results do not represent the will of the 
people, this could result in inegalitarian and illegitimate policies (Franklin, 
2004). A citizenry that shows up at the polling booth and casts a valid and 
well-informed vote is seen as a sign of a strong democracy. In contrast, a dis-
engaged citizenry with low political trust indicates the hollowing out of our 
democratic norms (Hooghe et al., 2011; Norris, 2004).
Not surprisingly, then, there is much concern about the drop in voter turnout 
especially in established democracies around the world (see Figure 1.1). We see 
FIGURE 1.1  Voter turnout in established democracies between 1970 and 2019 by 
region 
Notes: µ vote is measured as the mean of the total vote as a proportion of the registered electorate 
of the regions that held parliamentary elections from the time period 1970 until 2019. The shown 
percentage points are the mean by decade. We used the absolute number to show weighted 
averages. Hence, small countries don’t bias the trend. We only selected established democracies, 
since newer democracies can bias the trend and this has no added value for the purpose of this 
chapter. We included the following countries: Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), Northern America (Canada and the United 
States), and Australia and New Zealand. Be cautious when interpreting the numbers for Northern 
America. The voting-age population (VAP) turnout is in the United States a better representation 
of reality; however, this is not the case in Europe. Since our research focus is on Belgium, we 
decided to show the proportion of registered voters.
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (Solijonov, 
2016).
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the largest drop in voter turnout in Europe and Northern America, with 14% 
and 12.5%, respectively, for the period between 1970 and 2019. Europe’s drop is 
situated mostly in the 2000s until 2019 with almost 9%. The decline in Northern 
America is more gradual. Although Belgium’s voter turnout remains stable, we 
do see in the 1990s and between 2010 and 2019 a drop of over 2%. Nonetheless, 
Belgium remains one of the countries with the highest turnout rate of all estab-
lished democracies.
Looking more closely at different countries, it is obvious that CV laws 
have a strong impact on voter turnout (see Table 1.2). The CV countries – 
Australia, Luxembourg, and Belgium – stand out in comparison with the 
other established democracies. However, the strength of this effect is highly 
dependent on how these laws are implemented (Franklin, 1999; Hirczy, 
1994; Norris, 2004): Greece which has no sanctions to enforce its CV laws 
has a very low average turnout in comparison with other non-CV countries. 
Hence, laws de jure are not enough to guarantee high turnout. The differ-
ences between the other CV countries are quite small. Only the VAP turnout 
in Luxembourg is quite remarkable but this may be explained by its very 
large expat community.
As explained previously, electoral turnout is directly associated with demo-
cratic legitimacy. Whereas the turnout levels in non-CV countries give an indi-
cation of the citizens’ political trust, this exit option is blocked in CV countries. 
Nonetheless, citizens can express their dissatisfaction by casting an invalid vote. 
We do see in CV countries that the number of invalid votes is on average 4% 
points higher (Table 1.2). However, on average only 6% of the voters cast an 
invalid vote. In comparison with the often-lower voter turnout rates in the other 
established democracies, Belgium and the other CV countries still show high 
numbers.
1.5  What if compulsory voting were abolished?
As mentioned previously, CV has been a favorite subject of normative debates 
on how to improve democracy. A system of CV is claimed to impart a strong 
moral imperative to citizens, a signal that voting is an essential part of being a 
good citizen. As such, it generates a sense of moral and civic duty. The question 
then becomes whether abolishing CV would lead to a reduction in turnout, an 
increase in voter inequality, and whether it would benefit some parties more 
than others.
Since there are no naturalistic data on voter turnout in Belgium in the absence 
of CV, we have to determine its effect through hypothetical survey questions. 
This means that to determine whether CV actually increases voter turnout, 
we have to rely on the hypothetical question whether citizens would still go 
to vote if they were no longer obliged to. This question was taken up in the 
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2009 Partirep Election Survey (Partirep, 2009) and in the 2019 EOS RepResent 
Election Survey (Walgrave et al., 2020).
In the literature, it is generally assumed that voter turnout rates would 
decrease by as much as 25% if the system of CV in Belgium were abol-
ished, as this would be in line with the decline in the Netherlands after CV 
was abandoned in the early 1970s (Quintelier et al., 2011). However, the data 
(Table 1.3) show that this might be an underestimation. Even though the figures 






µ Invalid votes  
(%)
Australia 93.33 81.23 5.15
Luxembourg 90.86 53.25 6.52
Belgium 89.94 84.34 5.42
Greece (no sanctions) 68.71 77.01 2.08
Non-CV countries
Denmark 86.09 81.24 0.93
Sweden 83.94 81.19 1.25
Iceland 83.04 82.84 2.04
Italy 78.74 75.94 4.40
Austria 78.68 70.89 1.58
The Netherlands 78.56 75.22 0.49
New Zealand 77.94 74.68 0.72
Norway 77.15 74.66 0.55
Germany 75.04 69.05 1.41
Spain 71.92 67.57 1.64
Finland 66.94 70.70 0.65
Ireland 65.47 62.87 0.93
The United Kingdom 64.92 60.45 n.a.
Canada 63.33 57.28 n.a.
Portugal 58.20 65.25 3.43
The United States 56.75 45.41 n.a.
France 56.56 46.45 2.89
Total CV countries (not weighted) 91.37 72.94 5.70
Total non- CV countries (not weighted) 71.96 68.33 1.64
Δ (not weighted) 19.42 4.60 4.06
Total CV countries (weighted) 92.28 81.62 5.25
Total non- CV countries (weighted) 63.36 54.27 2.18
Δ (weighted) 28.91 27.35 3.06
Notes: The voter turnout is measured as the mean of the total vote as a proportion of the registered 
electorate and the VAP turnout is measured as the mean of the total vote as a proportion of the vot-
ing-age population. We included the parliamentary elections from 2000 to 2019. The shown percentage 
points are the mean for these two decades. When looking at the CV countries and non-CV countries, 
we show both the weighted averages and non-weighted averages. For the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
United States, there were too many missing values to calculate the invalid votes.
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (Solijonov, 2016).
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fluctuate over time, we find that about 45%–55% of the respondents to the sur-
veys indicated that they would no longer show up. The results also show that 
there are only limited regional variations, and that there would be no differences 
between turnout for regional and federal elections. Interestingly, there is some 
variation over time. In 2019, we witness a bump of over 10 percentage points in 
Flanders compared to the 2009 elections. This would indicate that turnout could 
increase when the electoral stakes are high. After all, in Flanders the 2019 cam-
paign was hard-fought and more polarizing than the 2009 campaign and led to 
the revival of the right-wing populist Vlaams Belang as Flanders’ second-largest 
party (Pilet, 2021).
Whereas the increasing voter turnout is a f irst-order effect, CV is 
also claimed to have a number of important second-order consequences. 
Increasing the number of people that show up to vote is normatively appeal-
ing but it is also claimed to reduce inequalities in electoral participation 
(Lijphart, 1997). In systems based on voluntary voting, a steady segment 
of the population (mostly lower socio-economic status groups) was found 
to systematically abstain from voting (Keaney & Rogers, 2006). CV forces 
those less privileged groups to make their party preferences known, and 
thereby reduces inequalities. CV is therefore claimed to have important 
egalitarian qualities.
Empirically, however, the assumption that CV increases equality is con-
tested. For instance, in an internationally comparative study of 36 countries, 
Quintelier et al. (2011) find no positive effects of CV on electoral equality, and 
nor does the formal model developed by Jakee and Sun (2006). In contrast, 
Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998, p. 421) argue that “abolishment of CV would 
lead to more inequality in political participation”. Our data support this argu-
ment. As Table 1.4 shows, inequality would increase if voting were no longer 
compulsory. Abolishing CV in Belgium would strengthen the political say of 
those who already have a political say. Especially the effects of education are 
strong and significant: over both elections, we find that lower educated citizens 
would be significantly less likely than higher educated citizens to turn out to 
vote. In addition, we find significant gender effects with women being less 
likely to turn out than men, and some age effects, with younger generations 
TABLE 1.3 Percentage of respondents that would always turn out 
if compulsory voting were abolished
2009 (%) 2019 (%)
Flanders Federal / 56.4
Regional 44.6 56
Wallonia Federal / 52
Regional 48.4 51.6
Source: Own calculations based on Partirep (2009) and Walgrave et al. (2020).
Compulsory voting 21
taking up their voting rights less often than older generations in 2019. The par-
adox of abolishing CV would thus be that everyone would be given the equal 
right and liberty to cast their vote but only the politically advantaged would 
take up that right.
Another potential consequence that has drawn considerable interest is 
whether CV has so-called directional or partisan effects. Some parties are 
assumed to have an electorate that is more prone to not go voting, so that 
non-participation always has ideological ramifications. Some parties have 
a much weaker electoral support and under voluntary voting systems, they 
would get significantly fewer votes. CV therefore has partisan effects: some 
parties benefit greatly from CV because their electorate is forced to come and 
vote. Empirical evidence on this issue, however, points in the other direction 
and states that the effect of CV would be negligible (Hooghe & Pelleriaux, 
1998, p. 423).
A competing hypothesis is not that CV benefits certain parties but rather 
that CV leads to random voting. CV forces people who would otherwise 
abstain to go to the ballot, but the compulsion does not force them to cast a 
well-considered vote. They will thus vote based on coincidence rather than 
conviction, and this has several negative consequences. First is the increasing 
number of ‘donkey ballots’, where those that are high on the ballot lists have 
a better chance of being elected (Keaney & Rogers, 2006). Second, when 
voting occurs randomly, the consistent link between having certain politi-
cal preferences and choosing the best party is lost (Selb & Lachat, 2009). If 
people are forced to vote without the willingness to get informed, they will 
choose randomly, and their political preferences will be inconsistent with their 
party choice. As such, voting would be reduced to empty ritual rather than 
the strengthening of democracy, which it originally envisaged. And finally, 
when CV leads to random voting by politically disinterested citizens, the 
TABLE 1.4 Percentage of respondents per sociodemographic group that would always 
turn out for the regional elections if compulsory voting were abolished by region
2009 2019
Flanders Wallonia Flanders Wallonia
Gender Male 48.0 49.1 59.9 55.4
Female 41.1** 47.9 (ns) 51.6*** 48.8*
Education Low 32.0 39.5 46.9 30.5
Middle 41.5 46.4 49.0 47.2
High 60.1*** 61.5*** 64.9*** 60.7***
Age 18–34 39.1 44.7 47.6 47.4
35–55 47.2 48.1 49.6 49.8
55+ 45.7 (ns) 51.5 (ns) 64.3*** 58.8**
Sign.: ***p = 0.001; **p = 0.01; *p = 0.05.
Source: Own calculations based on Partirep (2009) and Walgrave et al. (2020).
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representative claims of the system would be undermined. Since the outcomes 
of the elections do not necessarily represent the preferences of the voters, 
government cannot claim to represent the will of the population, which once 
again leads to a lack of input legitimacy.
The results in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 support the assumption that the aboli-
tion of CV would lead to partisan effects. A first finding is that many of the 
respondents who voted blanc or invalid would stay at home. These are usually 
the politically uninterested and cynical voters, and especially in 2019, we wit-
ness strong effects with over two-thirds of the blanc voters dropping out. Most 
strikingly, in Wallonia in 2019, the vote share of blanc/invalid voters would 
drop by more than 12 percentage points, which could lead to a fundamental 
redistribution of seats in parliament. This suggests that – in line with political 
discourse on CV since the 1990s – dropout would be highest among the polit-
ically disengaged.
A second finding is that the overall partisan effects are concentrated in a 
limited number of parties. Based on the survey results, we can conclude that 
in Flanders the Flemish Nationalist party N-VA would stand to gain from 
abolition of CV, and that the right-wing populist party Vlaams Belang would 
lose some support. The results are sufficiently strong to cause a redistribution 
TABLE 1.5 Difference in electoral outcome for each political party in the 2009 and the 
2019 election (Flanders)
2009 2019













N-VA 16.6 20.5 3.9 26.3 30.7 4.4 26.5 31.9 5.4
CD&V 28.1 28.2 0.1 10.2 11.3 1.1 10.4 11.3 0.9
Open 
VLD
12.1 12.2 0.1 8.7 8.3 −0.4 8.3 8.2 −0.1
sp.a 15.2 17.7 2.5 10.5 10.9 0.4 10.4 10.5 0.1
Groen 5.5 7.2 1.7 8.8 10.6 1.8 8.7 10.2 1.5
Vlaams 
Belang
7.4 5 −2.4 19.9 17.3 −2.6 20.2 17.2 −3
PVDA 0.6 0.5 −0.1 6.8 7.7 0.9 6.7 7.5 0.8
LDD 5.6 3.6 −2




8 4 −4 8.7 3.2 −5.5 8.8 3.2 −5.6
Total 100 100.1 99.9 100 100 100
aDiff. indicates the number of percentage points a party would lose (negative score) or gain (positive 
score) from abolishing CV. 
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of seats in parliament. The effect on the other parties is fairly limited. This is 
somewhat surprising as the party that is ideologically most in favor of abol-
ishing CV (Open VLD) is also the one that stands to gain the least from it. 
In Wallonia, the effects are more outspoken with the main contenders, i.e. 
the socialist Parti Socialiste (PS), the liberal MR, and the green Ecolo being 
the most to gain or lose from the abolition of CV. Abolishing CV would even 
bring these parties closer together and would thus intensify electoral competi-
tion for political market leadership.
A third conclusion we can draw from the tables is that there are no differences 
in directional effects between the federal and regional levels. Parties that would 
lose or gain in the federal elections would lose or gain approximately the same at 
the regional level. This could indicate that the regional level is not considered to 
be a second-order election, but it could also be due to the fact that the electoral 
cycles have been coinciding in Belgium since 2014. In other words, if voters turn 
up to cast a vote for the regional elections, they might as well stay and vote for 
the federal elections.
The f inal conclusion from the tables is that electoral and campaign con-
texts matter. In line with the results from Table 1.3, we f ind that the partisan 
effects are more outspoken in the f ierce 2019 election compared to the 2009 
elections.
TABLE 1.6 Difference in electoral outcome for each political party in the 2009 and the 
2019 election (Wallonia)
2009 2019













PS 26.5 24.2 −2.3 19.9 23.2 3.3 19.4 22.3 2.9
MR 19.1 19.1 0 17.2 22 4.8 16.9 21.2 4.3
cdH 14.1 19.4 5.3 6.3 8.5 2.2 7.3 10 2.7
Ecolo 24.7 28.2 3.5 15.4 18.7 3.3 15.1 19 3.9
FDF/
DéFI
0 6 6.9 0.9 5.2 5.7 0.5
PP 0 4.2 3 −1.2 3.9 3.1 −0.8
PTB-GO 0.4 0.3 −0.1 13.3 12.3 −1 13.8 12.7 −1.1




14.3 8.3 −6 17.9 5.3 −12.6 18.3 5.9 −12.4
Total 100 100 100.2 99.9 99.9 99.9
aDiff. indicates the number of percentage points a party would lose (negative score) or gain (positive 
score) from abolishing CV.
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has tried to demonstrate how ‘exceptional’ CV is in Belgium. Not 
only was Belgium the first country to adopt CV for national elections, it is also 
one of the few countries to have retained the system. Moreover, what this chapter 
has also highlighted is that party political polarization on the issue remains fierce: 
very few parties have switched sides over time, and most of them remain com-
mitted to supporting or abolishing the system. Also, the arguments that these 
parties use have barely changed over time. Proponents argue that CV boosts 
legitimacy, increases egalitarian decision-making, and symbolizes citizens’ civic 
duty to go and vote. Opponents argue that CV limits individuals’ freedom and 
that the system is difficult to enforce in a meaningful manner. Whatever the the-
oretical arguments may be, our analysis has shown that CV actually does make a 
difference: even though CV is hardly enforced in practice, voter turnout remains 
at a very high level.
Two other interesting findings stand out from our analysis. On the one hand, 
we found that the arguments why CV was adopted in the first place, as a buffer 
against the electoral gain of ‘extremist parties’, are the same arguments that are 
used to abolish it. After all, CV was adopted in 1893 to limit the electoral strength 
of the ‘radical’ socialist party, but nowadays, we increasingly hear that CV should 
be abolished because it would reduce the electoral power of radical right-wing 
parties. Radical right-wing parties are thought to attract more politically disin-
terested voters, who would be less likely to turn out. However, our results show 
that the directional effects, especially for radical right-wing parties, would be 
fairly limited. On the other hand, our analysis has shown that abolishing CV will 
have a large effect in terms of voter inequality (and input legitimacy). Abolishing 
the system would benefit male, higher educated, and older voters.
The question what will happen to CV in the foreseeable future remains dif-
ficult to assess. At present (2021), the debate is especially salient in Flanders. 
In Wallonia, a consensus seems to have crystallized in favor of CV which has 
silenced the debate in the region. Ecolo and PS are the only parties taking an 
explicit position in their manifestos. Additionally, no Walloon party made any 
proposal to maintain or abolish CV in any Parliament. On the Flemish side, the 
debate has been much more active, with a total of 19 law proposals or consti-
tutional revisions proposed by the liberal Open VLD and Flemish-nationalist 
N-VA in the Federal Parliament since 2000. Moreover, both parties successfully 
negotiated the abolishment of CV for local and provincial elections in Flanders 
into the 2019 government agreement with CD&V. Even though the issue of CV 
has been on the political agenda ever since the 1890s, it thus remains salient and 
fundamentally contested to this very day.
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THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF 
GENDER QUOTAS IN BELGIUM
Leading by example?
Robin Devroe, Silvia Erzeel, Petra Meier and  
Bram Wauters
2.1 Introduction
Although many international studies might credit Scandinavian countries for 
their good practices in promoting gender equality in politics, Belgium undoubt-
edly features as a close second. Indeed, while the country initially took a slow 
start in granting women political rights (the adoption of universal suffrage for 
women, for instance, came rather late [Meier, 2012a]), it succeeded in building 
an international reputation for itself from the mid-1990s onward (Meier, 2012a). 
This reputation is closely intertwined with Belgium’s extensive experiences with 
gender quotas. In 1994, Belgium became the first country in the world to adopt 
legislative gender quotas for all parties competing in elections and on all levels 
of government. In the following decades, new quotas acts were progressively 
adopted and implemented. The 2002 gender quotas acts, which required all 
Belgian parties to place an equal number of men and women on candidate lists 
and among the top two positions of each list, were unparalleled both in terms 
of ambition and effectiveness. More recently, the Brussels and Walloon regional 
governments adopted the zipper principle demanding the alternation of men and 
women across the entire candidate lists in local and regional elections.
This chapter analyzes the effects of gender quotas since they have first been 
adopted a quarter century ago. International scholarship on gender quotas has 
boomed in recent years, and many scholars have devoted time and attention 
to understanding the effects of these rules (Krook, Piscopo, & Franceschet, 
2012). Gender quotas may improve the descriptive and substantive representa-
tion of women, provide for female role models in politics and increase trust 
in political institutions. One key remaining question, however, is what kind 
of long-term effects, if any, gender quotas generate. By design, quotas have the 
potential to remove structural barriers for women and lead to a sustainable 
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gender transformation in politics (Lang, Meier, & Sauer, Forthcoming). In prac-
tice, quotas seem to generate mixed effects (Krook & Zetterberg, 2017). Gender 
quotas, like other institutional reforms, may need time to achieve the desired 
outcome, but because they are relatively new reforms, we know little about their 
long-term impact. In this sense, Belgium presents itself as a unique case. Due to 
its quarter century of quotas experience, it offers a unique opportunity to assess 
the long-term effects of gender quotas and provides a good starting point for 
comparative research.
In a first instance, gender quotas target descriptive representation. To that 
end, most studies look at the increase of the number of women candidates 
and women elected. This chapter will take a more nuanced look at descrip-
tive representation, by addressing four different aspects of it, more precisely: 
(1) the numerical effect, (2) the turnover effect, (3) the diversity effect and 
(4) the power effect. First, we consider whether gender quotas have led to an 
increase in the number of women elected in Belgium, an indicator that has 
received most scholarly attention so far. Quotas are often considered a ‘fast 
track’ to women’s political representation but the question is whether they lead 
to both direct change and continued growth over the years. Related to this is 
a second expected effect, namely, on gendered turnover. Quotas are structural 
measures aimed at removing barriers for women in politics. While their key 
goal is to bring more women in politics, we ask whether they also keep women 
in politics. Third, we consider how gender quotas shape the level of diver-
sity (in terms of age and level of education) within the group of women and 
men elected. Some scholars have argued that quotas might (re)produce within- 
group inequalities and support the selection of some groups of women more 
than others (Hughes, 2011). We consider whether this is the case in Belgium. 
Finally, we discuss whether quotas stimulate women’s access to positions of 
political power and, hence, whether they help women shatter the highest glass 
ceilings in politics: those of executive office and parliamentary party leader-
ship. Addressing these four different aspects over a long time span will allow 
for understanding more precisely the effects of gender quotas on the descriptive 
representation of women.
2.2 Gender quotas in Belgium: a quarter century experience
The literature puts forward a number of explanations for the adoption of gender 
quotas, such as female/feminist agency (Dahlerup, 2006), the electoral system 
in place (Tremblay, 2012) and party competition (Kittilson, 2006), often link-
ing the issue to changes in institutions such as power relations or structures 
(Dahlerup & Leyenaar, 2013). The Belgian case is no exception in this respect, 
as the highly proportional list system facilitated the adoption of gender quotas, 
and the women/feminist activists and party competition largely contributed to 
this achievement (Meier, 2012a).
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However, one important explanation for the early adoption of gender quotas 
in Belgium is exceptional, at least within the European context. As Dahlerup 
(2006) argues, especially in Western Europe gender quotas tend to be a breach in 
the political system based on an abstract concept of equality and merit. Indeed, 
in countries such as France or Italy the adoption of gender quotas involved 
fierce debates on how they would violate or not concepts such as citizenship and 
equality. However, in Belgium they simply extended the dominant system 
ensuring salient sociodemographic groups with positions in political (and other) 
decision-making processes. Gender quotas tend to get adopted in countries 
characterized by egalitarian political cultures (Lovenduski & Norris, 1993) and 
consociational or corporatist notions of group representation, especially where 
such measures exist for other groups (Dahlerup, 2006). While Belgium was not 
a very egalitarian society, the Belgian understanding of representation is inti-
mately related to its consociational conception of citizenship and corporatist 
notions of group representation, which, in turn, are connected to the specific 
history of the Belgian state.
Belgium is a consociational democracy à la Lijphart (2012) that integrates 
social groups into processes of decision-making and the balanced representation 
of key social groups is an essential legitimizing feature of the political system. 
The federalization of Belgium from the early 1970s onward led to an increased 
institutionalized representation of the main language groups in the European 
Parliament, in the federal Senate and in the Parliament of the Brussels Capital 
Region. Similar arrangements were made for the federal government and for 
the government of the Brussels Capital Region (Pilet & Pauwels, 2010). In sum, 
facilitating or guaranteeing descriptive representation is a common feature of the 
Belgian political system.
Whereas French or Italian protagonists of parity democracy and/or gen-
der quotas had to question the basic model of citizenship and/or equality, 
Belgian activists mainly had to demonstrate that gender quotas fitted with 
the Belgian concept of representing citizens so as to extend existing measures 
to gender. The adoption of these rules can be seen as an extension of the pre-
vailing model of citizenship, defining citizens in collective rather than indi-
vidual terms and underlining the importance of group representation. Even 
though there was opposition to gender quotas, there were no valid argu-
ments against them as the only possible argument – ‘sex does not matter’ – 
no longer held in the 1990s (Meier, 2012a). While Belgium is an exception 
within Europe in this respect, it shows similarities with other systems across 
the globe, where dispositions for gender go hand in hand with those for eth-
nic, racial or religious groups.
While this particular feature of the Belgian political system definitely helps to 
explain the adoption of gender quotas in 1994 and 2002, it does not explain why 
only Brussels and Wallonia adopted more far-reaching gender quotas for their 
regional and local elections than did Flanders. However, here again, the features 
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of the political system are important. Belgium is a small-scale highly compet-
itive federal system. Wanting to play out their progressive character compared 
to a more conservative right-wing Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia could make 
a difference by adopting the most egalitarian type of gender quotas, a zipper 
principle applying to the entire list of candidates.
2.3  The numerical effect: do gender quotas 
increase the number of women elected?
After gaining more insight into the unique history of Belgium’s electoral gender 
quotas, let us now consider their (long-term) effects, starting with the numerical 
effects and the question whether gender quotas have led to an increase in the 
number of women elected.
Before the adoption of the first gender quotas acts in 1994, Belgium 
scored rather poorly in international rankings of gender equality in political 
decision-making. Especially compared to other countries in Western Europe,1 
the country lagged behind in respect to women’s political representation (see 
also Figure 2.1(a) and (b) below). In 1991, 9% of the elected representatives in the 
Belgian Chamber of Representatives (i.e. the Lower House) were women. This 
percentage was (much) lower compared to some of its neighboring countries with 
proportional representation or mixed-member electoral systems, including the 
Netherlands (21%), Germany (21%) and Luxembourg (13%). It was higher than 
the percentage of women in two other neighboring countries, France and the 
United Kingdom, but these two countries apply majority rule which is known 
to be overall less conducive to a gender-balanced representation (Norris, 2004).
From the mid-1990s onward, women’s presence in Belgian politics began to 
increase, and significantly so over time, as shown both in Figure 2.1(a) and (b) 
and in Table 2.1. Today, Belgium constitutes one of the frontrunners in women’s 
numerical representation in Europe. Most elected assemblies at the national and 
regional level have more than 40% of women elected in the current period. In 
addition, Belgium also features among the countries that have made most progress 
since 1991. In the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, the largest elected assem-
bly in the country, the number of women grew from a meager 9% in 1991 to 41% 
in 2019. This comes down to a growth rate of 304%3. When we compare this to 
the growth rates in the other 17 countries in Figure 2.1(a) and (b), Belgium ‘per-
forms’ quite well: the average growth rate of women elected is 104% in countries 
without legally binding gender quotas (following a so-called incremental path) 
and 269% in (so-called fast track) countries with such quotas. Belgium also ‘out-
performs’ most ‘fast-track’ countries, with the exception of France (475% growth 
rate) and Portugal (310% growth rate), but the percentage of women in the start-
ing year of 1991 in those countries was lower than that in Belgium.
However, the question of whether gender quotas have directly caused this 
numerical change in women’s representation in Belgian politics does not have 
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FIGURE 2.1  Percentage of women in national/federal lower houses in Western 
Europe (1991–2019) countries (a) with and (b) without legally binding 
gender quotas
Source: Data after 1997: http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm, data before 1997: http://
archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/women45-95_en.pdf (both accessed on 16 July 2020).
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an easy answer. Previous studies have shown that both the design of quotas and 
the ‘fit’ with the institutional context have moderated the effects of the gender 
quotas (Meier, 2012b). The adoption of the first gender quotas in 1994 did not 
immediately trigger a large shift in women’s numerical representation at the 1995 
elections, as shown in Table 2.1. The main problem resided in the design features 
of the 1994 quotas: although strict sanctions applied, the relatively low quotas 
percentage stipulated at 33% and especially the absence of placement mandates 
limited any strong effects (Meier, 2012b). Women’s presence in the Senate did 
increase more substantially in 1995 but this had less to do with the effective 
implementation of the gender quotas and more with the institutional changes 
that took place at the same time. In 1993, an institutional and electoral reform 
stipulated that senators would be elected in two larger, rather than 21 smaller, 
electoral districts. It was this increase in district/party magnitude that created 
new opportunities for women’s representation (Meier, 2012b).
The 2002 gender quotas generated more effects, but here too, the success of 
the gender quotas interacted with a changing institutional context. The enlarge-
ment of the electoral districts and increasing party magnitude in the Federal 
Chamber of Representatives and the Flemish parliament, which was adopted in 
parallel in 2002, created an additional boost for women’s political representation 
in these two assemblies (Meier, 2012b). District and party magnitude in the 
Walloon parliament remained smaller and the percentage of women increased 
more slowly, which suggests that the net effect of the gender quotas was perhaps 
TABLE 2.1 Percentage of women elected at the federal and regional level in Belgium 
(1991–2019)




9% 12% 19% 35% 37% 39% 39% 41%




18% 20% 32% 41% 44% 47%
Walloon 
Parliament
8% 11% 19% 35% 40% 41%
Parliament of the 
Brussels-Capital 
Region
27% 35% 46% 44% 40% 44%




20% 24% 24% 32% 36% 36%
* This only concerns the directly elected senators. Since 2014, senators are no longer directly elected.
Source: Celis and Meier (2006); https://igvm-iefh.belgium.be/nl/activiteiten/politiek/cijfers (accessed 
on 16 July 2020).
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more limited than initially hoped for. The additional ‘zipper quota’ rules, which 
were applied for the first time at the regional and federal level in 2019, also gen-
erated an overall limited effect, as party magnitude is very small in Wallonia.
One reason why effects of gender quotas are not always detected is because 
effects might only become more visible over time. Indeed, the overview in 
Table 2.1 shows that women’s presence in most elected assemblies has continued 
to grow after 2003/2004, even in the absence of new quotas. This increase in 
the longer run speaks to recent studies showing that political actors (parties, can-
didates or voters) need time to adapt to new rules. Parties need time to develop 
new recruitment and selection strategies, female candidates need time to ‘become 
known’ and voters need time to get acquainted with unfamiliar faces (Wauters, 
Maddens, & Put, 2014). These changes generally do not happen overnight and 
inevitably encounter opposition (Devroe, Erzeel, & Meier, 2020). For instance, 
in the absence of legally imposed ‘horizontal’ quotas which take gender relations 
across all lists into account, it took some time for parties to select more women 
at the head of the list (Vandeleene, 2014) and for voters to cast more preference 
votes for women (Erzeel & Caluwaerts, 2015). Both are, however, crucial steps 
in the election of women. In addition, some parties still report encountering 
difficulties with the recruitment of female candidates, in particular right-wing 
parties (Devroe et al., 2020). If anything, 25 years of quotas experience has gone 
some way in changing the way the main political gatekeepers think about gender 
equality in politics. Most, if not all, democratic parties underline the importance 
of guaranteeing a gender balance on candidate lists (Vandeleene, 2014). These 
changes in social norms have arguably also contributed to the increase in wom-
en’s presence and to the effective implementation of gender quotas.
2.4  The turnover effect: do gender quotas 
keep women in politics?
Bringing in (more) women in parliament is a first crucial step to gender equal-
ity in politics but keeping them in parliament is equally important. After all, 
politicians who serve for a longer period of time in parliament have a higher 
chance of being promoted to senior positions and/or weighing heavily on the 
decision-making process (van de Wardt, Van Witteloostuijn, Chambers, & 
Wauters, 2020). Gender quotas, in turn, do not only influence the election of 
women and men but (potentially) also their reelection. After all, they are part of 
a wider set of context factors that influence parties’ strategic calculations about 
which candidates to support and reselect at the next election (Bacchi, 2006), 
and that inform candidates’ reelection strategies and their decision whether or 
not to run again. Previous studies already show that women are more likely 
than men to be ‘de-selected’ by parties and to leave parliament involuntarily 
(Vanlangenakker, Wauters, & Maddens, 2013). The question is whether quotas 
can remediate this gender bias. To assess this, we compare the reelection rates 
between men and women in Figure 2.2.
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Reelection rates refer to the percentage of incumbent MPs that are also pres-
ent in the next parliament. Figure 2.2 shows that before the introduction of 
the gender quotas, the reelection rate of women in the Federal Chamber of 
Representatives was extremely low. Only 9% of women MPs that served during 
the 1991–1995 legislative term reentered the Federal Chamber in 1995. There are 
some reasons for this low reelection rate: due to a state reform, the total number 
of seats in the Federal Chamber was reduced from 212 to 150, and the regional 
parliaments were for the first time separately elected.2 Nevertheless, these ele-
ments also played for male MPs, and there, we see a reelection rate of more than 
30%, which is much higher than the percentage of women. This indicates that 
women suffered from a large turnover when quotas were used for the first time. 
Factors such as a male-dominated parliamentary and party culture and outgroup 
effects among male party selectors could be held accountable for this large turn-
over (Niven, 1998; van de Wardt et al., 2020). Indeed, some parties were ill - 
prepared to deal with the increased demand for women and did little to rethink 
their recruitment and selection procedures to keep women in (Erzeel, Meier, & 
Vandeleene, Forthcoming).
Despite this initial gender gap, we could expect that the initial outgroup 
effects disappear over time and that the reelection chances of women improve as 
FIGURE 2.2  Reelection rate of incumbent MPs in the Federal Chamber of 
Representatives (1995–2019)
Source: Own calculations based on BE-Pathways data (Van Hauwaert & Janssen, 2017) 
complemented with recent data from the official website of the Federal Chamber of 
Representatives (www.dekamer.be).
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party elites, voters and aspirant candidates become accustomed with women in 
politics (Wauters et al., 2014). This expectation is, however, not entirely met in 
Figure 2.2.
Furthermore, we do not witness a negative effect of quotas on reelection rates, 
even on the contrary. Both after the 1995–1999 term and after the 2003–2007 
term (two terms when, respectively, the first quotas and more stringent ones 
were for the first time applied), we see an increase or a stabilization of the reelec-
tion rate of women, but definitely not a decrease. One could have expected that 
many women who were only put on the candidate lists to comply with the quota 
laws (as was common practice in some parties shortly after the introduction of 
quotas), would soon be leaving politics again but that is not what we see here. 
In other words, we do not find confirmation for ‘quota women’ being pushed 
toward the exit.
Over time, some fluctuations occur in the reelection rates of both men and 
women but these run remarkably parallel with each other. When new(er) par-
ties obtain electoral success (such as in the last decade, which is characterized as 
increasingly volatile), reelection rates of both men and women MPs decrease. Two 
remarks can be made here: the large difference in reelection rates between men 
and women witnessed in the 1990s became smaller over time, but reelection rates 
of women continue to be systematically lower than those of men until today.
In sum, it seems that gender quotas did not create an important turnover 
effect. There is, however, still a gender gap in terms of turnover and this to the 
detriment of women.
2.5  The diversity effect: do gender quotas 
increase diversity in politics?
Another question is which women (and men) have entered parliament as a result 
of the introduction of gender quotas. Do gender quotas mainly benefit the rep-
resentation of specific subgroups of (highly educated, young) women, or do 
quotas also help to diversify the population of women MPs? This is the question 
of intersectionality (Celis, Erzeel, Mügge, & Damstra, 2014), which refers to 
the idea that experiences of inclusion and exclusion are not only gendered but 
also interact with other identity markers such as age, socio-economic status, 
race, ethnicity, ability, etc. Disadvantages can accumulate, e.g. lower educated 
women in politics might experience specific thresholds as women and as lower 
educated persons in politics, and these can further interlock when being com-
bined. At the same time, the combination of identity markers adds to the rel-
evance of their representation, as lower educated women might have specific 
interests that require specific representation, as they do not simply coincide with 
those of women nor of lower educated people. The question is whether quotas 
only bring more women into parliament, or whether they also encourage the 
(s)election of a more diverse group of women.
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 study the intersection between gender and age, and gen-
der and education respectively. We focus on age and education in combination 
with gender for mostly pragmatic reasons: data on these characteristics are rela-
tively straightforward to gather over time, while the intersection between gender 
and ethnicity has already been investigated elsewhere (Celis et al., 2014).
As for age, rather than looking at the average age, we investigate how well the 
youngest (below 35 years old) and the oldest age group (above 55 years old) are 
represented, whether this differs by sex, and how the introduction of quotas has 
impacted on this difference.
Figure 2.3 clearly illustrates that the introduction of quotas has granted more 
chances to young women aspiring a career in politics. While in 1991 (before 
the introduction of gender quotas), the share of young MPs was almost equal 
between men and women (about 15%), the share of young women started to rise 
after the introduction of quotas. Especially in the 2003 elections, when the more 
stringent quotas were for the first time applied, the percentage of young women 
was high: about 30% of the women MPs were 35 years or younger. Although 
the percentage of young women MPs has slowly declined since then, the gap 
between men and women continued to be large and statistically significant (until 
2019). Because we cannot find the same evolutions for male MPs, we can state 
quite safely that quotas have helped younger women to cross the parliamentary 
threshold.
FIGURE 2.3  Share of MPs younger than 35 years by sex (Federal Chamber of 
Representatives, 1991–2019)
Source: Own calculations based on BE-Pathways data (Van Hauwaert & Janssen, 2017) 
complemented with recent data from the official website of the Federal Chamber of 
Representatives (www.dekamer.be).
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It is furthermore remarkable that since the first application of the quotas in 
1995, the percentages of young MPs have differed between men and women but 
have become similar in the most recent elections (as it was in 1991 before the 
introduction of quotas). It remains yet to be seen whether the same picture will 
emerge in the next elections.
While quotas have facilitated the influx of young women into parliament, this 
is not the case for older women (aged 55 years and older). This becomes apparent 
from Figure 2.4. The share of older people among women MPs has always been 
lower than among men MPs, and this continues to be the case over the last 25 years. 
There are some fluctuations (which remarkably coincide between men and women) 
but no general (upward) trend can be noted. This leads to the conclusion that while 
quotas might have helped younger women, this is not the case for older women. 
This could be explained by the so-called complementarity advantage (see also Celis 
et al., 2014): when party selectors want to launch new faces on the candidate lists, 
it is an attractive option to select a candidate that is both young and female, as it 
simultaneously realizes rejuvenation and feminization of the candidate lists.
When it comes to educational attainment, we distinguish between MPs with 
and without a degree of higher academic education. This distinction is most 
relevant in a parliamentary system which is increasingly described as a ‘diploma 
democracy’ (Bovens & Wille, 2017) in which MPs with a university degree 
increasingly prevail.
FIGURE 2.4  Share of MPs older than 55 years by sex (Federal Chamber of 
Representatives 1991–2019)
Source: Own calculations based on BE-Pathways data (Van Hauwaert & Janssen, 2017) 
complemented with recent data from the official website of the Federal Chamber of 
Representatives (www.dekamer.be).
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Figure 2.5 shows a small but steady increase of MPs with a university degree, 
both among men and women. The absolute percentages between men and 
women do not differ significantly, and this is the case throughout the whole 
period of analysis. Although there are slightly more fluctuations among women 
MPs, the general conclusion is that the introduction of gender quotas did not 
have an impact on the educational profile of MPs. Nor were lower educated MPs 
more selected due to a lack of other candidates ( just after the introduction of 
quotas), neither did quotas bring a more balanced group of women (in terms of 
educational profile) into parliament (in the long run).
In sum, it appears that quotas did not lead to a more diverse group of women 
represented in parliament, with the notable exception of young women who 
enjoyed more opportunities to start a national political career.
2.6  The power effect: do gender quotas bring 
more women in political power?
The final question that remains is whether gender quotas, and the consequent 
rise in the number of women MPs they encouraged, also increased women’s 
access to positions of power. Focusing on two specific positions of power, this 
section considers the evolution in the number of female parliamentary party 
FIGURE 2.5  Share of MPs with a degree of higher academic education by sex (Federal 
Chamber of Representatives 1991–2014)4
Source: Own calculations based on BE-Pathways data (Van Hauwaert & Janssen, 2017) 
complemented with recent data from the official website of the Federal Chamber of 
Representatives (www.dekamer.be).
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group leaders (PPG leaders) in the Federal Chamber of Representatives and the 
number of female ministers in the Federal government since 1991.
First, PPG leaders are pivotal players in parliament. They not only manage 
parties’ legislative branches, coordinate backbenchers’ specialized activities and 
ensure group unity, but they also promote political stability, decisional efficiency 
and parties’ collective accountability to the electorate (de Vet, 2019). Figure 2.6 
presents the evolution in the percentage of female PPG leaders per legislative 
term in the Federal Chamber of Representatives from 1991 onward. The dotted 
line presents the percentage of female MPs. As becomes clear from this figure, 
women are highly underrepresented among the PPG leaders. The historical 
underrepresentation of women in parliament logically also reduces the recruit-
ment pool from which female PPG leaders could be selected. Yet, the percentage 
of female PPG leaders is in all cases but one far below the level of female MPs. 
This seems to point toward an additional funnel hampering the progression of 
women to leadership positions. The percentage of female PPG leaders peaked in 
2010 with 45% but never reaches the 50% threshold and keeps showing distinct 
trends downwards in recent years.
Second, being a cabinet member is among the most powerful political posi-
tions. On top of the electoral gender quotas, it is also stipulated in law that 
all governments, both federal and regional, must include at least one woman. 
However, women have traditionally also been underrepresented among gov-
ernment ministers. Figure 2.7 presents the evolution in the percentage of female 
members of the federal government from 1991 onward, compared to the per-
centage of female MPs. In the 1990s, female members of Cabinet were rather 
exceptional but this number has steadily increased over the years. Yet, the share 
FIGURE 2.6  Female PPG leaders in the Federal Chamber of Representatives 
(1991–2019)
Source: de Vet (2019) and https://rosavzw.be/site/kwesties/politieke-participatie/in-belgie 
(accessed on 10 July 2020).
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of female ministers has never exceeded the 33% percentage level and remains far 
below the level of female MPs. Looking at the number of female deputy prime 
ministers, a large fluctuation over time can be noted. The positive figures dis-
played between 2008 and 2014 are strongly linked to two female members of 
government (Laurette Onkelinx [PS] and Joëlle Milquet [cdH]) who served as 
deputy prime minister in several successive governments. However, here again a 
downward trend can be noted in recent years.
Taken together, these analyses clearly highlight that although women’s 
numerical presence has increased over the years, this does not automatically 
result in high-level political positions being more open to or easier to reach for 
women. Despite the positive evolution observed in the number of female elected 
representatives, the highest echelons of power remain largely reserved for male 
politicians.
2.7 Conclusion
Belgium played a frontrunner role in the adoption of electoral gender quotas. By 
offering a reflection on Belgium’s quarter century experiences with these gender 
quotas and considering their long-term effects, this chapter laid bare the extent 
to which the provision of electoral gender quotas has actually contributed to the 
descriptive representation of women.
A first part of our analyses focused on the numerical effect by assessing 
whether gender quotas have led to an increase in the number of women elected. 
Our results point out that from the mid-1990s onward, women’s presence in the 
Federal Chamber of Representatives has significantly increased over time. In 
FIGURE 2.7 Female members of the Federal government (1991–2019)
Source: www.commisionroyalehistoire.be/belelite/nl/gov/governmentsoverview/fed (accessed on 
10 July 2020).
Gender quotas in Belgium 41
terms of growth rates, Belgium outperforms most other ‘fast-track’ countries. 
However, establishing a causal link between the implementation of gender quo-
tas and this remarkable increase in women’s numerical presence remains difficult 
as both the design of the quotas and the fit with the institutional context are 
found to have a moderating effect in this regard (Meier, 2012b).
Although the key goal of gender quotas might be to bring more women in 
politics, keeping them in parliament is an equally important target. We therefore 
also considered the turnover effect. Our results show that the ‘revolving door’ 
idea (according to which selectors select women only to comply with quotas 
increasing the likelihood of an early departure) does not hold. A comparison of 
the reelection rates of female and male MPs does not point to a negative effect 
of quotas on reelection rates, even on the contrary. Quotas helped to keep more 
women in politics over time, although female MPs are still more likely to exit 
than men.
By investigating what kind of women have entered parliament, we shed light 
on the diversity effect. Our analyses reveal that the introduction of quotas has 
helped younger women to cross the parliamentary threshold. A different picture, 
however, arises when looking at older women. They are still largely underrepre-
sented (especially in comparison to their male colleagues). Also, in terms of edu-
cation, the introduction of gender quotas did not have an impact on the profile 
of MPs: almost all male and female MPs have a university degree. This makes us 
conclude that quotas tend to reproduce within-group inequalities.
We finally investigated whether gender quotas brought more women in polit-
ical power. Focusing on PPG leadership and executive office, our results point 
out that the introduction of gender quotas did not help women in shattering the 
highest glass ceiling in politics. The fact that men continue to occupy the most 
‘visible’ positions is not only unequal in itself but also enables them to generate 
more (media) attention. This in turn increases their chances of being reelected 
(Hooghe, Jacobs, & Claes, 2015) and ultimately results in the preservation of the 
systematic underrepresentation of women in politics.
Taken together, this chapter shows that although gender quotas generate cer-
tain beneficial long-term effects for the descriptive representation of women, 
it remains questionable whether they truly lead to a sustainable gender trans-
formation in politics (Lang et al., Forthcoming). An important question pre-
vails whether the existing gender quotas will lead to a continued growth in 
women’s presence in politics and to the removal of structural barriers for wom-
en’s representation. This is not an easy prediction. While quotas do offer ‘fast 
track’ solutions, they do not guarantee linear and steady growth. In that sense, 
‘fast track’ patterns resemble ‘incremental’ patterns to women’s representation 
(Dahlerup & Leyenaar, 2013). From a comparative perspective, we are currently 
witnessing a ‘flattening’ curve in countries that had relatively high percentages 
of women in 1991, such as the Scandinavian countries. Dahlerup and Leyenaar 
(2013) have described this phenomenon as ‘saturation without parity’: the per-
centage of women fluctuates at a relatively high level of elected women but never 
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reaches a fully equal number to men. The question is whether gender quotas are 
capable of pushing the number of women behind this point of saturation. In most 
countries with gender quotas, the curve is still on the rise but Belgium might be 
an exception to this rule. Since 2011, the percentage of women in most elected 
assemblies at the federal and regional level has saturated around 40%. It is difficult 
to predict whether the percentage of women will continue to level off or whether 
it will push to a higher level in the foreseeable future. However, there is a distinct 
possibility that gender quotas too lead to ‘saturation without parity’, even if they 
are effectively designed as is the case in Belgium.
Notes
1 Looking at Western Europe allows for comparing similar systems (i.e. established democ-
racies with consolidated party systems).
2 The continuation of a political mandate in a regional parliament was not considered as 
a reelection in our analysis.
3  The growth rate was calculated as follows: ((proportion of women 2019 - proportion of 
women 1991)/proportion of women 1991) * 100.
4 The Chamber of Representatives no longer systematically mentions the educational degree of 
MPs from the 2019 term onward. Therefore, our analysis for education ends in 2014.
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3
AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC 
VOTING IN BELGIUM
Do voters behave differently 
when facing a machine?
Régis Dandoy
3.1 Introduction
In 1991, Belgium was one of the first countries to test on-site electronic voting 
(e-voting) for political elections.1 Since then, the country has continuously used 
e-voting in all of its binding elections (from the local to the European ones). In 
addition, this implementation has been scattered around the country as some 
municipalities used e-voting while other (sometimes neighboring) municipali-
ties used paper voting. These three elements – continuity over almost 30 years, 
use for all binding elections and implementation in only some municipalities – 
make the Belgian case of e-voting unique worldwide.
The Belgian e-voting experience is not only unique but also constitutes 
an original field study. The use of paper voting in some municipalities and of 
e-voting in others – as well as their variation over time – allows a comparison 
between voting modalities while keeping constant most of the features of the 
electoral system. This kind of analysis is not possible in countries such as Brazil 
where e-voting has been implemented in all municipalities. Since municipalities 
were not systematically selected (e.g. based on certain criteria), we could consider 
this a natural experiment, in which some municipalities (rather by chance) use 
electronic voting and others not. One exception to this pattern is that e-voting 
was abolished in 2017 for the elections in the Walloon region, while it is still used 
in (some) municipalities in the rest of the country.
Building on the uniqueness of the Belgian case, this chapter aims at inves-
tigating the impact of e-voting on voting behavior. Political scientists are gen-
erally aware that the design of the ballot or the electoral system has potentially 
an impact on voting behavior (see for instance Kimball & Kropf, 2005), but 
we know less about the consequences for the voters of the decision of using 
voting machines rather than paper ballots (Conrad et al., 2009; Roth, 1998; 
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Wang et al., 2017). E-voting is still a recent phenomenon and remains limited to 
a small number of countries (mostly Brazil, India and the United States), where 
it often remains peripheral (for instance in Canada, France, Japan or Peru). Most 
prior works tend to focus on specific countries and elections and there are few 
comparative studies (see van den Besselaar et al., 2003 for an exception). This 
chapter aims to contribute to the emerging literature on the impact of voting 
machines on voters’ behavior by digging into the Belgian case.
In Section 3.2, this chapter investigates scholarly literature regarding the 
impact of e-voting on several dimensions of the voting decision. Empirical 
studies from several countries and from previous works on Belgium will lead to 
draw three hypotheses regarding turnout, invalid votes and split-ticket voting. 
Section 3.3 presents an overview of the use of e-voting in Belgian elections and 
its evolution over the last three decades. In Section 3.4, I empirically investi-
gate the impact of e-voting on voting behavior by comparing electoral districts 
using e-voting with the ones using paper voting regarding electoral participation 
(i.e. turnout), the share of invalid votes as well as split-ticket voting. This section 
relies on legislative election results for the period 1991–2019 in two Belgian 
provinces and confirms that turnout is lower in electoral districts using e-voting, 
while paper voting tends to lead to more invalid votes and to more split-ticket 
votes.
3.2 E-voting and structure of the vote
Political scientists generally agree that any change regarding the organization 
of an election – be it the polling place, the design of the ballot or the electoral 
system – has potentially an impact on voting behavior (see for instance Kimball 
& Kropf, 2005; Miller & Krosnick, 1998; Reynolds & Steenbergen, 2006 on 
the impact of ballot design on election results). The introduction of e-voting is 
similarly considered a disruptive element. For instance, it is literally impossible 
to replicate exactly the paper ballot on the screen: for a series of technical reasons 
(screen size, color, font size, etc.), the ballot needs to be adapted to fit the screen. 
The literature teaches us that e-voting supposedly has an impact on the propen-
sity to cast a vote and on voting behavior.
To assess the impact of e-voting on voting behavior, researchers investigate 
its usability (Conrad et al., 2009; Roth, 1998; Wang et al., 2017). Usability is 
often understood as the degree to which individuals find it easy and satisfying 
to use systems and to perform the expected tasks accurately and within a rea-
sonable amount of time (Herrnson et al., 2008). Ensuring usability is important 
for consolidating representative democracy in the digital age. First, universal 
suffrage guarantees that every citizen should not only be allowed to vote but 
s(he) should also be able to vote electronically. It is therefore important to 
ensure that the usability of e-voting leads to a greater equality among voters. 
Voters should be equal when facing the voting machine, independent of their 
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gender, age, voting experience or digital skills. Second, usability is particularly 
important concerning the will of the voters. E-voting equipment or interface 
should not have an influence on the decision of the voter or cause her to make 
mistakes (for instance by unintentionally invalidating her vote and by selecting 
the next candidate on the list). E-voting systems need to make sure that citizens 
accurately vote for their preferred party or candidate.
The literature on electoral studies has indicated to us that seemingly minor 
changes in the electoral system may have major consequences for how citizens 
cast their vote. These findings are confirmed in the case of e-voting systems: 
voters alter their behavior and their vote choice in response to different e-voting 
technologies, which, in turn, may lead to different electoral outcomes across 
voting systems (Calvo et al., 2008; Katz et al., 2008). According to Conrad et al. 
(2009), “in a close election, even rare usability problems can distort the out-
come, particularly if they lead to systematic, as opposed to randomly distributed, 
errors”. The impact of the (poor) usability of e-voting systems is therefore to be 
found for three different types of voting behavior: turnout, invalid voting and 
split-ticket voting.
First, even if voters ultimately vote the way they intend to, they may find 
the experience unsatisfying and it might lead them to avoid future elections 
(Conrad et al., 2009). Based on field experiments in four European countries, 
van den Besselaar and colleagues (2003) demonstrated that a poor e-voting 
system design, and in particular an insufficient voter usability, may decrease 
turnout in future elections. Yet, an analysis of aggregate local election results in 
Japan demonstrated that turnout is higher in districts using e-voting compared 
to districts using paper voting (Tsukiyama, 2018). Other studies indicate a lower 
turnout in e-voting districts, such as in India (Debnath et al., 2017) and the 
United States (Card & Moretti, 2007; Roseman & Stephenson, 2005). Finally, 
scholars find no statistically significant effect of on-site e-voting on turnout in 
Brazil (Fujiwara, 2015), India (Desai & Lee, 2019) and the Netherlands (Allers 
& Kooreman, 2009).
Concerning the Belgian case, it is interesting to notice that – even if voting 
is compulsory – there are significant variations of turnout across the territory 
and over time. Several studies demonstrated the negative impact of electronic 
voting on turnout in local elections: in Flanders in 2006 (Ackaert et al., 2011), in 
Wallonia in 1994–2012 (Dandoy, 2014) and in all municipalities in 2006–2012 
(Dejaeghere & Vanhoutte, 2016). The conclusions of the BeVoting (2007) study 
are more mixed as the researchers observed a drop of turnout in the Flemish can-
tons but not in Brussels and one of the two analyzed elections in Wallonia. As a 
result, the first hypothesis (H1) tested in this chapter implies that a lower turnout 
should be observed in cantons using e-voting.
Second, a poor usability of e-voting systems can also directly contribute to an 
increase of voter errors (Conrad et al., 2009; Herrnson et al., 2008) and lead to 
an increase of the share of invalid votes (Stein et al., 2008). However, e-voting 
presents the advantage of preventing the unintentional expression invalid votes: 
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in most of the cases, the software and/or the equipment does not allow voters 
to cast null votes. Voting behaviors such as writing comments on the ballot, 
over-voting or voting for candidates from different lists (except systems allow-
ing panachage) are technically not possible with e-voting and one can expect to 
observe a decrease of the share of invalid votes. For instance, Nicolau (2015), 
Fujiwara (2015) and Katz and Levin (2018) showed that the introduction of elec-
tronic voting machines greatly reduced the quantity of null votes in Brazilian 
elections. In the United States, the introduction of on-site e-voting elections 
significantly reduced the number of residual votes (Kimball et al., 2004; Stewart, 
2006) and the number of over- and under-votes (Frisina et al., 2008).2 The same 
findings are reflected in the Dutch (Allers & Kooreman, 2009), Indian (Debnath 
et al., 2017; Desai & Lee, 2019) and Japanese cases (Tsukiyama, 2018).
In Belgium, it is important to notice that, while invalid voting is virtually 
impossible,3 the e-voting machine displays a ‘blank vote’ button on the bottom 
right-hand of the party menu. As the official election statistics do not allow to 
distinguish between blank from null votes, the share of invalid votes in paper 
districts represents both types of votes, while it accounts only for blank votes 
in the case of e-voting municipalities. Several studies indicated that e-voting 
helped reduce the share of invalid votes for the 2009 European elections (Pion, 
2010) and for the local elections in 1994–2012 (Dandoy, 2014) and in 2006–2012 
(Dejaeghere & Vanhoutte, 2016). In their study of local elections in Flanders in 
2006, Ackaert and colleagues (2011) observed the opposite phenomenon: more 
blank votes in e-voting municipalities compared to paper-based municipalities. 
A second hypothesis (H2) will test whether a smaller share of invalid votes is 
observed in cantons using e-voting.
Finally, e-voting may have a direct impact on the vote for candidates or 
political parties.4 The first set of works investigating this question look at vote 
differences across elections held on the same day. Analyzing the 2011 elections 
in Argentina, Barnes and colleagues (2017) found out that voters using e-voting 
systems display a significantly higher rate of ballot splitting than voters using the 
paper vote. Comparing different types of e-voting systems in the same country, 
Calvo and colleagues (2008) observed a significant variation of split-ticket rates 
depending on whether the system reinforces candidate-centric or party-centric 
cues (the rate of ballot splitting being lower in the latter case).
Another set of scholarly studies observes whether e-voting had an impact on 
the vote share of specific political parties. Katz and colleagues (2008) found sig-
nificant differences in party vote shares depending on the e-voting technology 
used by the voter and several authors investigated the parties and candidates 
that benefited from the implementation of e-voting. For instance, Card and 
Moretti (2007) analyzed the effects of touch-screen e-voting during the 2000 
and 2004 US presidential elections and observed a small but statistically signif-
icant positive effect on electoral support for George Bush. Similarly, Debnath 
and colleagues (2017) found out that candidates associated with corruption and 
criminal activities receive relatively less votes than other candidates in e-voting 
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polling stations in India, while Desai and Lee (2019) conclude that e-voting is 
associated with an increase of vote shares for minor parties. In the Brazilian case, 
Fujiwara (2015) indicated that e-voting caused a large enfranchisement of less 
educated voters, which led to the election of more left-wing state legislators. 
Yet, another piece of literature on the impact of e-voting on party vote shares 
leads to less articulate conclusions. Little effect on partisan votes is, for instance, 
observed in the case of a regional referendum in Brazil (Mellon et al., 2017), of 
local elections in Japan (Tsukiyama, 2018) and of local and national elections in 
the Netherlands (Allers & Kooreman, 2009).
Admittedly, the effect of electronic voting equipment on voting behavior 
may be of an indirect nature. For instance, the impact of e-voting could be 
mediated by turnout: the categories of voters that decide not to go to the 
polling station because e-voting is used are also the ones that are more likely 
to vote for specific parties (Geser, 2004). As result, e-voting punishes parties 
whose voters do not trust this new form of voting or are less familiar with 
new technologies. In India, the positive effect of e-voting on the vote share of 
minor parties was moderated by the share of invalid rates: the votes that were 
previously discarded as invalid are being funneled instead to minor parties 
(Desai & Lee, 2019). In addition, e-voting equipment may lead to a larger 
number of split-ticket votes and Barnes and colleagues (2017) observed that 
this voting behavior leads to a small increase in the vote shares obtained by 
minor parties in Argentina. They calculated that e-voting and ballot splitting 
would enable some of these parties to win a seat in the assembly. In the frame-
work of this chapter, I will test a third hypothesis (H3) according to which the 
share of split-ticket votes is higher in cantons using e-voting.
3.3 Overview of e-voting in Belgium
In 1991, Belgium decided to introduce on-site electronic voting in its elections. 
The arguments behind this decision were that it would help reducing the cost 
of elections (for instance, the costs related to the ballot papers and to the pay-
ment of polling station staff ), accelerate the publication of the results, increase 
the reliability of the results and reduce the number of staff in each polling 
station. Two different e-voting systems were tested in two cantons (Verlaine 
and Waarschoot) at the occasion of the 1991 legislative elections and it was 
decided to implement e-voting at a larger scale.5
The Law of 11 April 1994 regulates the implementation and use of e-voting 
in Belgium. About 20% of the Belgian voters were allowed to use e-voting in 
76 municipalities at the occasion of the European elections of June 1994 and of 
the local and provincial elections in October 1994. All types of political elections 
were concerned, and e-voting has been used in all local, provincial, regional, 
national and European elections organized in Belgium since 1994. E-voting 
occurs on-site (on election day in the polling stations) while anticipated voting 
and internet voting are not allowed. Each polling station is equipped with at 
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least one voting machine. The voting process is quite simple: the voter receives 
a smart card that s(he) introduces in the machine; the voter indicates his/her 
preferences for parties and the candidates on the screen (using a light pen or a 
touchscreen); the voter confirms his/her votes (blank votes are allowed) and the 
voter gets the smart card back and introduces it into the ballot box.
While the 1994 law regulates the use of e-voting, the lists of cantons using 
the system are managed by royal arrests. It means that the enlargement of 
e-voting to other cantons is rather simple and does not require a heavy legisla-
tive effort. E-voting has consequently been enlarged to about half of the cantons 
in the provinces of Antwerp and Liège and in Brussels, and from 1999 to 2014, 
about 44% of the Belgian voters have been using e-voting. The situation varied 
territorially as all municipalities in the Brussels region and German-speaking 
community use e-voting, while it nearly concerns half of the voters in Flanders 
and only 22% of the voting population in French-speaking Wallonia. With 
the 5th state reform, the regions received in 2001 the oversight on provinces 
and municipalities, implying that the regions can now choose themselves the 
voting modalities for local and provincial elections on their territory.
The e-voting also evolved over time, partly following the evolution of the 
technology. For instance, a system of e-voting with paper trail (or paper record) 
has been tested in 2003 in two cantons (Verlaine and Waarschoot) and, partly 
based on the recommendations of the interuniversity report BeVoting, grad-
ually enlarged to all Brussels, Flemish and German-speaking municipalities. 
Since 2014, the light pen system has been gradually replaced by a touch-screen 
system. In 2019, a system allowing the visually impaired or blind voter to cast 
their vote independently (by following the voice instructions emitted by the 
voting software, via a headset) has been tested in two municipalities (Aalst and 
Mechelen).
The use of e-voting in Belgium has not been without debate and without 
problems. The equipment used since 1994 became relatively obsolete by the mid-
2000s but their life span was extended (resulting in additional costs for the main-
tenance of the equipment). In some Brussels and Walloon municipalities, the old 
e-voting system has been used until the 2014 elections, creating an increasing 
number of small-scale incidents. Among those incidents, I can cite the 2003 
problem in the municipality of Schaerbeek where a candidate received more than 
4000 additional preference votes, or the 2004 problem in the municipality of 
Antwerp where a defective floppy disk created counting errors. In 2018, in one 
Brussels (Saint-Josse-ten-Noode) and six Flemish municipalities, a recount of the 
paper trails had to be carried out after aberrant results were observed because of 
software issues.
The 2014 elections witnessed a problem of another magnitude: a program-
ming error in the software used in 39 Walloon and 17 Brussels municipalities 
implied that the ballots of some of the voters who changed their mind during 
the voting process were not recorded. This problem delayed the publication 
of the results for three days in Brussels and it was estimated that the votes of 
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2250 voters have been lost. In the days that followed, several political leaders 
in Brussels and Wallonia declared that they were in favor of returning to 
paper voting. In June 2015, the Walloon Parliament confirmed the abandon-
ment of electronic voting in this region and this decision will be extended 
to regional, federal and European elections. The software problem had the 
opposite impact in Brussels and in the German-speaking community: these 
two entities decided to completely renew their old e-voting equipment and 
replace it with an e-voting system with paper trail. Since the 2018 elections, 
e-voting with paper evidence is used in all Brussels and German-speaking 
municipalities, as well as in a majority of Flemish municipalities. The other 
Flemish municipalities and all the French-speaking Walloon municipalities 
exclusively use paper voting.
Overall, the Belgian e-voting case presents a profile based on three main 
characteristics that is unique worldwide. First, it has been used for all binding 
elections organized in the country. Many other countries implemented e-voting 
only for local (and/or regional) elections, such as Australia, Canada or Japan. 
Second, it presents a continuity over almost 30 years, unlike countries such as 
Bulgaria, Ecuador, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. Third, it has been 
implemented in a varying number of municipalities, contrary to countries such 
as Brazil or Venezuela. This last characteristic of a ‘moving target’ implies that 
researchers can compare between municipalities using e-voting and neighboring 
municipalities using paper voting, as well as comparing one municipality over 
time as it may oscillate between paper and e-voting.
3.4 E-voting and voting behavior in Belgium
As indicated in Section 3.3, e-voting is a widespread phenomenon in 
Belgium. In this chapter, I focused on a limited geographical subset of elec-
tions using e-voting and I provide a detailed analysis of the e-voting phe-
nomenon in all the municipalities and cantons from the provinces of Liège 
in Wallonia and of Limburg in Flanders. The choice of these provinces is 
rather logical. Unlike other provinces, there have been no changes over 
time in the list of municipalities that used e-voting in these two provinces 
until 2014. Probably more importantly, there is a relatively equal number of 
municipalities and cantons using e-voting and paper voting in the provinces 
of Liège and Limburg.6 Out of the 84 municipalities in the Liège province, 
34 of them used e-voting for every single election between 1995 and 2014, 
which correspond to 12 electoral cantons out of 26 and about 62.75% of the 
voting population of the province. In the Limburg province, exactly half of 
the municipalities used e-voting between 1999 and 2014, i.e. 7 cantons out 
of 15 and 60.61% of the voting population.7 This occurrence of municipal-
ities using e-voting next to municipalities using paper voting in the same 
province for all elections and over a larger period of time constitutes a rather 
unique quasi-experiment.
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For the analyses of the impact of e-voting on voting behavior, I focused on 
the national (federal) elections (House of Representatives). The advantage of 
these elections is that the electoral district is provincial-wide, meaning that the 
same set of parties and candidates are presented to all the voters in the prov-
ince, independent of the voting modality in their canton. Given their specific 
voting behavior (particularly in terms of turnout and invalid votes shares – 
see Dandoy, 2014; Dejaeghere & Vanhoutte, 2016; Istasse, 2020), I excluded the 
German-speaking municipalities from the analyses. In addition, and unlike the 
other Walloon municipalities, these municipalities kept the e-voting modality 
for their elections after 2014. The data consist of national election results 
at the canton level for the provinces of Liège (1995–2014) and of Limburg 
(1999–2019).
The analyses indicate that the first hypothesis is confirmed: turnout is lower 
in cantons using e-voting compared to cantons with paper voting in both 
provinces. On average, during the period 1995–2014, turnout reached 90.35% 
in the Liège cantons using paper voting while we observe a turnout of 87.56% 
in the e-voting cantons. In the Limburg province, cantons using paper voting 
display an average turnout of 94.07% while this figure drops to 92.61% on the 
cantons with e-voting. Overall, the turnout difference between the two voting 
modalities is of 2.79% in the Liège province and of 1.46% in the Limburg one. 
These differences are quite important when one remembers that there is less 
variance in turnout figures in countries where voting is compulsory. Figure 3.1 
shows that these differences in turnout are present in all election years, inde-
pendent of the overall decline of turnout over the period under investigation.
In the Liège province, the difference in turnout between the two types 
of voting modalities seems to decrease over time. The difference in turnout 
between cantons using paper voting and e-voting was 3.60% in 1995 while it 
declined and reached a difference of only 2.17% in 2014. This evolution is not 
due to the fact that voters using e-voting tend to participate proportionally 
more over time but rather the consequence of the overall decline of turnout 
FIGURE 3.1  Turnout in national elections (Liège province, 1995–2014; Limburg 
province, 1999–2019)
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in the province that affects more particularly the cantons using paper voting. 
In the Limburg province, the difference in turnout between cantons using 
paper voting and using e-voting remains fairly stable over time. In any case, 
it is interesting to notice that we do not observe that the negative impact of 
e-voting on turnout diminished over time in parallel with voters’ increasing 
familiarity with e-voting and increasing digital skills.
Yet, the differences in turnout cannot be fully attributed to different types 
of voting modalities and several other factors may come into play. For instance, 
Dejaeghere and Vanhoutte (2016) indicated that sociodemographic variables 
measured at the municipal level such as age, marital status or migration had an 
impact on turnout in Belgian local elections besides e-voting, while Dandoy 
(2014) stressed out the importance of party competition, the presence of protest 
parties and urbanization for the same type of elections. Yet, these works have in 
common that they also put forward the importance of the size of the electoral 
districts, confirming the numerous studies that investigated the impact of the 
size of communities on turnout since Dahl and Tufte (1973). There is indeed 
an important bias in the sample of cantons that used e-voting in our two prov-
inces and the average number of voters is significantly higher in cantons using 
e-voting compared to cantons using paper voting.
Concerning the second hypothesis, our data suggests that it is also confirmed. 
Cantons using paper voting display a larger share of invalid votes compared to 
cantons using e-voting. On average, during the period 1995–2014, the share 
of invalid votes is larger by 2.42% in cantons using paper voting (7.71%) com-
pared to cantons using e-voting (5.29%) in the Liège province. Those figures 
reach, respectively, 6.06% and 5.13% in the Limburg province, indicating a dif-
ference of 0.93% between the cantons using different voting modalities. Our 
data based on national election results indicate important differences in the share 
of invalid votes between cantons using different voting modalities, confirm-
ing previous findings for local elections in Flanders (Dejaeghere & Vanhoutte, 
2016).8 Overall, the observed difference in invalid vote share is rather important 
and somehow compensates the difference in turnout observed above: turnout is 
lower in cantons using e-voting but voters from these cantons express a larger 
share of valid votes.
Figure 3.2 displays the share of invalid votes across election years for both types 
of cantons in both provinces. Over the whole period, the share of invalid votes is 
always higher in cantons using paper voting compared to cantons using e-voting. 
Yet, there seems to be no clear time-related patterns in the Liège province: the 
largest difference between cantons using paper voting and using e-voting was in 
2003 (3.01%) while the smallest was observed in 1995 (1.53%). On the contrary, 
the share of invalid votes in the Limburg province clearly declines over time: from 
a difference of 1.34% in 1999 to a mere difference of 0.22% in the 2019 elections. 
In any case, we do not observe a clear relation between turnout and the share of 
invalid votes as the decrease of turnout over time is not followed by a similar pat-
tern concerning the share of invalid votes in the cantons using e-voting.
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Once again, several sociodemographic factors may in parallel have an impact 
on the share of invalid votes in these two provinces. Similar to their findings 
concerning turnout, Dejaeghere and Vanhoutte (2016) observed that invalid 
votes in local elections in Belgium are – besides e-voting – statistically related 
to age and migration, as well as to unemployment. In his study, Dandoy (2014) 
found out that turnout, municipality size and the patterns of competition (num-
ber of lists and presence of national parties) are similarly associated with the share 
of invalid votes in local elections in Wallonia.
Finally, this chapter aimed at observing the impact of e-voting on party vote 
shares. Given the specificity of the cantons in the Liège and Limburg prov-
inces and the geographical grouping of the cantons using paper voting and using 
e-voting, observed differences regarding party vote shares are mostly explained 
by sociodemographic variables rather than by the voting modality.9 For instance, 
e-voting cantons in the Liège province include left-leaning cantons such as 
Herstal, Saint-Nicolas or Seraing that bias the comparison between e-voting 
and paper cantons. However, the split-ticket voting hypothesis can be tested 
at the occasion of the 2014 elections. On the same day, voters had to choose 
their representatives in the federal parliament, the Walloon and Flemish regional 
parliaments and the European parliament. We therefore can compare whether 
e-voters tend to split their votes more often than voters using paper ballots (H3). 
German-speaking municipalities – where voters could emit an additional vote 
concerning the election of the German-speaking community parliament – are 
excluded from the calculations for the Liège province.
Table 3.1 presents the share of voters voting for different parties between 
the three combinations of elections. For instance, the figure of 3.91% for the 
province of Liège means that 3.91% of the voters in the cantons voting with 
paper did vote for two different parties in the federal elections compared to 
the regional elections. Overall, we observe that the share of split-ticket vot-
ing remains quite modest when using aggregate data,10 in contrast with the 
34.5% of the survey respondents that report having divided their votes among 
FIGURE 3.2  Share of invalid votes in national elections (Liège province, 1995–2014; 
Limburg province, 1999–2019)
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different parties at the 2014 simultaneous elections (Willocq & Kelbel, 2018). 
Figures are slightly higher for the Limburg province due to the ‘Verhofstadt 
effect’ in the European elections, meaning that an important share of Flemish 
voters decided to vote for the party of former prime minister Guy Verhofstadt 
in the European elections while voting for their preferred party in the other two 
elections.
Nonetheless, the data allow us to investigate trends across cantons with 
different voting modalities. Contrary to the third hypothesis, the share of split-
ticket voters is larger in cantons using paper voting in both provinces. This is 
in particular true when looking at the differences between the federal elections 
and the regional and European elections in the Liège provinces and when look-
ing at differences between the regional and European elections in the Limburg 
province. In our data, the only couple of elections that display a higher share 
of split-ticket voting in e-voting cantons concern the difference between the 
regional and European elections in the Liège province. We can conclude from 
these analyses that there seems to be more impact of voting for different elec-
tions on different paper ballots than voting on different successive computer 
screens.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at investigating whether voters alter their behavior and their 
vote choice in response to different voting technologies. Given the varying usa-
bility of paper voting and electronic voting (e-voting), I assessed the impact of 
e-voting on voting behavior by focusing on three distinct phenomena: turnout, 
invalid voting and split-ticket voting. Building on the uniqueness of the Belgian 
e-voting system, this chapter relied on a quasi-experimental research design. 
Patterns of voting behavior have been empirically studied by comparing national 
legislative election results in cantons using e-voting with cantons voting with 
paper ballots in two Belgian provinces for the period 1995–2019.
This chapter confirmed previous findings reported in other countries. A 
lower turnout is observed in cantons using e-voting compared to cantons using 
paper voting. In a country where voting is compulsory, and where voting 
TABLE 3.1 Share of split-ticket votes in the 2014 elections (Liège and Limburg 
provinces)
Liège province Limburg province
Paper voting (%) E-voting (%) Paper voting (%) E-voting (%)
Federal – Regional 3.91 1.50 2.37 1.63
Federal – European 6.42 5.17 7.90 7.40
Regional – European 4.15 4.87 9.07 7.08
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participation remains very stable across election years, a difference of turnout 
of about 2% is an important phenomenon. It is also interesting to notice that 
we do not observe that the negative impact of e-voting on turnout dimin-
ished over time in parallel with voters’ increasing familiarity with e-voting 
and increasing digital skills. Turnout remains lower in cantons using e-voting 
in recent election years.
In parallel, this chapter also acknowledges that – in line with a second 
hypothesis – a smaller share of invalid votes is observed in cantons using 
e-voting. Even if this is explained by the fact that the voting machine does not 
allow voters to express a null vote (only blank votes are allowed), the impact of 
e-voting is stronger than the indirect effect of compulsory voting, i.e. a large 
share of invalid votes in observed in countries using this voting feature. In a 
next step, a comparison with countries presenting similar characteristics (i.e. 
e-voting and compulsory voting) such as Ecuador or Peru would help us vali-
date these findings for the Belgian case.
Contrary to the first two hypotheses, we do not witness a higher share of 
split-ticket votes in cantons using e-voting. On the contrary, there are propor-
tionally more split-ticket voters in cantons using paper voting, probably due to 
the fact that these voters had separate paper ballots in hand while e-voters faced 
different screens on the same voting machine. More work is needed to inves-
tigate this issue and a comparative study of the impact of unified vs. separate 
ballots and e-voting is welcome. Finally, as the number of split-ticket votes has 
a direct consequence on election results and on party vote shares, the indirect 
impact on e-voting needs to be further investigated. Differences in party vote 
shares may not only be the consequence of the cantons’ sociodemographic fea-
tures but also on the (higher) incentive for voters to express split-ticket votes in 
cantons using paper voting.
Notes
 1 The first trials took place in the United States in 1974 and in India in 1982.
 2 In their study of US elections, Ansolabehere and Steward III (2005) found out that the 
variation of the share of residual votes depends not only on the type of voting technol-
ogy but also on the type of elections (presidential, gubernatorial or senatorial).
 3 Even if it is possible to manipulate the system in a specific way to cancel the vote (see 
the complex procedure in Pilet et al., 2019).
 4 To my knowledge, there are no works investigating the impact of e-voting on voting 
behavior in Belgium.
 5 A system of optic scanning of paper ballots was also tested in two cantons (Chimay and 
Zonneke) between 1999 and 2003, while a system of computer-assisted counting system 
of the paper ballots has been used in 35 Flemish and Walloon cantons between 2012 and 
2018.
 6 In Brussels, all municipalities use e-voting and a large majority of municipalities use it in 
the Antwerp and Flemish Brabant provinces. In the other provinces, the e-voting is not 
used (provinces of Namur and Walloon Brabant) or used in only a handful of municipal-
ities (provinces of Hainaut, Luxembourg and East- and West-Flanders).
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 7 For the 2019 legislative elections, six additional municipalities decided to move to 
e-voting, while four other municipalities merged, slightly skewing the balance in favor 
of e-voting for these elections.
 8 On the contrary, past analysis of invalid voting in local elections in Wallonia indicated 
no significant differences between paper voting and e-voting (Dandoy, 2014). This is 
probably related to the political offer (i.e. there are many more parties and candidates 
in national elections compared to the local ones) and de facto to the size of the ballot 
paper.
 9 For instance, for the 2014 federal elections in the Liège province, the parties PTB and PS 
scored better in e-voting cantons (+5.6% and 4.76%, respectively) while the parties MR 
and cdH obtained a lower vote share in these e-voting cantons (−6.06% and −3.75%, 
respectively).
 10 The share of split-ticket voting has been calculated in a conservative way by summing 
the vote share differences between two elections for all parties, divided by two.
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in consociational Belgium
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4.1 Introduction
Representative democracies are under huge pressures due to the growing disil-
lusion toward their institutions and their main actors. Belgium is not an excep-
tion to this general trend in industrialized countries. To face this challenge, 
several scholars and political actors propose to bring citizens back into polit-
ical systems. They intend to foster opportunities for unorganized citizens to 
take part in deliberation about public goods and to influence decision-making 
beyond electoral periods (Dryzek et al., 2019). One of the most popular delib-
erative and participatory innovations is the deliberative minipublic, a generic 
appellation for citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, or citizens’ assemblies 
(Smith, 2009). These forums bring together a group of citizens that deliberate 
on a political issue, listen to stakeholders’ and experts’ testimonies, and subse-
quently formulate a set of policy recommendations. Minipublic participants are 
recruited through a process of random selection to establish a sample of citizens 
with diversified backgrounds (Carson & Martin, 1999).
For decades, Belgium has been described as a copybook example of a con-
sociational State (Deschouwer, 2012; Lijphart, 2012). Elites of each subgroup 
monopolized the governmental decision-making that inhibited the develop-
ment of more direct citizen participation. For ten years, we are nevertheless 
witnessing a remarkable increase of democratic innovations, especially delibera-
tive minipublics. Some pundits have even presented the country at the forefront 
of the spread of participatory and deliberative mechanisms (OECD, 2020). A 
couple of initiatives have attracted a lot of academic and media attention as the 
grassroot G1000 which aimed to gather a thousand people during the politi-
cal crisis of 2011 (Reuchamps et al., 2017) or the Parliament of the German-
speaking community that established a permanent randomly selected assembly 
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(Niessen & Reuchamps, 2019). But is Belgium really exceptional? And if so, 
what makes it exceptional?
This chapter first presents an overview of minipublics that took place in 
Belgium between 2001 and 2019 and discusses the particularities of Belgium 
with respect to deliberative minipublics. We demonstrate that, while Belgian 
minipublics share many common traits with the rest of the world, they are atypi-
cal for two reasons. On the one hand, they tend to be convened at higher levels of 
authority. On the other hand, several cases have recently been institutionalized. 
Next, we suggest explanations that account for this new trend of institutionali-
zation, especially the structural elements and the action of specific groups cam-
paigning in favor of the implementation of minipublics.
4.2  An overview of minipublics in Belgium 
between 2001 and 2019
To capture Belgian particularities regarding deliberative minipublics, we rely 
on an innovative data collection project—the Belgian Minipublics Project 
(BMP)—which documents 43 minipublics that took place in Belgium between 
2001 and 2019 (Vrydagh et al., 2020).1 Although there exist international 
data collection projects on minipublics (OECD, 2020; see also the website 
Participedia), none has successfully mapped cases to a certain completeness.2 
Therefore, we do not have access to data allowing us to compare all the BMP’s 
listed characteristics. The BMP database counts 43 deliberative minipublics 
for the 2001–2019 period. We provide a complete overview of these cases 
in the appendix (Table A.4.1). Our selection criteria, including a minipublic 
in the database, were threefold: (1) participants should be randomly selected, 
(2) the participatory process must feature a deliberative dimension, and 
(3) participants must exclusively be inhabitants of Belgium.3
4.2.1 The design characteristics of minipublics
Minipublics can take different forms with respect to the number of participants 
and the length. Regarding the former, minipublics are often subject to criticisms 
for involving only a very limited number of participants, thereby not constitut-
ing a truly participatory process (Chambers, 2009; Lafont, 2019). As shown in 
Figure 4.1, Belgian minipublics do not escape this criticism as only 2634 people 
in total have fully participated, that is an average of 61.2 participants per pro-
cess (45.9 without the G1000 extreme value). A large majority of minipublics 
(28 cases, 65.1%) gather fewer than 41 citizens. Only ten cases (23.2%) have seen 
between 41 and 100 people deliberate, while only five cases (11.6%) count more 
than 101 participants. A quick comparison with the OECD database seems to 
indicate that Belgium organizes more frequently smaller minipublics (fewer than 
40 participants), but this difference is more likely to be the result of the data collec-
tion process.4 However, one Belgian minipublic stands out due to its attendance: 
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the G1000. With 704 participants, this minipublic has generated a lot of public 
attention and put in the spotlight the ideas of citizen deliberation and random 
selection. Its design was innovative, and, to date, no other cases were imple-
mented on a similar scale. The literature even has created a category in their 
typology of minipublics to capture the G1000 (Setälä & Smith, 2018). As we will 
explain next, this singular case has played a substantial role in making Belgium 
an exceptional country with respect to its minipublics.
Regarding the length, Belgian minipublics do not seem to show exceptional 
characteristics. The literature indicates that the length can vary between one and 
ten days, and even up to 20–30 for Citizens’ Assemblies (Elstub, 2014; OECD, 
2020; Setälä & Smith, 2018). The Belgian case features a similar diversity as illus-
trated by Figure 4.2. Almost half of them (21 cases; 48.8%) last less than three 
days. Whereas minipublics lasting four or five days are less common (five cases; 
11.6%), those lasting six or seven days (i.e. roughly three weekends) are more 
frequent with twelve cases (27.9%). Finally, we count four minipublics that last 
FIGURE 4.1  The number of participants of Belgian minipublics between 2001 and 
2019
FIGURE 4.2 The length of Belgian minipublics between 2001 and 2019
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between eight and eleven days (9.3%), while we did not find the precise length 
of a minipublic that lasted around ten days.
4.2.2 Minipublics’ themes
Minipublics deal with a great variety of topics (OECD, 2020, pp. 73–77), and 
Belgian minipublics make no exception. Figure 4.3 shows a series of broad cat-
egories in which we classified the topics they discussed. The most common 
topic is the territory with 18.6%, followed by the environment with 13.9% and 
health-related issues with 11.6%. Other popular topics consist of generational 
issues5 and mobility (four cases, 9.6% each), the education, and the European 
Union (three cases, 7% each). Three minipublics also feature an open agenda 
(7%). Finally, we see a great diversity (25.3%) of themes ranging from science and 
research or radicalization to consumption and social cohesion.
4.2.3 Level of government
The implementation of minipublics beyond the local level seems at first sight 
unlikely in Belgium. As previously mentioned, the Belgian federal level tends 
to function as an exclusive arena for political elites, wherein the citizens’ direct 
involvement is scarce and discouraged (Deschouwer, 2012). Moreover, the aca-
demic literature points out that minipublics—and other processes of citizen 
participation—tend to be initiated at the local level (Dahl, 1994; Font et al., 2018, 
p. 629; for an exception, see Pogrebinschi, 2013). The OECD report confirms 
FIGURE 4.3 The themes of Belgian minipublics between 2001 and 2019
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this general trend, as a majority of minipublics tend to be carried out at the 
local level: 52% were implemented at the local level, 30% at the regional level, 
15% at the national or federal level, and 3% at the international level (OECD, 
2020, pp. 69–70).6 Yet, despite these international findings, our data demonstrate 
the opposite. Figure 4.4 shows most Belgian minipublics are organized at the 
regional or federal level and deal with competencies belonging to these levels of 
authority.
We distinguish here two variables: the level of government of a minipublic’s 
initiator and the level of authority to which the minipublic’s issue relates.7 Our 
data indicate that only a minority of minipublics involved local authorities or 
issues. Regarding the initiators’ level of authority,8 most minipublics were either 
organized at the regional9 (18 cases, 41.9%) or federal level (7 cases, 16.3%), 
whereas local authorities only convene five minipublics (11.6%). The European 
Union has also organized a few minipublics (four cases, 9.3%), but this finding is 
more likely to be the result of our selection criteria rather than a confirmation of 
our theoretical expectations.10
In addition, most of the issues under deliberation (18 cases, 41.9%) also relate 
to a regional level of authority. The federal level is the second most common 
one with ten cases (23.2%), followed by the local level with seven cases (16.3%). 
Figure 4.5 suggests that Belgian minipublics seem to depart from the general trends 
identified in the academic literature and the OECD’s large comparative study: 
minipublics are not in majority organized at the local level but at the regional level 
and they regularly deal with federal and—sometimes—European issues.
FIGURE 4.4  The level of government of Belgian minipublics’ initiators between 2001 
and 2019
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4.2.4 Evolution of minipublics
When we look at the evolution of minipublics in Belgium in Figure 4.6, we can 
distinguish two phases. First, we see a steady rise of minipublics between 2001 
and 2016. The annual number of minipublics oscillates between zero and four 
and yields an average of 1.6. The second phase—between 2017 and 2019—is 
shorter but features a considerable increase in cases, almost half of the entire data-
base (18 cases, 41.9%). The annual average scores 6.5 and reaches a maximum of 
eight cases in 2017 and a minimum of five occurrences. This two-step evolution 
is difficult to put in a comparative perspective, but the general trend identified in 
the OECD report tends to follow a similar dynamic (OECD, 2020, p. 69).
If Belgium does not seem to depart from the main trends of the OECD 
report regarding the evolution of the number of minipublics organized 
over the years, why is Belgium presented at the forefront of this movement 
(OECD, 2020)? The answer does not lie here in the numbers but in the kinds 
of minipublics that have been implemented since 2019. Indeed, while it is 
complex to categorize minipublics based on ancient original designs, such as 
citizen juries, consensus conference, or planning cells (Elstub, 2014; Setälä 
& Smith, 2018; see Vrydagh et al., 2020 for an example of categorization of 
these models on cases), we are witnessing in Belgium a trend of institution-
alizing minipublics.
On February 25th, the Parliament of the German Community of Belgium is 
the first Parliament to institutionalize a ‘Permanent Citizen Dialogue’ (Niessen 
& Reuchamps, 2019). Next, on December 13th, the Parliament of the Region 
of Brussels Capital and of the Common Assembly of the Common Community 
FIGURE 4.5  The level of authority of minipublics’ issues in Belgium between 2001 
and 2019
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Commission modified their internal regulation to create the Deliberative 
Citizens’ Commissions composed of randomly selected citizens and elected 
representatives (Vrydagh et al., 2021). Finally, the Parliament of the Walloon 
Region has also integrated a Deliberative Citizens’ Commission in their internal 
regulation.11
Besides these initiatives at the regional level, we observe that institutional-
ized minipublics are mushrooming at the local level too, especially in urban 
areas. In the region of Brussels, the municipalities of Auderghem, Brussels 
City, Etterbeek, and Saint-Gilles have institutionalized minipublics in the form 
of Neighborhood Councils that provide advice to the elected council and/or 
comanage processes of participatory budgets. In Flanders, the municipality of 
Mechelen has also institutionalized a Citizens’ Cabinet that provides the city 
council with recommendations.
Belgium is of course not the only place where minipublics are institution-
alized. The city of Madrid institutionalized an Observatorio de la Ciudad in 
which 49 randomly Madrilenian citizens deliberated to send citizen proposals 
on a referendum and to monitor the municipality’s actions (Smith, 2020).12 
Nevertheless, what makes Belgium exceptional is the speed and the range of this 
institutionalizing trend. Whereas other cases of institutionalization tend to be 
singular and isolated, Belgium has seen multiple cases of institutionalization at 
different levels of government in less than three years. Starting from this excep-
tional characteristic, the next section suggests explanations accounting for this 
sudden and broad rise of minipublics.
FIGURE 4.6 Evolution of minipublics in Belgium between 2001 and 2019
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4.3  Dynamics fostering or hindering the 
rise of minipublics in Belgium
At first glance, the development of democratic innovations in Belgium might 
appear surprising. Indeed, citizen participation has been very marginal until the 
beginning of the 21st century due to the consociational nature of the Belgian 
State and the Royal Question trauma. Belgium is typically described as a text-
book example of a consociational State (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2020; 
Deschouwer, 2012; Lijphart, 1968). This kind of political system, relying on 
compromises between elites of all segments of society, has emerged to maintain 
the country united and peaceful, despite its religious, linguistic, and socioeco-
nomic divides. This system is said to be able to secure the State stability as long 
as citizens remain passive and elites govern on their own (Huyse, 1970). A greater 
involvement of citizens would therefore severely complicate the consensus- 
building process and undermine the political stability (O’Leary, 2005). Furthermore, 
the consultation on the return of the King (called The Royal Question) after World 
War II dramatically divided the country between Flemish and Walloon citizens, 
almost leading to a civil war (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2020).
Despite this context, we are currently observing the spread of minipublics, 
and even some cases of institutionalization at the local and regional levels. Two 
crucial elements seem to have shaped the growth of deliberative minipublics 
in the Belgian political system: the progressive construction of a network of 
advocates for democratic innovations and the development of a political offer on 
participatory democracy.
4.3.1 A network of advocates
A network of actors progressively acted as a lobby in favor of opening up the 
political system to new forms of citizen participation. Although this network 
has no formal structure, it grew stronger and larger and contributed to setting 
the issue of participatory and deliberative democracy on the Belgian politi-
cal agenda. A key actor is the G1000 platform, which brings together activ-
ists and academic researchers that are committed to deliberative democracy 
(Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2018). In 2011, this grassroots organization set up 
a minipublic as a response to the political crisis that led Belgium to break 
the length record of a State without a functioning government. Thanks to an 
important communication campaign, with famous public figures as spokesper-
sons such as David Van Reybrouck—author of the book ‘Against the elections’ 
(2013), the G1000 succeeded in attracting a lot of political and media attention 
on the virtues of citizen deliberation and sortition. It acted as a catalyst for a 
group of actors who later formed a network committed to the implementation 
of democratic innovations in Belgium. The platform also counts among its 
ranks important foundations, like the Foundation for Future Generations or 
the King Baudouin Foundation.
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Other foundations and associations are also campaigning for advancing the 
use of minipublics, as La Maison du Peuple d’Europe, Periferia, Présence et Action 
Culturelles, and Reboot Democracy/Agora. Despite the heterogeneous nature of the 
various innovations they promote,13 they contributed to put the notions of public 
participation, random selection, and deliberation on the political agenda. Most 
of these organizations are ‘deliberative activists’, but a blurry line distinguishes 
those that lobby with a benevolent purpose from those that canvass to generate 
revenue. For the last ten years, we are indeed witnessing a significant increase of 
operators (such as Particitiz, CitizenLab, Fluicity, Atanor, Tree company or Tr@me) 
that are specialized in the design and implementation of citizen deliberation 
and are developing a ‘participatory democracy market’ (Lee, 2015; Mazeaud 
& Nonjon, 2018). These businesses’ services entail proposals for organizing a 
one-shot process (e.g. minipublics on a specific issue) and longer processes (e.g. 
participatory budgets of a neighborhood), or for setting up an online platform. 
These informal networks of advocates have played an important role in convinc-
ing a growing number of actors that minipublics are an appropriate solution to 
the malaise affecting representative democracies. They also helped popularize 
in Belgium some international minipublics, such as the Irish Citizens’ Assembly 
(Farrell & Suiter, 2019).
4.3.2  The political offer regarding participatory and 
deliberative democracy
As suggested in our comparative overview, public authorities are the main 
organizers of minipublics. Some political actors and political parties have indeed 
accompanied the development of democratic innovations, including deliberative 
minipublics. This suggests that, despite Belgium’s consociational tradition, polit-
ical leaders have progressively endorsed the development of citizen deliberation 
and participation. As a matter of fact, whereas there were only a few mentions 
of democratic innovations in party manifestos for the 2010 elections, the sub-
sequent manifestos contained significantly more calls for implementing delib-
erative and participatory processes ( Jacquet et al., 2016). This trend was further 
amplified in the 2019 elections, with almost all parties developing proposals to 
increase citizens’ participation in decision-making (Pascolo, 2020). How can we 
explain this evolution?
First, the political system’s consociational nature is declining because the 
Belgian classical segmental divisions (pilarisation/verzuiling) seem increasingly less 
relevant (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2020). Belgian citizens seem less faithful 
to these segments and their traditional intermediate institutions, e.g. the 
Church (Papadopoulos, 2013). Some citizens claim for other models of democ-
racy in which they could be politically active without intermediate institutions 
(Blondiaux, 2008).
Along the same line, political leaders increasingly feel that the electoral 
model of democracy experiences a malaise. Levels of party affiliation are at 
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an all-time low (van Haute & Gauja, 2015), and we observea rise of absten-
tion and blank and null votes (Biard et al., 2019; Pilet et al., 2019), as well as 
vote switching (Talukder et al., 2021), while trust in elected representatives 
is plummeting (Goovaerts et al., 2019). Overall, more citizens are becoming 
dissatisfied with the current system of representative democracy and are call-
ing for alternatives (Caluwaerts et al., 2017). Political elites seem to be aware 
of this dissent and are therefore increasingly seeking to reform the political 
system to create new participation channels (Bedock, 2017). In 1994, popular 
consultations were allowed at the local and provincial level and, since 2019, at 
the regional level. The mushrooming of minipublics also seems to be a way for 
political elites to address citizens’ dissatisfaction. They often evoke the crisis 
of representative democracy as a motive of their organization. As suggested 
by Macq and Jacquet (2020), the leaders of the German-Speaking community 
that established Belgium’s first permanent minipublic fundamentally conceive 
the new institution as a way to restore the broken link between elected rep-
resentatives and the population. They hope that discussions with randomly 
elected citizens will show that making public decision is a complex enterprise 
subject to many constraints, which they think ordinary citizens often fail to 
understand. Accordingly, German-speaking political leaders hope that this 
new assembly will help to restore trust in traditional representative institutions 
and actors.
However, all parties do not have the same attitudes toward randomly selected 
assemblies. In general, left-wing parties tend to be more supportive of these 
reforms (Gourgues, 2013; Herzog, 2016; Lawrence et al., 2009; Lovenduski & 
Norris, 1993; Scarrow, 1999). In the Belgian context, the two green parties 
were among the first to integrate the notion of citizens’ participation into their 
manifestos, as early as the 1990s (Biard et al., 2020). They have since then 
pushed an agenda for democratic reforms through, inter alia, minipublics. They 
were notably the two main advocates for the mixed parliamentary committee 
in the Brussels and the Walloon Regions and they successfully implemented 
these reforms when they joined the government of these two federal entities. 
In regard of these experiences, the multiple institutional reforms toward more 
federalism seem to have opened new avenues for citizen participation and min-
ipublics, because it is easier for smaller political parties to join governmental 
coalition where they can implement their political programs. In Flanders, the 
green political party Groen also tried in 2017 to institutionalize minipublics 
with a Citizens’ Assembly bill, but it was the only party that voted in favor of 
the bill. The lack of support from other political parties does not mean that 
they all, at least explicitly, oppose minipublics. Actually, the whole Flemish 
Parliament voted the same day in favor of a nonbinding resolution asking the 
Flemish Government to engage “in ‘participatory experiments’ and to actively 
include citizens in policy discussion” (Van Crombrugge, 2020, p. 68).
More generally, it is important to underline that contemporary Belgian polit-
ical leaders remain balanced toward the development of democratic innovations. 
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Both qualitative and quantitative research shows that members of the differ-
ent parliaments (MPs) of the country support consultative minipublics ( Jacquet 
et al., 2020; Rangoni et al., 2021). They view these deliberative participatory 
processes to enrich the representative linkage. However, when it comes to deci-
sion-making power, MPs are much less supportive. The very large majority of 
MPs considers randomly selected assemblies should not receive the authority to 
make binding decision. To put it simply, democratic innovations are valuable 
as long as they do not interfere with the power of current decision makers and 
citizens’ voice remains consultative.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter intended to explain the rise of minipublics in Belgium. We first 
described the state of minipublics to identify what makes Belgium exceptional. 
Our comparative overview of 43 minipublics shows that Belgian minipublics 
are similar to the international trends with respect to its design and its topics, 
but they feature exceptional characteristics regarding the level of government 
where they are convened. Despite an unlikely institutional context and the 
assumptions in the literature, only a minority of minipublics were convened at 
the local level, while a majority was organized at the regional and federal levels. 
The most uncommon characteristic is, however, the recent series of institution-
alization of minipublics, which followed an increase in the number of minipub-
lics starting in 2017. Almost half of all Belgian minipublics were implemented 
between 2017 and 2019. The institutionalization trend started in 2018 and has 
seen several institutionalized minipublics at the local and regional levels.
The second part of the chapter aimed to explain this exceptional growth 
of (institutionalized) minipublics. First, we suggest that Belgium has a strong 
informal network of diverse actors that lobby in favor of minipublics. Second, 
we analyzed the public offer of political parties and public authorities. Although 
Belgium is known for its consociationalist system that initially seems incom-
patible with citizen participation, we propound different factors explaining the 
success of minipublics in this unlikely setting. The declining relevance of con-
sociationalism in parallel with declining levels of trust toward institutions and 
politics correlate with the development of a political offer for citizens’ partici-
pation. Furthermore, the recent institutional reforms toward more federalism 
seem to open new venues for minipublics, especially at the regional level.
This chapter primarily sought to open a reflection rather than provide defin-
itive answers. Future research is necessary not only to test empirically these 
hypotheses but also to formulate others. Indeed, we have just scratched the sur-
face of the explanations of the rise of minipublics in Belgium. Among other 
potentially relevant explanations, we could have mentioned the role of public 
officials who were involved in a minipublic organization and became convinced 
by the process and are now canvassing in their own administration and political 
cabinets. The notorieties of international minipublics, like the Irish Citizens’ 
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Assembly or the recent French Climate Convention on the Climate, have shown 
Belgian leaders and citizens that minipublics could be implemented on salient 
and sensitive political issues at a high level of government. Finally, while we 
welcome projects of cross-country data collections, we also want to call for data 
collection projects that seek to list exhaustively minipublics in one country. Such 
databases are crucial if we aspire to conduct more in-depth comparative analysis 
between countries and to explore in more detail how different countries contrib-
ute to the global rise of minipublics.
Notes
 1 We adopt a three-level methodological approach to identify minipublics. First, we 
searched on the Web and in the national, regional, and local media with a series of 
terms related to minipublics. Second, we sent a list with our cases to Belgian municipal-
ities, practitioners, and scholars specialized in participatory and deliberative democracy 
to consolidate our list and find other cases that we may have missed. Finally, we sent 
our cases’ descriptions to minipublics’ organizers and initiators in order to be sure that 
everything was well reported. The database of  Vrydagh et al. (2020) ends in 2018, so we 
completed it with the data of 2019 for this chapter. We do not include cases from 2020 
because the COVID-19 prevented the start or the continuation of several minipublics.
 2 For instance, the impressive OECD data collection has identified only four cases of 
minipublics in Belgium between 2001 and 2019, whereas the BMP project has listed 
35 cases matching the OECD’s selection criteria.
 3 As a consequence, we do not consider deliberative minipublics organized by inter-
national organizations, such as the European Union, that involve citizens from other 
countries.
 4 During our data collection process (Vrydagh et al., 2020), we have realized that small 
and—often local—minipublics tend to go under the radar. It is thus likely that a larger 
cross-countries data collection project does not have the resources or the local knowl-
edge necessary to spot these less reachable minipublics.
 5 Generational entails issues such as the youth or the elderly.
 6 As we previously pointed out, the proportion of minipublics at the local level is likely to 
be larger because it is more difficult to find them.
 7 For instance, the Walloon regional Parliament initiated the minipublic ‘Quelle Europe 
pour demain’ (2017) during which citizens deliberated on the European Union. This 
case thus belongs to the European category.
 8 This thus excludes the eight minipublics initiated by the civil society. The percentage 
displayed in this section is based on the entire population of the database.
 9 Regional authority consists of the regional authorities of Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels, the 
communitarian authorities of the French- and German-speaking communities, and the 
provinces.
 10 We selected minipublics whose participants were exclusively inhabitants of Belgium.
 11 Walloon Parliament, “Modification du Règlement du Parlement de Wallonie visant à 
consacrer la constitution de commissions délibératives entre députés et citoyens tirés au 
sort”, approved on October 28 2020.
 12 The Observatorio de la Ciudad has, however, been dismantled in early 2020 by the next 
right-wing local government (La Vanguardia, 2020).
 13 Some organizations, such as Kayoux, promote the random selection of candidates on local 
elections lists and the organization of citizen panels at the local level, while others, such 
as the political party Agora, organize regional minipublics to address recommendations to 
the Brussels Parliament. There are also organizations, like the Burgerlobby, that advocate 
for the institutionalization of minipublics and the end of the Belgian coalition system.
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 14 The first round of the permanent Bürgerrat had 10 meetings. The handover to the new 
one happened on the tenth encounter, and the new Bürgerrat is now meeting again.
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TABLE A.4.1 An overview of minipublics in Belgium (2001–2019)
Minipublic Date Level of authority Participants Length Theme
Quel Brabant Wallon pour demain 2001 Regional 62 3 Territory
Lire dans mes genes 2003 Federal 30 7 Health
Des OGM au champ 2003 Federal 17 2 Environment
Publiek forum—GMOs 2003 Regional 16 9 Environment
Sécurité alimentaire: à quel prix? 2004 Federal 30 2 Food
Panel Citoyen sur les droits des consommateurs 2004 Federal 30 2 Consumption
Meeting of minds 2005–2006 European 21 6 Health
Panel citoyen—Plan IRIS II 2006 Regional 30 4 Mobility
J’inspire ma Ville… Bruxelles Capital Santé 2006 Regional 21 10 Environment
Nos campagnes, demain en Europe 2006 Regional 35 6 Territory
Citizens’ perspectives on the Future of Europe 2007 European 132 3 European Union
Burgerconventie—Auto en gezondheid 2007 Regional 224 1 Mobility
World Wide Views 2009 International 100 1 Environment
European Citizens’ Consultation in Belgium 2009 European 49 2 European Union
Citizen Visions on Science, Technology and  
Innovation
2009–2010 European 11 2 Sciences and  
technology
Radioactive Waste Management Plan 2009–2010 Federal 32 6 Environment
G1000 2011–2012 Federal 704 9 Open agenda
Notre future 2013 Federal 24 6 Generational
Labocitoyen 2014 Federal 32 9 Health
G100 Grez-Doiceau 2014 Local 50 1 Open agenda
Parlement Citoyen Climat 2015 Provincial 33 6 Environment
Ouderpanel 2015–2016 Regional 22 6 Education
Climacteurs 2015 Regional 55 1 Environment
Excellence de l’enseignement en débat citoyen 2016 Regional 24 6 Education
Canal Citoyen 2016 Local 30 1 Territory
Thrivin




We are Molenbeek 2017 Local 112 1 Radicalization
Panel citoyen sur les enjeux de vieillissement 2017 Regional 27 3 Generational
Panel Citoyen sur l’extension de l’Esplanade 2017 Local 98 1 Territory
Gents Burgerkabinet—mobiliteitsplan 2017–2018 Local @50 3 Mobility
Fabrique de liens Citoyens—Verviers 2017–2019 Local 1 5 Social cohesion
Quelle Europe pour demain 2017 Regional 83 2 European Union
Panel Citoyen sur la petite enfance 2017 Regional 22 3 Generational
Make Your Brussels Mobility 2017 Regional 38 4 Mobility
Conférence du Consensus—Pacte D’excellence 2018 Regional 116 1 Education
Panel Citoyen sur les jeunes en Wallonie 2018 Regional 27 4 Generational
Panel Citoyen sur la propreté publique—Enghien 2018 Local 15 3 Territory
Mon ADN: tous concernés 2018 Federal 29 6 Health
Make My administration 2018 Federal 46 2 Administration
Agora—Assemblée citoyenne sur le logement 2019–2020 Regional 60 7 Housing
Panel Citoyen—SOL Louvain La Neuve 2019 Local 25 7 Territory
Ostbelgien—Bürgerrat 2019–2020 Regional 24 1014 Open agenda
Ostbelgien—Bürgerversalmmungen—Health 2019–2020 Regional 16 4 Health
Agora citoyenne sur la forêt 2019–2020 Provincial 31 6 Territory
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An increasing number of radical right populist parties (RRPPs) got closer to 
power in the last few decades (Biard, 2019a, 2019b; Jamin, 2016). In some cases, 
these parties support or have supported a minority government, such as in the 
Netherlands or Denmark. In other cases, they directly participate or have par-
ticipated in government coalitions, such as in Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Norway, 
Poland, Slovakia or Switzerland. Yet, Belgium remains an exception. Even 
though they have been a strong electoral and political force ever since the early 
1990s, no RRPP has ever exercised power in Belgium, neither directly nor indi-
rectly, from the local to the national level. This situation is particularly striking 
regarding Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, VB), which succeeded in becom-
ing one of the dominant parties in Flanders (Rihoux et al., 2020). This para-
dox between electoral strength and the lack of government participation may 
be explained by the strategies adopted by mainstream parties toward RRPPs. 
In particular, the so-called cordon sanitaire, i.e. the deliberate decision of most 
mainstream parties not to govern with the VB, explain why RRPPs’ electoral 
power has not translated into executive power.
The aim of this chapter is to take stock of the arguments used by mainstream 
parties to justify the cordon sanitaire and question how mainstream parties have 
dealt with RRPPs over the years. Our analysis suggests that Belgian mainstream 
parties are strongly defending the cordon sanitaire principle, based on three main 
types of arguments: value-based, ideology-based and association-based argu-
ments. However, the chapter also indicates that the cordon sanitaire faces great 
challenges that lead to questions about the durability of the cordon sanitaire in 
Belgium over time and, more generally, the durability of disengagement strate-
gies toward RRPPs.
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To this end, the chapter first defines the notion of radical right populism and 
proposes a state of the art of the mainstream parties’ strategies adopted toward 
RRPPs. After some methodological considerations, the chapter develops the 
analysis based on a set of 36 interviews conducted with elected representatives 
and party officials and media archives. Finally, a discussion and some concluding 
remarks are formulated.
5.2  Radical right populist parties (RRPPs) and 
mainstream parties’ strategies toward them
While Kitschelt (1997) wrote in 1997 that RRPPs were politically marginalized, 
RRPPs have since entered a new phase in their development. Today, they not 
only achieve significant electoral performance but they also manage to move 
ever closer to power. After all, in an increasing number of cases, they enter into a 
government and yield executive power, whether at the local, the regional or the 
national level. Moreover, recent research has shown that RRPPs in power are 
not necessarily doomed to failure since they are sometimes able to stay in power 
for several consecutive legislatures (Zaslove, 2012).
The literature has extensively studied the factors of RRPPs’ success (e.g. 
Moffitt, 2016), the history of these parties (e.g. Betz, 2013), their leaders (e.g. 
Pappas, 2016), electorate (Norris, 2005) or policy influence (e.g. Biard, 2020) but 
scholars have paid less attention to the reactions of mainstream parties to RRPPs. 
Because these parties mobilize populism and defend a restrictive position on both 
immigration and law and order issues (Mudde, 2013), they are generally not 
considered to be ‘classical parties’. As such, it would be interesting to study how 
mainstream parties’ position themselves toward these RRPPs.
RRPPs are often considered a threat to liberal democracy (Rummens, 2017; 
Urbinati, 2014) because they disregard the separation of powers or the rights of 
minorities (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013). In spite of the perceived threat RRPPs 
represent, these parties perform well during elections at each level of government 
(Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Rensmann et al., 2017) and become able to – directly or 
indirectly – influence policymaking (Biard et al., 2019; Biard, 2021). Even if they do 
not access power or perform well in a general election, they also become a real elec-
toral threat to mainstream parties, and particularly to right-wing mainstream parties 
(Bale, 2008; Van Kersbergen & Krouwel, 2008), because of their anti-establishment 
stances. Therefore, mainstream parties tend to strategize against RRPPs.
Different political strategies toward RRPPs have been developed by main-
stream parties (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013; Meguid, 2005). These strategies might 
be explicitly adopted in reaction to the parties (such as by using legal tools in order 
to ban a party) and their ideas/policies (such as when mainstream parties co-opt 
RRPP policies). Mainstream parties can either engage or disengage with RRPPs 
(Downs, 2001) (Table 5.1). This means they can co-opt some of their policy pro-
posals and collaborate with them, or they can ignore them, block coalitions and 
adopt legal restrictions (Downs, 2001; Heinze, 2018; Minkenberg, 2006).
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With a ‘disengage strategy’, mainstream parties can first ignore RRPPs. By 
ignoring them, they wish to diminish their legitimacy, making them less attrac-
tive to voters (Downs, 2001). They can either ignore the parties themselves or 
the issues they raise and the positions they take on those issues. Second, they 
can establish a cordon sanitaire, which is an agreement between political parties 
to exclude any form of collaboration with a specific party ( Jagers & Walgrave, 
2007). This means that mainstream parties refuse to govern with RRPPs, they 
refuse to form a minority government with the external support of an RRPP or 
they refuse to cooperate at the legislative level, for example by passing legislation 
thanks to the support of the RRPPs. Traditionally, a cordon sanitaire is decided 
concomitantly with the demonization of RRPPs (Taguieff, 2014). This demoni-
zation discourse helps to justify the cordon sanitaire by framing RRPPs as a threat 
to liberal democracy. Finally, they can enact legal restrictions against them to 
limit their power and influence. For instance, mainstream parties may ask for 
the suspension of the public funding of RRPPs (Cadranel & Ludmer, 2008) or 
RRPPs’ bans (Bale, 2007; Bourne & Casal Bértoa, 2017).
The literature underlines that the electoral consequences of a disengagement 
strategy for RRPPs can be particularly important (Minkenberg, 2006). Such a 
strategy can indeed create an exhaustion effect for the RRPPs’ electorate, lead-
ing it to vote for another party or abstain (Pauwels, 2011).
However, mainstream parties do not just disengage RRPPs. Since the 
end of the 1990s, the presence of RRPPs in Europe has gained acceptance 
(Widfeldt, 2010), and mainstream parties have increasingly adopted strategies 
of engagement toward them as a result. This means they collaborate with them 
by integrating them into the executive or gaining their support from outside 
(in the case of a minority government). This was or still is the case in Italy, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Poland or Bulgaria. Beyond the fact that 
mainstream parties can collaborate with RRPPs, they can also be ‘contami-
nated’ by them (Norris, 2005: 266). This means mainstream parties can co-opt 
RRPPs’ policies without collaborating with them. This contagion effect seems 
to affect parties in opposition more than parties in government (van Spanje, 
2010). In addition, Han (2015: 571) has shown that mainstream parties “adjust 
their positions only when they feel an immediate and direct threat to their 
status in party competition”.
Previous studies have also addressed the consequences of an engagement 
strategy toward RRPPs and suggest that this can diminish the confidence or 
TABLE 5.1 Strategies of mainstream parties toward RRPPs 
(adapted from Downs, 2001; Heinze, 2018)
Disengage strategies Engage strategies
Ignore RRPPs and their policies Co-opt RRPPs’ policies
Cordon sanitaire Collaborate with RRPPs
Legal restrictions
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hope of the RRPP electorate. Indeed, RRPPs traditionally have a weak bar-
gaining position because of their extreme position on the left-right continuum 
(Akkerman & de Lange, 2012). Therefore, such a strategy can also lead to an 
electoral decline for RRPPs. For instance, the integration of the Greek LAOS 
(Laïkos Orthodoxos Synagermos) into the national government in 2011 provoked 
the electoral decline of the party and the development of another RRPP: Golden 
Dawn (Deleersnijder, 2016). Yet, an engagement strategy can also have con-
sequences for mainstream parties, affecting their internal dynamics (Goodwin, 
2011).
Research has shown that the strategies outlined previously are not unique 
and not static: several types of strategies can be adopted, and these strategies 
can evolve (Heinze, 2018). Yet, generally, mainstream parties tend to shift from 
a ‘disengage strategy’ toward an ‘engage strategy’. They hardly ever shift from 
an ‘engage strategy’ toward a ‘disengage strategy’. Mainstream parties can also 
engage with RRPPs for several reasons, including accessing power or adopting 
and fulfilling their own pledges for electoral purposes, in short, for office-seeking, 
policy-seeking and vote-seeking (De Lange, 2012). Mainstream parties thus 
carry out a cost-benefit analysis (van Heerden et al., 2014).
5.3 Belgium: an atypical case
From this state of the art, it is clear that mainstream parties have dealt with 
the cordon sanitaire in many ways. However, Belgium remains an exception in 
several regards when studying strategies adopted by mainstream parties toward 
RRPPs. First of all, Belgium is characterized by a split party system and Flemish 
RRPPs are different from Walloon RRPPs (Istasse, 2019; Pilet et al., 2009). 
Moreover, RRPPs have various electoral destinies in Belgium depending on the 
region in which they develop (Biard & Faniel, 2019; De Jonge, 2020). While 
they achieve important electoral performances in Flanders, they are struggling 
to take off in Wallonia or Brussels. In Flanders, the VB – which is the most sig-
nificant RRPP for several decades – indeed became the second largest party in 
the elections of 26 May 2019 (see Figure 5.1).1 On the contrary, Walloon RRPP 
such as the Front national (FN) or the Parti Populaire (PP) remained marginal-
ized for a long time, before disappearing. For its part, Nation (which still exists) 
has always been marginal and has never succeeded in obtaining a seat in a parlia-
mentary assembly (Dohet et al., 2014: 62–64). This is the reason why this chapter 
focuses on strategies adopted by mainstream parties toward the VB.
The Belgian case is also an exception with regard to the relationship between 
RRPP and power. Contrary to almost all other European countries, no Belgian 
radical right populist party has exercised executive power at any level over years, 
in spite of the fact that the VB performs particularly well in Flanders. It is a para-
dox that is maintained over time – even if the VB has been in significant decline 
for a period of ten years until 2019.2
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Such a paradox can be explained by the exceptionally high level of formal-
ization of the cordon sanitaire in Belgium. Set up in the wake of the municipal 
elections of 9 October 1988, during which the Vlaams Blok (the previous name 
of the VB) made a significant electoral breakthrough, the cordon sanitaire was 
born in Belgium on 10 May 1989, on the initiative of Jos Geysels, Member of 
Parliament and National Secretary of the Dutch-speaking Green Party (Agalev). 
He urged all the mainstream parties to reject any alliance with the VB, at all 
levels of power. The protocol signed at that time specifies that:
The signatories commit their party not to enter into political agreements 
or commitments with the Vlaams Blok, either within the framework 
of democratically elected assemblies at municipal, provincial, regional, 
national and European level, or in the framework of elections at these same 
levels of power.
Even if several of its signatories quickly deny it, the cordon sanitaire will be con-
cluded again between the Flemish parties and later between the French-speaking 
parties, especially after the elections of 24 November 1991, described as ‘Black 
Sunday’ as a consequence of the important electoral performances made by the 
VB. Based on the same text, the cordon sanitaire is deemed to have been main-
tained until today.
Even though the cordon sanitaire has been an active strategy in Belgium for over 
30 years, very little is hitherto known about why mainstream parties support this 
strategy. Based on a qualitative method, this research aims at better understand-
ing how mainstream parties have dealt with the cordon sanitaire over years. 
FIGURE 5.1  Results of Vlaams Belang in the federal elections (Flemish cantons) from 
1978 to 2019
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For this purpose, data are collected both through interviews conducted with 
36 elected representatives and party officials between May 2017 and January 2018 
and the collection of media archives. These data are then subject to a thematic 
analysis after categories and subcategories have been created (Miles et al., 2013). 
The latter make it possible, in particular, to distinguish three types of arguments 
relating to the willingness of political actors to maintain the cordon sanitaire.
5.4 Empirical findings
This section analyzes the extent to which the cordon sanitaire strategy is being 
maintained in Belgium, and what tensions the cordon sanitaire has been fac-
ing since its adoption. The ultimate goal of this section is to better apprehend 
how mainstream parties behave regarding RRPPs in Belgium, and particularly 
regarding VB (Section 5.4.1), and how their strategies have evolved over time 
(Section 5.4.2).
5.4.1 The attitude of mainstream parties regarding VB today
The absence of VB from power since its foundation in 1979 can be understood 
in the light of the cordon sanitaire strategy adopted by mainstream parties more 
than 30 years ago (Pauwels, 2011). Today, the cordon sanitaire still exists to 
prevent RRPPs from exercising power. The interviews we conducted highlight 
three major reasons why mainstream parties – not only from the north (Flemish-
speaking; FL) but also from the south (French-speaking; FR) of the country – 
adopt a disengage strategy toward RRPP, and particularly toward the VB.
First – and maybe the most important one – they deny any collaboration and 
even refuse to acknowledge the proposals made by RRPPs because they con-
sider that the latter are a danger for liberal democracy. These are value-based 
arguments: mainstream parties refuse to engage with the policies proposed by 
VB because they believe these will a priori violate liberal democratic prin-
ciples. It should be noted that one N-VA interviewee (cf. later) recognizes 
the importance of the cordon sanitaire because of the undemocratic nature 
of VB, although this is not the official position of his party. For instance, 
another interviewee from the N-VA states, “in my opinion the cordon sanitaire 
is undemocratic” (N-VA MP [FL], interviewed 12 July 2017). All the positions 
of the interviewees from other parties reflect the official positions of the party 
to which they belong.
Alinea I am not familiar with these law proposals. I have not read them.
(CD&V MP [FL], interviewed 13 June 2017)
We never vote on a text or amendment of the Vlaams Belang. And I 
don’t speak with them. No contacts.
(Groen MP [FL], interviewed 6 July 2017)
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It is not a democratic party. And those who deny human rights in favor 
of a well-found but completely obscure rule like eigen volk eerst are not cor-
rect. And therefore I will not make any agreement with a party that, in my 
opinion, does not belong to democracy.
(N-VA MP [FL], interviewed 4 July 2017)
We have never worked with Vlaams Belang. The MR is a democratic 
party and Vlaams Belang has always been regarded by my party as unac-
ceptable. So we have never… We don’t discuss with them. So let’s be clear. 
We greet them because we are polite, but that is all. So there is absolutely 
no contact, and certainly not on the substance of the subjects.
(MR MP [FR], interviewed 18 May 2017)
Our relations with Vlaams Belang are inexistant. We even do not say 
hello to each other’s. I do not want any contact with Vlaams Belang. No 
contact, even no respect. It is an absolute principle. I do not pay any atten-
tion to their proposals.
(Défi MP [FR], interviewed 1 June 2017)
When they [Vlaams Belang’s elected officials] propose something, it is 
an automatic reject. Because it comes from them. When we receive law 
proposals, my assistant provides me an analysis project by project. He says 
“that party proposes that, that other parties are against, etc.”. However, 
when it comes to the proposals by Vlaams Belang he only says “no com-
ment, we will vote against anyway”. I thus even not receive the analysis 
by my assistant.
(PS MP [FR], interviewed 16 June 2017)
Second, mainstream parties claim that they often refuse any collaboration with 
VB because they consider that their ideas are globally too far from their own 
ideas. Support for the cordon sanitaire is thus also based on ideological concerns.
I have never voted for Vlaams Belang and I do not have any sympathy for 
that party. For me it has always been clear that I wanted to be involved first 
in the Volksunie and, later, in the NVA. I have never been attracted by the 
discourse of the Vlaams Belang. They are too provocative and too racist. 
They go too further.
(N-VA MP [FL], interviewed 15 September 2017)
Third, mainstream parties may agree with VB’s proposal at some occasions 
or, to some extent, their ideas may converge. Yet, they are afraid to be associated 
with that RRPP if they defend a similar proposal. Therefore, on such occasions, 
they refuse to strive for the adoption of that proposal. It results from the fact that 
they fear electors’ reactions. Nevertheless, that third option is usually found in 
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right-wing or center-right political discourse, more than in left-wing political 
discourse. They believe that too close an association with VB might legitimize 
RRPPs claims or might be electorally disadvantageous. Such fears have already 
led to the exclusion of several representatives from their party, such as Jean-
Marie Dedecker or Hugo Coveliers from VLD (the previous name of the Open 
VLD) between 2004 and 2006. Globally, that third element thus has a less strong 
explanatory strength than the first since it concerns a smaller number of parties 
and elected representatives.
Alinea. It is clear that, in some cases, obtaining the support of a RRPP is 
problematic for the adoption of a text because we refuse, of course, any 
assimilation or comparison with them. Therefore if someone says “you 
know, the Vlaams Belang has the same position than you”, it is negative for 
us and, in fine, for the text.
(MR MP [FR], interviewed 18 May 2017)
I think that if the Vlaams Belang proposes a text himself, it is an obstacle 
for us. We cannot defend a proposal made by that party. It is never a pleas-
ure to admit that adopted measures come from the Vlaams Belang. The 
cordon sanitaire still exists.
(CD&V MP [FR], interviewed 8 June 2017)
In some cases, certain issues were never discussed externally precisely 
because they were carried by Vlaams Belang.
(CDH MP [FR], interviewed 29 June 2017)
If the Vlaams Belang addresses an interesting issue, it kills the issue. Even 
if it says the truth. We cannot be aligned to the Vlaams Belang because 
they are considered as lepers.
(previous LDD MP [FL], interviewed 25 July 2017)
The interviews demonstrate that these factors explain why mainstream parties still 
adopt disengage strategies toward VB. Even more, they ardently defend the cordon 
sanitaire principle. Among the parties represented in Parliament and apart from 
RRPPs, only the N-VA does not officially defend the maintenance of the cordon 
sanitaire, even if some of its elected representatives admit that they want it to be 
maintained. Three main types of rationales can be distinguished on the basis of the 
thematic analysis: value-based, ideology-based and association-based arguments.
5.4.2 An ever-increasing challenge to the cordon sanitaire
Despite overwhelming support for the cordon sanitaire, it has been put under 
pressure several times, particularly since the early 2000s and in Flanders. At 
that moment, the VB achieved what was then its best electoral performance, 
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particularly on the occasion of the 2004 regional elections (with 24.0% of the 
votes in Flanders – which remains the best electoral result of its history). In 2004, 
the VB was also convicted by a court on the basis of the law aiming at punishing 
certain acts inspired by racism and xenophobia, as a result of which it decided to 
dissolve and refound itself based on an apparently more smooth and less radical 
discourse.
Four main kinds of pressures – which some consider to be real breaches of 
the cordon sanitaire – emerge from the qualitative analysis of the media corpus. 
These pressures are provoked by different actors, from various parties (including 
among those who officially support the cordon sanitaire), concerning different 
levels of power and intensify over time.
First, while the cordon sanitaire implies not only governing with RRPPs 
but also not passing laws with the support of these parties, some reforms would 
not have been possible without the contribution of VB’s votes. For instance, 
it is the case with the adoption of the special law of 30 January 2004, modi-
fying the size of the Flemish electoral districts for the renewal of the Flemish 
Parliament. On this occasion, a majority of two-thirds of the members of 
parliament was required. Despite the abstention of several members of the 
majority, the text managed to obtain a two-thirds majority and was adopted 
thanks to the indispensable support of both the N-VA and the VB. More 
recently, in December 2019, a VB law proposal was passed in the parliamen-
tary Defense Committee, thanks to the support of N-VA and CD&V. The law 
proposal considered requiring the Minister of Defense to append a report on 
the use of languages in the army to his annual policy note. This vote was made 
possible due to the absence of several MPs. Even if the law proposal was then 
rejected in a plenary session, on 19 December 2019, many observers and poli-
ticians consider this to be a break of the cordon sanitaire.
The second type of tension experienced by the cordon sanitaire relates to 
the formation of electoral alliances with the radical right populist party. In 
2006, in view of the local elections, VB entered into an alliance with another 
party for the first time. This led to the formation of a joint list between the VB 
and VLOTT (which was a splinter group of the VLD) in almost ten Flemish 
municipalities. Also in 2006, the VCD (which was a split from the CD&V) 
also entered into a joint list with the VB in the municipality of Bree. Although 
these electoral alliances performed well in the areas where they run, the VB did 
not manage to join a coalition in any municipality. Moreover, the formations 
that formed an alliance with the VB are particularly marginal. No party with 
representation in a regional or federal parliamentary assembly ever constituted 
a joint list with the VB.
Third, several attempts to involve the VB in the formation of a government 
coalition have been made for more than 15 years. For example, following the 
regional elections of 13 June 2004 – in which the VB achieved a historically 
high score of 24.0% of the cast votes for the election of the Flemish Parliament – 
the VB officials were invited by the informateur Yves Leterme (CD&V) during 
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his consultations in order to form a Flemish government. Although the aim of 
the meeting was more ‘to respect VB voters’3 than negotiate a real government 
agreement with the VB, it marks an important turning point in the relationship 
between the VB and the largest party in Flanders (at that time in a cartel with 
the N-VA). Following the elections of 7 June 2009 and 25 May 2014, the VB 
officials were again consulted by the informateurs, namely Kris Peeters (CD&V) 
and Bart De Wever (N-VA). However, any possibility of cooperation with the 
VB was quickly ruled out.
The breaking of the cordon sanitaire seemed most likely to occur in Flanders 
after the municipal elections of 14 October 2018. During this election, a local 
VB list (Forza Ninove), led by a Flemish MP and senator (VB), obtained 40.0% 
of the votes (15 seats out of 33). The day after the election, Bart De Wever (the 
leader of the Right-wing N-VA) announced that he intended to examine inter-
nally the possibility of forming a coalition with Forza Ninove. However, De 
Wever quickly indicated “that the chances of a successful negotiation between 
Forza Ninove and the local N-VA, after seeing a racist photo circulated by the 
leader of Forza Ninove, were below zero”.4 While the N-VA finally opted for 
the opposition, a coalition without the radical right list was finally formed. The 
cordon sanitaire was then maintained.
During the regional and community elections of 26 May 2019, the question 
of maintaining the cordon sanitaire reappeared. In the aftermath of these elec-
tions, the VB was invited to take part in several rounds of negotiations with 
the aim of forming a Flemish government. Although a coalition between the 
N-VA, CD&V and Open VLD was eventually formed, a coalition involving 
the VB was actually considered. According to Gwendolyn Rutten – then pres-
ident of the Open VLD – the N-VA explicitly proposed to the Open VLD and 
the CD&V to govern together, with the VB.5 Although the liberal’s statements 
are not confirmed within the N-VA, the fact remains that the break of the 
cordon sanitaire never seems to have been so imminent at the Flemish regional 
level.
Finally, more and more elected representatives or officials from main-
stream parties are questioning the very idea of maintaining the cordon sani-
taire. Beyond the N-VA that, officially, has never been in favor of maintaining 
the cordon sanitaire, several voices are indeed being raised within different 
mainstream parties to question it. For instance, on 5 June 2020, MP Hendrik 
Bogaert (CD&V) stated that it was time to get rid of the cordon sanitaire as 
a result of the electoral importance of extremes. According to him, allowing 
VB to participate in a coalition would be the best way to counter extremism: 
“When a party joins a coalition, it is obliged to bring nuances, to put water 
in its wine and to take others into account”.6 Such a discourse can also be 
found on the left of the political spectrum. On 30 August 2020, MP Melissa 
Depraetere (SP.A) indeed said, “For me, the cordon sanitaire should disappear; 
It is a stupid invention”.7 Nevertheless, no party (beyond the N-VA) has offi-
cially questioned the very existence of the cordon sanitaire.
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5.5 Conclusion
Among the many available strategies to deal with RRPPs, Belgian mainstream 
parties have proven to be ardent advocates of disengagement through a cordon 
sanitaire. Even though this strategy has been in effect for over 30 years, the 
analysis indicates that support among mainstream parties remains strong for 
three reasons: most Belgian parties refuse any collaboration with VB because 
they consider that this RRPP is a threat for liberal democracy (value-based 
argument), because VB’ ideas are too far from their own ideas (ideology-based 
argument) and because they are afraid to be associated with VB (association- 
based argument).
However, despite the apparent support for the cordon sanitaire, our analysis 
has also shown that it is increasingly challenged in Flanders. Four types of chal-
lenges have been detected over time. First, some reforms have been made possi-
ble thanks to the contribution of VB’s votes. Second, several electoral alliances 
with VB have emerged. Third, and most importantly, numerous and serious 
attempts to integrate VB within a coalition are multiplying. Finally, the very 
idea of maintaining the cordon sanitaire is increasingly questioned, despite the 
difficulties outlined earlier, both by right-wing and left-wing politicians.
Our analysis thus indicates that Belgium is at a nodal point: as long as the 
cordon sanitaire is being challenged, we can expect changes in the strategy 
adopted by mainstream parties toward RRPPs. The argument made by Heinze 
(2018) according to which mainstream parties tend to shift from a ‘disengage 
strategy’ toward an ‘engage strategy’ is thus not contradicted since the trend 
seems to be moving in that direction. The author indeed indicated that many 
Scandinavian parties not only increasingly adopt RRPPs’ positions but also 
engage in collaboration with them over time. If this is not the case in Belgium 
today, the developments identified through the analysis suggest that this is a 
stage that could also be observed in Belgium in the next few years.
Moving forward, this chapter opens up a double research agenda. On the 
one hand, future research should be devoted, more broadly, to the analysis of 
engage and disengage strategies, with a specific focus on the co-optation of 
RRPPs’ policies by mainstream parties in order to draw up a more complete 
picture of the evolution of the strategies adopted by mainstream parties toward 
RRPPs. This could be done by studying the evolution of parties’ manifestos 
over time. Mainstream parties may indeed copy entire sections of RRPPs’ 
manifestos for electoral purposes without, however, calling into question the 
very foundations of the cordon sanitaire. On the other hand, reactions to 
RRPPs not only come from mainstream parties but are also expressed through 
civil society (Lundberg, 2021). Yet, as underlined by Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), 
too little research has been done to better apprehend how civil society reacts 




 1 Born on the occasion of the national elections of 17 December 1978, the Vlaams Blok 
is an electoral cartel bringing together two parties (the Vlaams Nationale Partij and the 
Vlaamse Volkspartij). That cartel officially became a party in 1979.
 2 In fact, the VB takes a positive turn in 2018, on the occasion of both the municipal and 
provincial elections. Cf. Blaise and Sägesser (2018) and Blaise et al. (2018).
 3 La Libre Belgique, 17 June 2004.
 4 RTBF INFO, 16 October 2018.
 5 Le Soir, 26 June 2020.
 6 De krant van West-Vlaanderen, 5 June 2020.
 7 De Zondag, 30 August 2020.
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BREAKING FREE FROM 
PARTITOCRACY
Do Belgian candidates stand out?
Audrey Vandeleene, Chloé Janssen and  
Maximilien Cogels
6.1 Introduction
Belgium is said to be a textbook example of a partitocracy, that is an extreme 
case of dominance of political parties on all aspects of the social and political 
system (Dewachter 2002; De Winter, della Porta, and Deschouwer 1996a; 
Steyvers 2014). This happens through patronage in parliament, public admin-
istration, the judiciary, and even in civil society (de Visscher 2004; De Winter 
2002; De Winter and Dumont 2000, 2006). Hence, one can assert that Belgian 
exceptionalism resides among others in her strong partitocratic nature. Belgian 
parties are powerful actors, if not the most powerful actors of the system (De 
Winter, della Porta, and Deschouwer 1996b). But is it exceptional compared to 
other partitocratic countries?
Scholars point at the decreasing legitimacy of the partitocratic system, and 
of political parties in general (Mair 2013; Rahat and Kenig 2018), as attested by 
declining trends in party membership (van Haute et al. 2013), higher levels of 
electoral volatility (Dassonneville 2018), and the rise of parties with renewed 
organizational structures or ideology (Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Mazzoleni and 
Voerman 2016). One may then wonder whether these weakened party organiza-
tions still manage to hold a strong control on their representatives or if politicians 
are nowadays more often allowed to break with their party line. Building on the 
(contested) personalization thesis (Balmas et al. 2014; Karvonen 2010), this chap-
ter proposes to disentangle parties’ grip on a particular group of political elites, 
the candidates to elected office.
Candidates are key political actors, first during the campaign, then as rep-
resentatives once elected (André et al. 2017). Electoral candidates embody the 
party (Katz 2001) from the moment they have been officially selected by party 
selectorates (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Yet this is not to presume that candidates 
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are left loose in the wilderness, free of their acts and speech. What we want to 
unpack in this chapter is the extent to which candidates report being free from 
their party grip, to highlight the exceptional nature of Belgian partitocracy. This 
chapter assesses the leeway let to Belgian candidates in terms of campaigning 
and representational style compared to three other partitocratic regimes: Italy, 
Greece, and Portugal. We conduct our research using the large longitudinal data 
set of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS).
We proceed as follows. The first section reflects on the candidate-party linkage 
and presents our research question: (when) do candidates in partitocratic regimes 
break free from their party? We then build several hypotheses based on the 
literature. Thereafter, we present our large data set and discuss the operation-
alization of our variables. We continue with a comparative descriptive analysis 
across countries before studying the determinants of Belgian candidates’ inde-
pendence more specifically in a multivariate fashion. We conclude by discussing 
Belgium’s presumed exceptionalism regarding its partitocratic nature.
6.2 Theoretical framework
It has been demonstrated that the idealistic view of a political party as a unitary 
actor does not hold (Tavits 2009). Parties strive to reach and maintain cohesion 
but they remain a collection of individuals, be them MPs, party members, or 
electoral candidates, who may sometimes be hard to discipline (Carey 2007). To 
avoid disunity, parties may ask their folks to sign a pledge where they commit 
to the party ideology and rules, for instance, a charter for members to sign upon 
reception of their party card, or when selected as candidates (Aylott, Blomgren, 
and Bergman 2013; Cordero and Coller 2015; Gauja 2010).
But still, party headquarters cannot avoid individualistic behaviors from 
their candidates. At campaign time, candidates meet “potential voters face-to-
face on market squares, through visits to companies, at social events, or simply 
through knocking on their front doors” (Zittel and Gschwend 2008, 978). 
Parties simply cannot control whether all candidates stay neatly on the party 
line. Nonetheless, candidates might have incentives to follow the party line to 
fulfill their political ambitions. Different goals mark politicians’ parliamentary 
career. In this regard, (re)selection and (re)election are crucial because they 
directly pave their way to elected assemblies (Hazan 2014; Strøm 1997). These 
goals shape to some extent candidates’ incentives to please (or not) the party 
leadership. Hence, the question we ask is: (when) do candidates in partitocratic 
regimes break free from their party?
Primary explanations for candidates’ role conception have been found in 
macro-level variables and notably the electoral system (Zittel and Gschwend 
2008). The latter strongly determines the incentives for candidates to culti-
vate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995). For instance, contexts of intra-
party competition where candidates need to distinguish themselves from their 
co-partisans to get elected generate greater incentives for candidates to play the 
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personal rather than the party card toward voters. Since electoral success can 
be measured individually, candidates will make their best to garner the most 
personal votes.
The Belgian electoral system both hinders and stimulates candidates’ inde-
pendence toward their party. On the one hand, the flexible list system is nor 
a candidate nor a party-centered system. Contrary to single-member district 
(SMD) systems where a single candidacy per party per district puts these at the 
forefront as the sole figure of the party (Grofman 2005), group-based behav-
iors are more common in list systems. But on the other hand, the preferential 
voting system allows voters to assess candidates on an individual basis (Zittel and 
Gschwend 2008). Belgian voters can convey an individual preference for one or 
several candidates, which encourages candidates to cultivate a personal vote as 
opposed to PR closed list systems where candidates are assessed en bloc (Carey 
2007; Cordero and Coller 2015).
However, scholars report that macro-level variables do not have a causal 
effect on candidates’ independence toward their party but form the setting 
allowing candidates to break more or less free from it (Zittel and Gschwend 
2008). Candidates’ independence is rather determined by parties’ or individuals’ 
characteristics. Hence, large variations are expected even within partitocratic 
regimes.
This chapter investigates the factors affecting candidates’ incentives to break 
free from their party within a partitocratic context. Although our overarching 
hypothesis is that Belgian candidates stand out in a limited way given the strong 
party control, we still expect to find differences between candidates based on 
several party- and individual-level variables.
At the party level, party ideology is expected to favor or hinder candidates’ inde-
pendence and this for two main reasons. First, an ideology encompasses a set of 
values and principles which may impact candidates’ role conception and behav-
ior during the campaign (Close 2018). Second, it often shapes how the party is 
structured: the dispersion of power within the organization and the degree of 
freedom let to candidates are likely to vary along with ideology. Regarding val-
ues, rightist candidates are expected to cherish the values of individualism and 
reject any form of regulation, and leftist candidates would favor collectivism and 
group-based solutions (Coffé and Reiser 2018). Importantly, Close and Nuñez 
(2016) argue that one cannot reason linearly along the left-right spectrum since 
major differences have to be pinpointed in the organizational traditions of par-
ties that do not follow this logic. They encourage party families-based studies to 
investigate party cohesion.
Liberal parties are expected to favor candidates’ independence due to their 
lighter organizations and their lack of strong guidelines (Enyedi and Linek 2008). 
At the opposite, radical right parties are expected to have very few independent 
candidates due to their strong hierarchical organizations favoring order and dis-
cipline (Mudde 2007). Green parties are said to offer a weakly hierarchical struc-
ture and promote values of self-fulfillment and self-affirmation, encouraging 
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candidates’ independence (Close 2018). Yet their stances against individualism 
and their collective decision-making mode of functioning downplay the expec-
tation that Green candidates would show independence (Rihoux and Frankland 
2008; Talshir 2002). This implies that leftist party families are expected to apply a 
stronger grip on their candidates, as opposed to rightist families, with the excep-
tion of the radical right parties. Our first hypothesis therefore stipulates that:
H1: Candidates are more likely to break free from their party in rightist 
party families, except for radical right families.
A second party-factor refers to candidate selection procedure. Considering that can-
didates aim to get (re)selected (Strøm 1997), they need to please the selectorate 
(i.e. those who decide who gets selected). In a partitocratic context, we expect 
party headquarters not to value independent lone wolves but rather to prefer 
group-players who they can easily coordinate (Hazan 2014). Accordingly, when 
candidate selection is organized at the central party level (e.g. the party board), 
candidates would have stronger incentives to play collective than when the deci-
sions are taken at the constituency level where party selectorates would not be 
able to ensure party discipline as much (Cordero and Coller 2015; Zittel and 
Gschwend 2008). In the same vein, candidate selection procedures involving 
many selectors, i.e. inclusive selectorates, are expected to stimulate candidates’ 
independence, as opposed to exclusive selectorates (a small group of selectors like 
a list committee) who are more able to guarantee cohesion and discipline (Key 1964; 
Kristjánsson 1998). Building up on this, we hypothesize that:
H2: Candidates are more likely to break free from their party when candi-
date selection procedures are decentralized and inclusive.
Third, the size of the party in the constituency is likely to influence candidates’ 
independence from their party. In constituencies with a large district magni-
tude (i.e. the number of seats at stake in the district), candidates face many con-
tenders within their party and party magnitudes (i.e. the number of seats won 
by the party) are likely to be higher. As Renwick and Pilet (2016) indicated, 
one expects preference votes to be more determinant for candidates’ election as 
party magnitude increases, because the system gets more ‘open’. Candidates are 
therefore more likely to cultivate a personal vote as district (and, thus, party) 
magnitude increases (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). Yet, we know that 
very few candidates manage to break the rank order in the Belgian national 
context (Vandeleene, Dodeigne, and De Winter 2016). Nevertheless, beyond 
determining who is getting elected, attracting a large share of preference votes 
is a signal to selectorates that the candidate may be entitled to climb the ladder 
of the electoral list in the next election (André et al. 2017). When party mag-
nitude is smaller, on the contrary, preference votes may signal popularity to 
the selectorates but are not likely to help candidates be elected. Research has 
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demonstrated that when party magnitude is low, voters are less keen on casting a 
preference vote as opposed to a list vote (André, Wauters, and Pilet 2012). Given 
the effect of preference votes on candidates’ reselection and election, we expect 
a mechanism according to which when party size in the district increases, the 
likelihood of receiving preference votes follow suits, as well as the chances that 
preference votes will boost electoral success. The incentives for candidates to 
break free from their party are therefore greater when party size is larger. Based 
on this, we hypothesize that:
H3: Candidates are more likely to break free from their party when party 
size in the district is large.
Next to party-level variables, we expect independency to be encouraged by indi-
vidual-level factors, i.e. the characteristics of the candidates themselves. First, 
their political experience and the subsequent linkage to the party matter. We expect 
incumbent MPs to be more likely to behave independently from their party. As 
detailed by Zittel and Gschwend (2008), incumbents can indeed rely on critical 
resources to organize their campaign, like their personal staff or network. We 
also expect them to be more confident in their capacities to be popular among 
voters. On top of that, incumbents are de facto more well-known by voters given 
their ongoing political career and their access to the media. These elements lead 
us to assume that incumbents will be keener on playing their individual card.
Yet political experience has not always been flagged as influential in deter-
mining independence (Cordero and Coller 2015). Tavits (2009) argues that 
it is not parliamentary experience that matters but rather local experience. 
Local incumbents (e.g. mayors) enjoy a strong local base, making them less 
dependent on the party for their local political career. If they are active at the 
local level only, they may be less socialized with the functioning of the party at 
the national level and, henceforth, be less likely to follow the national party’s 
guidelines. In the same line, we may expect incumbent MPs not to deviate 
from their party rules since they are often themselves part of the party elite 
and set these rules (Zittel and Gschwend 2008). Hence, although incumbent 
MPs have the means to break free, they do not per se wish to do so because of 
a greater sense of loyalty toward their party. This mechanism is likely to be 
similar for candidates who are involved in the party as an organization. We 
expect that holding a mandate within the party increases candidates’ loyalty 
and reduces independence. These considerations lead us to a twofold hypothe-
sis covering the party-candidate linkage.
H4a: Candidates are more likely to break free from their party when they 
hold an elected mandate at the local level.
H4b: Candidates are more likely to break free from their party when they 
do not hold a party office.
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Electoral popularity and even more electoral security are important incentives for 
candidates to free themselves from the party. If candidates believe that their 
chances to get elected are high, they will be more likely to enter in a personal 
relationship with voters. As argued by Zittel and Gschwend (2008), this would 
especially be the case when the victory margin is narrow, similar to a horse race 
“which engages everyone involved to an increasing degree the closer it gets” 
(p. 984). To mobilize the small percentage of votes who could secure their elec-
tion, these candidates will behave more independently. At the opposite, when 
candidates know that the battle is lost, their incentives are rather to be loyal to 
the party to please the selectorate for reselection.
H5: Candidates on a hopeful list position are more likely to break free from 
their party.
Finally, we assume that candidates’ ideological preferences may also be predictors of 
their independence. Candidates who are more distant ideologically from their 
party are expected to be more independent than candidates more in line with the 
party ideology (Zittel and Gschwend 2008). The loyalty to the party is indeed 
likely to be influenced by the degree of agreement between the candidates and 
their party’s policy preferences, or the ideological congruence (Lesschaeve 2017).
H6: Candidates are more likely to break free from their party when they 
are ideologically incongruent with their party.
6.3 Empirical strategy: data and method
6.3.1 The candidate surveys
Our analyses rely on the CCS, a large international project surveying legisla-
tive candidates just after the elections on matters of campaigning, policy issues, 
representation, or their political and personal background. Extracting a subset 
of this extensive database, we grouped four partitocratic countries: Belgium, 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal (De Winter, della Porta, and Deschouwer 1996a). 
Other countries that could be considered partitocratic (e.g. Spain or Austria) 
have not been included due to data availability. Our data set covers one election 
in each country, and 1.789 candidates in total (see Table 6.1).
6.3.2 Variable operationalization
6.3.2.1 Dependent variable
To capture the independence of candidates toward their party, we selected three 
variables accounting for candidates’ campaigning and representational style. 
We propose two dependent variables to measure the former. The first variable 
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concerns the personal campaigning resources (i.e. tools that aim to promote the 
candidate rather than the party) used by the candidates. This allows us to grasp 
the extent to which the party allowed the candidate to run a personal campaign. 
Our variable personal campaign resources has been constructed by taking the sum 
of the personal campaigning tools used by candidates. This includes personal 
campaigning posters, personal ads in the newspapers, personal flyers, personal 
website, and having individual meetings at home or drop-in offices. The varia-
ble ranges from 0 (i.e. the candidate did not use any of these tools) to 5 (i.e. the 
candidate used all of them).
Further than the practice of the campaign, the CCS also asked candidates 
more theoretically about the primary aim of their campaign. The question takes 
the form of a scale ranging between 0 (which depicts that candidates wanted to 
attract as much attention as possible to them selves as candidates) and 10 (which 
refers to candidates who tried to attract as much attention as possible to their 
party).
Candidates’ representational style is determined based on three questions ask-
ing how MPs should vote (1) if their opinion diverges from the opinion of their 
voters; (2) if the opinion of their voters diverges from their party’s position; and 
(3) if their opinion diverges from their party’s position. We built a dichotomous 
variable where 1 represents the party delegates, i.e. candidates whose choice is 
to follow the party in any case ( Janssen, Chiru, and De Winter 2018).
6.3.2.2 Independent variables
We expect first party-level variables to affect the propensity of candidates 
to be independent from their party. The variable party ideology has been 
constructed based on how candidates position their party on the left-right 
scale. We consider the average position of all candidates from the same party. 
We added a dummy for the radical right parties, based on the party brand. 
Second, the degree of inclusiveness of the candidate selection process has been 
operationalized to keep two categories: exclusive (e.g. party leader) vs. non-
exclusive (including nomination by party delegates or all members of the 
party). For the degree of centralization, we built two categories (centralized 
for a decision at the party level and decentralized for the constituency level). 
Third, the party magnitude refers to the number of MPs elected within the 
TABLE 6.1 Number of candidates by country
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party list in a given district. This accounts for the size of the party within 
the district.
We also include individual-level variables. Candidates’ local experience is a 
dummy variable, with 1 indicating that the candidate holds a local office at the 
moment of the election or held it in the past. The party mandate variable flags 
candidates who have ever worked for the party (at the local, regional, or national 
level, for instance, as a chair or a secretary of a party’s section). The hopeful list 
position, a position on the list with high chances of being elected, has been cal-
culated based on the current election (t). It can indeed be argued that most can-
didates, who were elected in an election, were located on a hopeful list position. 
We finally measure the ideological congruence between candidates and their party 
on the 0–10 left-right scale. We computed the absolute difference (own position 
minus party position) of both scales to create a new variable. A value close to 
zero means that the candidate and the party are perfectly aligned. In each model, 
we control for candidates’ gender, education (university degree vs. no university 
degree), and age.
6.4 Empirical analyses
6.4.1 Bivariate analyses: do Belgian candidates stand out?
Do candidates in partitocratic countries stand out from their party? We aim to 
compare Belgian candidates to their counterparts in other partitocratic regimes. 
We start by comparing the means for the first two dependent variables to investi-
gate potential differences in candidates’ campaigning style (see Table 6.2).
In Belgium, candidates use on average about three personal campaigning 
resources, which is relatively similar to Greek candidates. However, the mean 
is considerably lower in Italy and especially in Portugal. Hence, Belgian (and 
Greek) candidates tend to be more likely than Italian or Portuguese candidates 
to promote their own person during the campaign. Differences in the means are 
significant (p = 0.00).
We now turn to the primary aim candidates give to their campaign. The 
higher the score, the greater their aim to attract attention to the party rather 
than to themselves. Here, candidates in general assert their aim is to give more 
TABLE 6.2 Description of candidates’ campaigning style across 
countries (µ (N))
Personal campaign resources Primary aim of campaign
Belgium 3.07 (595) 7.18 (641)
Greece 3.30 (175) 5.84 (175)
Italy 2.17 (573) 6.60 (651)
Portugal 0.92 (185) 8.53 (188)
Total 2.50 (1528) 6.96 (1655)
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attention to the party (with a general average of 6.96 out of 10). Belgian candi-
dates stand above this general average (7.18) but below Portuguese candidates. 
While Greek and Belgian candidates had a similar use of campaigning resources, 
we find stronger differences here as Greek candidates are less likely to assert that 
the aim of their campaign is to promote the party. Here again, differences across 
means are significant (p = 0.00).
Our third dependent variable is an indicator of candidates’ representational 
style. Table 6.3 shows the distribution of this variable across countries. Belgium 
is the only country for which the proportion of party delegates (34.8) is greater 
than the total proportion of party delegates for all countries (26.3). This points 
that Belgian candidates are more likely to assert that they will follow their par-
ty’s opinion within parliament than candidates in Greece, Italy, or Portugal. We 
note that the proportion of party delegates is particularly low in the latter (17.5). 
Hence, expected party discipline within the parliament appears to be particularly 
strong in Belgium compared to other countries.
To summarize our descriptive findings, we can say that Belgian candidates do 
not seem to stand out as such compared to their counterparts in other partito-
cratic countries when it comes to their campaigning style. However, we see that 
they strongly differ to other candidates when it comes to their representational 
style, as they are more likely to act loyally to their party in the deliberative pro-
cess within parliament.
6.4.2  Multivariate analyses: (when) do Belgian candidates 
break free?
We now focus on the Belgian candidates and build explanatory models to uncover 
why they may break free from their party. The models depicted in Table 6.4 are 
based on the dependent variables related to candidates’ campaigning style. The first 
model uses candidates’ personal campaign resources as dependent variable while 
the second uses the primary aim of the campaign. Since the dependent variables are 
continuous, we ran linear regressions.
Our first model captures the personal focus (vs. party focus) of the campaign 
resources used by candidates. The underlying assumption is that the more diverse 
the set of personal campaigning resources, the more likely it is that candidates put 
TABLE 6.3 Distribution of party delegates across countries, N (%)
Party delegates
NNo Yes
Belgium 302 (65.2) 161 (34.8) 463 (100.0)
Greece 148 (75.9) 47 (24.1) 195 (100.0)
Italy 507 (75.5) 165 (24.5) 672 (100.0)
Portugal 212 (82.5) 45 (17.5) 257 (100.0)
Total 1.169 (73.7) 418 (26.3) 1.587 (100.0)
Note: Pearson chi2 (3) = 28.9091, p = 0.000.
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the focus on their own image rather than the party’s. Results indicate that several 
party-level variables have an influence on candidates’ campaign resources. The 
more rightist the ideology of candidates’ party, the more personal campaigning 
tools candidates use. However, candidates running for a far-right party are less 
likely to use several personal campaigning resources compared to other candi-
dates. This is neatly in line with our expectations (H1), and the effect is particu-
larly important when it comes to a far-right party ideology. Then we do not 
find a significant impact of candidate selection methods on the outcome variable 
(H2). Our third hypothesis (H3) suggested a link between party size and candi-
dates’ independence that seems to be confirmed: the higher the number of seats 
won by the party in the constituency, the more likely it is that candidates used a 
larger set of personal campaigning resources.
Considering individual-level variables, we see that incumbency either in 
local or party office does not significantly affect candidates’ use of personal 
campaign resources. We need to reject our fourth hypotheses (H4a and H4b). 
Our results then show that candidates occupying a hopeful list position are 
more likely to use a diverse set of personal campaigning resources than other 
candidates, which is in line with our fifth hypothesis (H5). Finally, we do 
not see any significant relationship between candidates’ congruence with their 
party and their likelihood to break free from the party in terms of personal 
campaign resources (H6).
TABLE 6.4 The determinants of Belgian candidates’ campaigning style, B(se)sig
(1) (2)








 Inclusiveness: non-exclusive 0.035 (0.106) 0.276 (0.204)
 Centralization: centralized 0.306 (0.234) 0.453 (0.390)
 Party magnitude 0.106 (0.023)*** −0.201 (0.069)*
Individual-level variables
 Incumbency local office 0.270 (0.185) −0.434 (0.405)
 Incumbency party office −0.013 (0.192) −0.890 (0.531)
 Eligible list position 1.055 (0.242)*** −0.575 (0.611)
 Ideological congruence 0.115 (0.088) −0.159 (0.165)
Control variables
 Gender: male








 _cons 1.981 (0.523)** 8.242 (0.503)***
 N 172 178
 R2 0.301 0.256
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the party level. ^p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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The second linear regression model uses candidates’ primary aim of the 
campaign as dependent variable. Higher values on the dependent variable indi-
cate that candidates aimed to attract more attention to the party than to them-
selves during the campaign. This model somehow brings similar results as the 
first model when we analyze the direction of the coefficients; however, only a 
few of our independent variables show to have a statistically significant effect 
on the outcome variable. At the party level, only party magnitude appears to 
have a statistically significant effect on candidates’ conception of the primary 
aim of the campaign. Results indicate that the higher the party magnitude, the 
less likely it is that candidates conceive the aim of the campaign as promoting 
the party. This confirms our third hypothesis (H3). None of our individu-
al-level variables seem to significantly explain candidates’ conception of the 
primary aim of the campaign. Considering the control variables, the level of 
education and candidates’ age do, however, matter for the aim of the campaign. 
The less educated and the older candidates favored the party more than them-
selves during their campaign.
We now turn to the determinants of candidates’ representational style. Results 
depicted in Table 6.5 highlight the determinants of candidates’ likelihood to 
conceive their role as that of a party delegate. Results of this model are, however, 
disappointing in terms of statistical significance since none of our independent 
variables have a statistically significant relationship with the outcome variable. 
Besides, the pseudo R2 indicates that the proportion of the variance explained by 
the model is really low (about 4%).
6.5 Discussion and conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to assess whether Belgian candidates stand out in the 
partitocratic context of Belgian politics. Given the supremacy of Belgian politi-
cal parties on a variety of matters, one would expect electoral candidates not to 
be able or entitled to break free from their own party. Are candidates allowed 
to portray themselves individually by using personal campaign resources like a 
personal website or conducting individual meetings at home? To what extent 
do candidates report having run a campaign centered on themselves rather than 
on their party? Do they expect to always follow the party official position when 
acting as representatives? Based on a large international candidate survey (CCS), 
we investigated these questions and mapped out two main elements.
First, we compared Belgian candidates and their counterparts in other parti-
tocratic regimes to evaluate Belgium’s exceptionalism. We assessed that Belgian 
candidates differ from their Greek, Italian, and Portuguese counterparts but 
not always in the same direction. The party grip in terms of the forecasted loy-
alism in parliament is stronger in Belgium compared to the other partitocratic 
countries, while the leeway for Belgian candidates is relatively large when it 
comes to campaigning style. Belgium thus appears to be exceptional among 
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partitocratic regimes when it comes to behavior in parliament but not in terms 
of campaigning style. Party discipline is deeply entrenched in would-be poli-
ticians’ minds.
Second, we strived to explain the determinants of Belgian candidates’ inde-
pendence toward their party. Our regression models show that a series of party 
and individual variables matter to explain whether a given candidate will stand 
out. Yet, we find explanations for campaign-related models and not so much for 
the model uncovering representational style. Our findings demonstrate a pro-
pensity to behave independently in rightist parties (but not in radical right ones), 
when the party is more successful in terms of number of seats in a constituency, 
and also among candidates on hopeful list positions.
What our results display is a certain degree of heterogeneity, both between 
and within countries. There are clearly cross-country variations, so that we 
cannot say that all partitocratic regimes function the same. Every country is 
kind of exceptional in its own way. The partitocratic power might translate 
differently from one partitocracy to the other. In Belgium, it is party disci-
pline in parliament that seems to be prevalent over a party-driven mode of 
campaign. We also conclude that within Belgium, the story varies. Although 
Belgium is considered a system where parties are extremely powerful, the 
same mechanisms do not play in all contexts. We importantly uncover party 
differences along their ideology and size. We also find differences between 
TABLE 6.5 The determinants of Belgian candidates’ 
representational style, B(se)sig
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Note: Standard errors are clustered at the party level. ^p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 
0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Breaking free from partitocracy 105
the candidates depending on their electoral security. One therefore cannot 
assert that all parties in a partitocratic regime hold a strong control over their 
folks, and not all candidates are in the same boat. Some take or receive more 
freedom to cultivate a personal vote while others remain under the thumb 
of their party.
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COALITION FORMATION IN 
BELGIUM
From exceptional complexity 
to regime breakdown?
Lieven De Winter and Patrick Dumont
7.1 Introduction
The New York Times reported that on Sunday January 23, 2011, 34,000 Belgians 
marched the streets of Brussels under the banner “Shame. No government, great 
country” (Castle, 2011). Defying the normal conventions of protest politics to 
try to get rid of a government, this was a public outcry to the political class to 
finally form a government, 255 days after the May 13, 2010 general elections. 
Belgium was well on the way to break the world record of government formation 
duration, with 354 days record hitherto held by Cambodia. Eventually, with 541 
days, that record was pulverized by the installation of the Di Rupo government 
on December 5, 2011.
In West European comparative perspective, Belgium is indeed an exceptional 
case in terms of coalition formation: high or even record values are reached 
regarding the classic determinants of government formation complexity (such 
as number of players, uncertainty and information scarcity), the structure and 
features of the cabinet formation process (e.g. institutional constraints, long for-
mation duration) and its outcomes (“irrational” coalition composition, extensive 
coalition agreements). These core features of the bargaining process affect the 
life of coalitions, in terms of government duration, intra-cabinet conflictuality, 
policy inertia and ineffectiveness.
This chapter presents the Belgian case on all these coalition formation and 
functioning core variables in comparative West European perspective. We find 
that on most of these independent and dependent variables of the chain of coali-
tion formation (see Figure 7.1), Belgium scores record-breaking values, or at least 
is one of the top three “performers”.
Our theoretical framework draws on the comparative projects of Strøm, 
Müller & Bergman that by now empirically embrace the 1945–2019 period in 
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Western as well as Eastern and Central Europe (hereafter C1, C2, C3 and C4)1 
and updates and extends our previous work on the Belgian case. We also inves-
tigate whether these exceptional government formation features impact citizens’ 
trust in politics and satisfaction with democracy, eroding the legitimacy of the 
wider political system and fostering its disintegration.
7.2  Bargaining complexity and information 
uncertainty, causes and consequences
We define bargaining complexity as the difficulty of finding a coalition of parties 
that would make a viable coalition government. Complexity increases when 
actors involved in the formation of a government face a high number of viable 
coalition outcome “resolutions”. These outcomes comprise (1) the partisan com-
position of the coalition; (2) the results of policy negotiations, usually contained 
in a coalition policy agreement and (3) the distribution of ministerial portfolios 
and other key positions (e.g. chairpersons for the assemblies, EU Commissioner). 
Obviously, ceteris paribus, the fragmentation of the parliamentary party system 
boosts bargaining complexity, in an exponential manner.2
After the 1999 elections, which led to a new peak in the fragmentation of seats 
among parties in parliament, no less than nine different coalitions were at the 
same time clearing the following formal and informal constraints: (1) winning 
more than 50% of seats in the federal parliament; (2) based on a majority of MPs 
in each language group and (3) symmetrically composed, i.e. each linguistic 
component of a “party family” was part of the potential coalition (Dumont, 
2011). However, some of these informal composition constraints have been 
relaxed in most of the governments formed since 1999. Thus, in 2019, with 4,095 
coalitions numerically possible given the parliamentary seat distribution (2,021 
of which are winning), bargaining complexity has probably never been higher.
Research on coalition bargaining has highlighted a second factor which is 
likely to delay cabinet formation duration: information uncertainty. Rather than 
being involved in a bargaining game where all players have complete informa-
tion over the preferences and strategies of the others, in practice, party lead-
ers face a much messier reality. These actors are often not transparent in their 
preferences, and change their preferences during the formation. Elections are 
being particularly disruptive in terms of vital information (Diermeier & van 
Roozendaal, 1998); whereas party leaders gradually learn about preferences and 
FIGURE 7.1 Cabinet formation, determinants and effects
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strategies of government partners and opposition parties in day-to-day legislative 
work, parties come to elections with new platforms and demands; furthermore, 
they undergo changes in size in accordance to their electoral performance; in 
addition, the heat of the campaign may have polarized positions and (internal) 
rivalries and disappointing results may also provoke a change of leader to repre-
sent the party in government formation talks.
Especially after high-volatility elections, uncertainty would plausibly be 
high. In periods of high electoral stability, a party can be more easily be per-
suaded to enter a coalition (Strøm, 1990): all else equal, the less party lead-
ers have to worry about possible repercussions in future elections, the more 
willing they will be to reach an (coalition) agreement, which under other 
circumstances would have appeared too risky. In periods of high electoral 
competitiveness, the bargaining situation is made more complex by the fact 
that the ratio of instant office rewards to deferred electoral costs may be lower 
or more uncertain, given the long-term trend that governing parties increas-
ingly tend to lose more votes than opposition parties (Narud & Valen, 2008). 
Thus, when parties tend to focus on vote-seeking rather than office-seeking 
strategies (Strøm & Müller, 1999), one would expect more bargaining rounds 
and longer periods of negotiation. Finally, Strøm (1994) also argues that party 
preferences and strategies may also not be stable throughout the formation 
process. Thus, although a longer formation process may be needed to gather 
new information, its very length may also bring new uncertainty by causing 
preference changes within and across parties at the bargaining table.
Information uncertainty is thus conceptualized separately from bargaining 
complexity. In a three-party system where any two-party coalition is a winning 
formula, it will be more difficult, ceteris paribus, to form a government right after 
an election than midway in the legislative term.
The interaction of high bargaining complexity and high information uncer-
tainty leads to the most difficult circumstances in which coalition governments 
are to be formed. In this chapter, we analyze whether this core relationship is 
true, concentrating on the Belgian case in comparative perspective. Figure 7.1 
depicts how we extend our analysis from this initial link between complexity 
and uncertainty with coalition formation (in dark grey) to the study of coalition 
governance and stability (in light grey), and to the likely societal causes and con-
sequences (in white) of the often assumed exceptionally difficult job of forming 
and maintaining governments in Belgium.
Our expectations are, in line with the existing literature, that high party frag-
mentation results from a high number of societal cleavages. Combined with the 
uncertainty of (especially disruptive) elections, this bargaining complexity would 
lead to more failed attempts to reach the final coalition solution and thus require 
longer formation durations (De Winter & Dumont, 2008). In turn, we expect 
that high complexity due to party system fragmentation will also be associated 
with a high number of coalition parties that end up governing. The more par-
ties in government, the more likely these will have different policy preferences 
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and incentives to deviate from what was discussed at the time of government 
formation or even to leave the coalition once their preferred legislation has been 
passed. To avoid such “opportunistic” behavior, formateurs will seek to build 
credible commitments among parties in the form of comprehensive coalition 
agreements. The comprehensiveness of these documents, and therefore also their 
size, is likely to increase with the level of distrust among actors involved. Since 
distrust is linked to information uncertainty, we thus expect that in terms of 
the functioning of coalition, both high bargaining complexity and uncertainty 
will also lead to, ceteris paribus, longer coalition agreements (see Müller & Strøm, 
2008). We document these links in the following section of the chapter.
Moving to the right hand side of Figure 7.1, and to the third section of this 
chapter, we argue that, because even comprehensive coalition agreements are 
“incomplete contracts” and because exogenous events may force coalition part-
ners to take decisions on issues that were not anticipated at the time of govern-
ment formation, the large number of coalition parties – and its related greater 
array of policy preferences – will lead to higher intra-cabinet conflictuality and/
or policy inertia and ineffectiveness, eventually making for shorter cabinet dura-
tion. Finally, in the conclusion, we investigate whether these latter three dys-
functions in particular could spill over into the political culture, producing low 
trust in political institutions, dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy, 
erosion of the legitimacy of the entire political system, fostering its instability 
and even potentially triggering its breakdown.
7.3  Cleavages, party fragmentation, multilevel 
politics and electoral volatility
Our empirical analysis puts the Belgian case in comparative perspective, focusing 
on Western Europe.3 Given that party system fragmentation is a crucial deter-
minant of bargaining complexity, the period under study starts in 1978, with 
the split of the last traditional unitary party, the Belgian socialists (PSB-BSP). It 
ends with the formation of the (exceptional) De Croo seven-party coalition on 
October 1, 2020. Throughout the chapter, our empirical analyses mostly draw 
on the data that was collected with the framework of not only C1, C2 and C4 
(2021) but also other comparative datasets, some of which may refer to a longer 
time period or, on the contrary, not cover the full 1978–2020 time span.
As seen earlier, the distribution of seats between parties has a direct effect on 
the total number and the number of potential coalitions that would reach more 
than 50% of seats in parliament and thus make for a viable, majority-supported 
government. Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) Effective Number of Parliamentary 
Parties (ENPP) is the operationalization most often used in comparative pol-
itics to measure party system fragmentation. It takes into account the number 
and the size of parliamentary parties and thus reflects the bargaining complex-
ity concept introduced earlier. In the period under consideration, Belgium is 
the record holder of the average party system fragmentation measured by 
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Laakso-Taagepera’s ENPP (in the Chamber of Representatives). It also holds the 
highest level of fragmentation ever recorded in Western Europe: after the 2019 
elections its ENPP peaked at 9.7.4
Another way of looking at the difficulty of forming a coalition is to look at 
the relative size of the largest party in parliament. Across Western Europe, that 
party is indeed expected to play a prime role in coalition formation. Sometimes 
the constitution recognizes the leader of that party the right to “make the first 
move” (Bäck & Dumont, 2008), that is, to invite other parties to negotiate a 
coalition together. The smaller the largest party, the more contested its status 
as first formateur, and the more partners it will need to coalesce with to reach 
a majority, thereby making coalition formation more difficult. Throughout the 
period 1978–2014, Belgium was the Western European country with the lowest 
average number of parties that received more than 15% of the vote in an election 
and thus had the smallest number of “major parties” (Siaroff, 2019: Table 2.1), 
and that in 1999, even its largest party had not reached that 15% threshold.5
What brings about this high level of party system fragmentation? Aside from 
the effect of electoral systems (Duverger, 1950), the most pertinent determinant 
of the format of party systems is the number of cleavages in society, as defined 
by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there is no 
authoritative comparative research on the number of relevant cleavages in West 
European democracies. According to Lijphart’s (1999) subjective and unsystematic 
attempt, Belgium is one of the very few plural, in the sense of deeply divided, West 
European countries. However, Taagepera and Grofman (1985) claim that there 
does exist a direct and simple mathematical link between the number of cleavages 
and the ENPP. The formula would be ENPP = n cleavages + 1. If they are right, 
with an ENPP fluctuating between 6.8 (1978) and 9.7 (2019), no less than six to 
eight cleavages would have been relevant in Belgium in the last 40 years.
This seems hard to reconcile with common ways of counting cleavages in the 
Belgian polity (De Coorebyter, 2008), which records three traditional cleavages: 
the first being religious (Church/State), the second socioeconomic (left-right) 
and the third linguistic (Flemish vs francophones). The different components 
of what makes for a more recent cleavage in Western Europe, summarized as 
the Green-Alternative-Libertarian vs Traditionalist-Authoritarian-Nationalist 
divide by Hooghe et al. (2002), do also need to be taken into account. And, 
rather than counting the linguistic cleavage as one of those present in the Belgian 
party system as a whole, one could consider the latter as made of two different 
party systems (one Flemish and one Francophone one), each with its own cleav-
age constellations. In the Francophone party system, we would find the Church/
State (or liberal vs traditional values opposition of the GAL-TAN cleavage), the 
economic left-right and the environment vs productivism cleavages. The cosmo-
politan vs nativism cleavage is not politicized given the absence of a successful 
far right francophone party, nor the Flemish vs francophone divide as all fran-
cophone parties endorse the institutional status quo regarding devolution. In the 
Flemish party system, we find the same cleavages as in the South but we need 
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to add the Flemish vs francophones cleavage (ranging from moderates to separa-
tists, which can also be seen as a “super cleavage” over the “Belgian system”, see 
below) and the cosmopolitan vs nativism divide politicized mostly by the Vlaams 
Belang. Altogether then we would arrive at eight cleavages politicized in the 
Belgian party systems: five in Flanders and three in Wallonia.
In addition to its effect on the number of cleavages that are pertinent for the 
representation of parties in the federal parliament, Belgium’s linguistic community 
divide has also led to the construction of a multilevel political system. The latter 
has not only increased complexity of reaching an agreement at the bargaining table 
through the higher number of parties that is necessary to build a federal government 
(at least four) but has also increased information uncertainty. Through constitutional 
reforms since the 1970s, leading to the regionalization of most federal competences 
and the transfer of most public resources, the lack of hierarchy of norms and the 
holding of direct elections to regional parliaments, the regional and community level 
is now considered at least as important as the federal level (Reuchamps et al., 2017).
The addition of elections at the regional level, the territorial unit where par-
ties are organized, with the formation of regional and community executives 
at stake, has triggered more information uncertainty for cabinet formation and 
maintenance at the federal level. First, in those regional elections, the main par-
ties in each linguistic community have from 1995 onwards waged a fierce compe-
tition to become the largest party in seats in their regional parliament. Contrary 
to the federal level, the King plays no constitutional role in regional government 
formation; hence, the largest party is the natural formateur at that level. This bat-
tle for regional leadership has enhanced volatility, especially in Flanders where 
no less than four parties have become the leader in seats in one decade. Second, 
party leaders who negotiate for their party at both the regional and federal level 
have by now been socialized in this new, regionalized context where a political 
career in one’s own region is equally prestigious as one at the federal level. The 
gradual emergence of this new generation caused misunderstandings and mistrust 
among long-standing coalition negotiators in the 2007 government formation. 
Third, the empowerment of regional institutions and actors have contributed 
to the drifting apart of the Flemish and Francophone civil societies allowing 
the Flemish nationalists to transform the nebulous thesis of segmented pluralism 
(Lorwin, 1971) into the deception of “two democracies”, two nations growing 
apart but held prisoner in an artificial state.6 Fourth, regional elections have not 
only contributed to building regional identities but have also tended to radical-
ize party positions on the linguistic/community divide as leaders only appeal to 
voters from their community. The 2007 government formation was again a case 
in point but, by the 2019 elections nearly half of the Flemish voters opted for the 
two parties (N-VA and VB) that strive for Flemish independence, and thus the 
demise of the Belgian political system/state. When anti-Belgium-system parties 
become relevant in coalition bargaining at the federal level, uncertainty is bound 
to rise as mainstream parties are unlikely to know their true objectives and strat-
egies. For instance, the N-VA, considered by about all other Flemish parties as 
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“coalitionable”,7 could in principle profit from at least two diverging strategies: 
either joining a federal coalition in exchange for major institutional concessions 
toward more Flemish autonomy, or, sabotaging for months the formation of a 
coalition without them, thus showing that the Belgian (federal) system is ungov-
ernable and thus should be abandoned all together.
In addition to increased uncertainty at the federal bargaining table when 
regional elections have been organized on the same day as the federal elections 
(1995, 1999 and 2019) and government formation at different levels were interre-
lated, regional elections also made federal coalition maintenance (and following 
federal coalition formation) more difficult when the elections were not synchro-
nized: heated campaigns among parties at one level affected the internal cohesion 
and work of coalition governments at another level, and the formation of coa-
litions with different partners across levels both accentuated coordination prob-
lems between interregional and federal decision-making (Deschouwer, 2012), 
eventually also blurring responsibility given that often all parties were in power 
at least at one level, a point we come back to later when exploring the conse-
quences of Belgium’s complex governance system on public opinion.
In terms of information uncertainty then, even though overall electoral vol-
atility in Belgium was lower in the period than where the old party regime was 
blown away by newcomers, it has been higher than the West European average 
(Caramani, 2015; Siaroff, 2019) with peaks in 1981, 1991, 1999, 2003, 2010 (and 
2019) followed by elections with greater stability. Also, even if it was not as abrupt 
as in some other countries, the electoral decline of mainstream parties (Christian 
democrats, socialists and liberals) was dramatic, from a combined share of votes of 
78% in 1978 to 45% in 2019. This means that especially for those parties, which 
were still the core actors of all coalition governments in the period, government 
participation has increasingly become a serious electoral risk, often paid cash in 
votes at the next elections. As a result, mainstream parties have become ever more 
cautious when underwriting compromises in the bargaining process.
Finally, in addition to party leaders becoming increasingly socialized and polit-
icized in separate arenas, information certainty increased due to changes of party 
leaders during periods of government negotiations. Comparative research shows 
that short experience as a party leader results in lengthier and more failure-ridden 
bargaining periods (Ecker & Meyer, 2020). For instance, at the time of formation 
of the De Croo government in 2020, only two of the eight party leaders who 
signed the coalition agreement had led their party in the 2019 electoral campaign.8
7.4 Formation process and outcomes features
The previous section has shown that Belgium was exceptional in terms of bar-
gaining complexity in the period under study, and that information uncertainty 
had also been high because of the relevance of the linguistic/community divide 
and the need to form federal coalitions with parties that compete (mostly) within 
their own community. A first consequence of the combined effect of those 
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characteristics is its record-long government formation duration: for postelection 
cabinets in Western Europe 1945–2016, it took on average 104 days, a record held 
together with the Netherlands. However, the 2019–2020 government formation 
lasted 493 days, so Belgium would hold the European record of average duration 
of formation, as the Rutte III cabinet of 2017 took “only” 225 days to form. In 
any case, the European record of the longest single formation is also Belgian, 
with the infamous 541 days to form the Di Rupo government (2010–2011).
Simply put, this exceptionally long formation process is due to the large number 
of failed bargaining attempts. Often a set of parties start bargaining, but after some 
weeks or months, they realize that no coalition policy compromise is possible. 
Belgium holds the West European record in this regard as well, with close to three 
failed attempts before succeeding in forming a government in the 12 post-electoral 
formations since 1978. It took for instance no less than eight attempts to arrive 
at a viable coalition formula and coalition agreement for the Di Rupo coalition 
(2011–2014), and even 13 attempts for the 2019–2020 formation (Sägesser, 2020).
Belgium is the record holder on those two features reflecting the difficulty of the 
formation process because the combined effect of the bargaining complexity and 
information uncertainty factors described earlier largely determine the types of for-
mation outcomes those processes would lead to. One of those outcomes is the size of 
the cabinet in terms of number of coalition partners, for which again Belgium scores 
highest in Western Europe: considering coalition cabinets only, the average num-
ber of cabinet parties in Belgium since 1970 sits at 4.54, the highest, with Italy and 
Finland coming second and third, with, respectively, 4.32 and 4.07 cabinet parties.
Another outcome, and additional cause for long formation duration, is the 
level of care that partners give to the policy agreement that seals their deal. 
Coalition agreements are the result of negotiations where each partner comes 
with its own policy demands and are likely to require several sessions to arrive at 
compromises, especially when a large number of sometimes quite ideologically 
distant parties are at the bargaining table. In the 1945–1998 period, Belgium had 
the longest government agreement (Martens VII in 1988 – known as Martens 
VIII in Belgium’s usual counting – 43,600 words), and also the highest average 
in Western Europe (14,180 words). Even though the Di Rupo and Michel agree-
ment surpassed that earlier record (53,000 and 57,100 words, respectively), in the 
following period some countries started drawing even longer agreements, and 
Belgium had some surprising short ones. Taking this period as a whole, Belgium 
would now rank third in Western Europe with over 20,000 words for 24,000 
words for Germany the new record holder.9
7.5  Government formation, outputs, 
outcomes and their effectiveness
Coalitions that contain many parties are delicate constructions that take a long 
time to form but can be easily be destroyed. Despite comprehensive agreements, 
programmatic disputes between parties are usually at the heart of intra-cabinet 
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conflicts during the life of government (Damgaard, 2008). Also in Belgium the 
main reason for cabinet termination is conflicts between coalition parties (19 
out of 43 governments in the 1946–2019 period). In terms of actual government 
duration, Siaroff’s (2019) data put Belgium second after Italy (with 13 months 
and 17 months, respectively), while C4-data rank Finland second and Belgium 
third.
Long formation durations and short-lived governments do not give much 
time for government to prepare, pass and implement effective policies. Dandoy 
and Terrière, in this book, investigate the growing occurrence and length of 
caretaker cabinets in Belgium, which are (or at least are expected to be) rela-
tively impotent governments given their restricted decision-making capacity 
(Ecker & Meyer, 2020). But even for fully empowered and thus viable gov-
ernments, the need to contain coalition conflicts and the difficulty to change 
the policy status quo have had consequences for effective decision-making and 
policy innovation.
The high number of coalition partners has led to the adoption of a wide variety 
of conflict solving mechanisms, some of which are time consuming (Kerncabinet, 
confessionals, party summits, cabinet committees and inter-cabinet work-
ing groups, etc., see De Winter, Timmermans, & Dumont, 2000; De Winter 
& Dumont, 2021) and slow down decision-making. Sometimes compromises 
are only found by paying off the conflicting demands of all coalition parties, 
by awarding extra expenditures to each party “clientele” (cfr. the mega deals, 
“pacts” concluded on the denominational, economic and institutional divide). 
This method became burdensome for public finances since the economic reces-
sion of the late 1970s.
Coalitions counting usually four to six parties tend to write coalition policy 
agreements in which, for each and every policy issue, a coalition compromise 
position is formulated that is situated somewhere close to the average positions 
of coalition parties. In Belgium, this has often resulted in a position that is close 
to the one of the median position of parties represented in parliament: that of 
the (Flemish) Christian democrats (De Winter & Dumont, 1999). An excep-
tion was the Verhofstadt I six-party coalition that adopted a different, gener-
alized exchange (uitruil) strategy, due to the large programmatic heterogeneity 
of the liberal, socialist and Green party families (Dumont, 2011). The par-
ties followed the logic of “policy territories”, where liberal views were mostly 
reflected in the tax reform plans, socialists influenced mostly the social policy 
areas, and Greens could make their imprint on transportation and energy, and 
each party family received ministerial remits accordingly. Overall, the much 
more usual logic was to find a median compromise for an overall centrist coali-
tion, which led to policies that were not only close to the Christian democrats’ 
habitual positions but also to those of the previous governments, thus barely 
moving from a status quo position. On the one hand, this logic assured policy 
stability, but on the other hand, it led to policy inertia, and thus suboptimal 
effectiveness.
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In fact, the difficulties of forming and maintaining Belgian coalition gov-
ernments have affected the effectiveness of their policy outputs and outcomes. 
A general longitudinal and comprehensive indicator of good governance is a 
state of healthy public finance, in terms of the size of the national public debt 
(Tarek & Ahmed, 2017). In 1993, in the run up to the Maastricht Treaty con-
version norms, Belgium public debt reached an unedited Eurozone record of 
nearly 140% of GDP, beating even Italy. Its public debt to the 1989–2019 period 
stands at 110%, behind Italy (113%) and Greece (121%).10 Regarding the size of 
the shadow economy (undeclared economy in percentage of GDP), Belgium was 
bypassed in 2000 and 2016 by only three West European countries: Portugal, 
Italy and Greece.11 Finally, rankings provided by Transparency International on 
the perception of (political) corruption show that until 2000, Belgium was per-
ceived to be among the most corrupt country in the EU, and clearly the most 
corrupt amongst countries that do not belong to Southern Europe (De Winter, 
2002). However, since 2001 the country’s position gradually improved. In 2011 
and 2019, Belgium was surpassed by not only Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece 
but also by Ireland and France.
A contemporary sectorial snapshot indicator of good governance is the success 
of a country fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. There is some discussion about 
the validity of the figures published by national governments in terms of cases 
detected, successfully treated and mortal casualties. One of the most comprehen-
sive measure is the “excess deaths” or “excess mortality rates”,12 i.e. the number of 
deaths per 1,000 inhabitants from all causes during a crisis above and beyond what 
we would have expected to see under “normal” conditions (Checchi & Roberts, 
2005). Regarding the peak months (March and April) of the first wave of the 
pandemic, Belgium had the highest excess rates after Spain and Italy, compared 
to the 2016–2019 averages.13 Thus, it does not come as a surprise that Belgians 
were little satisfied (57%) with the measures the government had taken so far 
(end of April 2020): only Italians, Frenchmen and Spaniards were less satisfied.14
Regarding citizens classic political support attitudes (van Ham & Thomassen, 
2017), however, generally Belgium scores around West European averages. The 
nine European Social Surveys (2002–2018) indicate that Belgians have compar-
atively (EU) a bit more than average trust in politicians and in political parties 
but a bit less trust in parliament, the legal system, the police and the national 
government. Also satisfaction with the way democracy works in one’s country 
is below average. Thus, we do not find really “exceptional” averages in the lon-
gitudinal comparative perspective. However, this does not exclude extreme low 
values for some indicators at a particular moment. For instance, in the aftermath 
of the Dutroux and dioxin affairs, satisfaction with democracy had dived under 
the traditionally pathologically low score of 20% of Italy. But it fully and swiftly 
recuperated toward a more average position in Western Europe.15
Finally, support for political actors, institutions, processes, policies, principles, 
ideas and values, etc., are all components of the overarching but fuzzy con-
cept of “political legitimacy”, the degree of how power is used in ways that 
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citizens consciously accept. There is a general presumption that a legitimacy 
crisis may trigger the replacement of a dysfunctional regime by an unaccept-
ing society (van Ham & Thomassen, 2017). The concept is, however, hard to 
measure (Weatherford, 1992). To our knowledge, only Gilley (2006) made an 
empirical, multidimensional study of state legitimacy in the late 1990s and early 
2000s for 72 states. Gilley (2006, p. 501) defines legitimacy as a degree: “a state 
is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding 
and exercising political power”. Amongst West European democracies, Belgium 
enjoys the lowest degree of state legitimacy except for Italy and Greece (Gilley, 
2006, p. 514).
Thus, overall, we do not find much of a link between the levels of institu-
tional performance and popular political support in Belgium (Magalhães, 2017). 
Conjecturing that this lack of an expected relationship is part and parcel of 
Belgian exceptionalism would probably go a bridge too far however.
7.6  Discussion and conclusion: a truly 
exceptional and explosive case
Despite truly exceptional and potentially explosive societal characteristics (num-
ber of cleavages and the linguistic/community divide in particular) that lead 
to extremely difficult cabinet formations and maintenance of governing coa-
litions, the degree of the Belgian “malgoverno” (Heylen & Van Hecke, 2008) 
as reflected by political instability or policy outputs and outcomes need to be 
relativized when compared with other West European countries. Some Belgian 
political personnel “genie” might be credited for that better-than-expected per-
formance given preexisting conditions. But the state of domestic politics and the 
economic performance of other European countries obviously also affect the 
relative ranking of Belgium on corresponding indicators. In addition, Belgium 
also had some “lucky” episodes where policy inertia turned out to be preferable 
to actual choices due to international economy circumstances (Albalate & Bel, 
2020).16 But those rare episodes could only be seen as positive in retrospect.
Whether because the Belgian “political genie” is also efficient in terms of 
communication, because of low clarity of responsibility triggered by the lack of 
transparency of a complex system or out of mass public resignation and apathy, 
we do not find much of a relationship between the less than optimal governance 
indicators, trust in institutions, satisfaction with democracy and legitimacy.
Up until now, the blatant legitimacy deficit has not spilled over into citi-
zen behavioral revolt, by a vote empowering antiestablishment parties or mass 
demonstrations. However, it may just become impossible to form a federal gov-
ernment in the near future. At the time of writing this chapter, most Flemish 
parties call for further devolution after the 2024 elections, while most fran-
cophone parties prefer the status quo. In addition to this institutional agenda 
already anchored on the 2024 political agenda, formulating a coalition com-
promise on the unavoidable austerity policies for restoring the economy costs 
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of the anti-Covid emergency measures may be an unsurmountable hurdle for 
any coalition formula. In addition, it is not unlikely that at the 2024 federal and 
regional elections, the separatists parties (VB, N-VA) win a majority of the seats 
in the Flemish parliament, forming an independence-seeking Flemish govern-
ment, while at the same time being able to sabotage the formation of a federal 
government. A new prolonged formation impasse may show that the centrif-
ugal Belgian federal system does not function anymore as a régime capable of 
legitimately governing “two separate democracies”, and should be dumped all 
together.
Notes
 1 C1 = Müller W.C. & Strøm, K. (Eds.). (2000). Coalition Governments in Western Europe. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; C2 = Strøm, K., Müller, W. C., & Bergman, T. (Eds.). 
(2008). Cabinets and coalition bargaining: the democratic life cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; C3 = Bergman, T., Ilonszki, G., & Müller, W. C. (Eds.) (2020). 
Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press; C4 = 
Bergman, T., Bäck, H., & Hellström, J. (Eds.). (2021). Coalition Governance in Western 
Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 2 The number of solutions equals 2n − 1, where n stands for the number of parties repre-
sented in parliament.
 3 We exclude East and Central European democracies given their still unconsolidated party 
system. Also, we exclude Malta (for its lack of coalition cabinets), France (semi-presidential 
system), Cyprus (presidential system) and European microstates. We further exclude Swit-
zerland, a country where the four main parties agreed in 1959 on a more or less propor-
tional “magic formula” that would include them all in subsequent governments.
 4 See: https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/people/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ 
ElectionIndices.pdf.
 5 Putting those two indicators together, Siaroff (2019) developed an Index of Coalition 
Difficulty (ICD) that combines the ENPP with the size in seats of the largest party. The 
higher this value, the assumed greater the challenge of forming a government. Again, 
Belgium has the highest average for Western Europe in the period under study.
 6 Most intra-Belgian comparisons actually do not reveal sharp differences in social and 
political attitudes between Flemish and Walloons (Billiet, Maddens & Frognier, 2006).
 7 And the latter increasingly considers the Vlaams Belang as a potential government part-
ner: in 2019, the formateur party N-VA invited first the Vlaams Belang for coalition talks 
that lasted two months in the regional government formation process before turning to 
the mainstream parties.
 8 The coalition is made of seven parties but Ecolo has two co-presidents.
 9 The Prodi II agreement in 2006 in Italy and the Bettel II in 2018 in Luxembourg 
counted more than 80,000 words. Regarding the average size of the coalition agree-
ments, Germany is now the record holder (the latest two Merkel governments had much 
longer agreements than earlier ones, topping each at more than 60,000 words), followed 
by Austria (the 2017 Kurtz agreement also had close to 60,000 words).
 10 See: https://tradingeconomics.com/portugal/government-debt-to-gdp
 11 See: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/12/13/Explaining-the- 
Shadow-Economy-in-Europe-Size-Causes-and-Policy-Options-48821
 12 Each demise in pensioners homes (the largest sector of casualties) is usually counted as 
a COVID-19 victim, which is certainly an overestimation and more inclusive than the 
way casualties are counted in most other West European countries.
 13 See: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/5/5c/Table_1_Excess_
mortality_indicator_Jan21_update2.png
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 14 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/
public-opinion-in-the-eu-in-time-of-coronavirus-crisis
 15 See: https://www.gesis.org/en/eurobarometer-data-service/search-data-access/eb-trends- 
trend-files/list-of-trends/democracy-satisf
 16 Albalate and Bel (2020) show that the long 2010–2011 formation period led to better 
GDP per capita growth than what would otherwise have been expected.
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8.1 Introduction
Yves Leterme took oath as prime minister of Belgium on 20 March 2008, con-
cluding a political crisis that started almost one year earlier. But the Christian 
democratic leader is not remembered for being the prime minister who managed 
to handle the financial crisis or who failed to reach an agreement on the sixth 
Belgian state reform. He will rather be remembered for an odd record: out of his 
1026 days as Belgian prime minister, Leterme spent more than half of it (59.55%) 
as chief of a caretaker government (cabinets Leterme I and II). This remarkable 
statistic illustrates that caretaker governments are not an extraordinary phenom-
enon in Belgian politics. Instead, they are becoming an integral part of the polit-
ical dynamics in this country.
Caretaker periods mark the transition between the termination of one gov-
ernment and the start of another. If the end of a cabinet and the kickoff of a 
new one are considered goldmines for political scientists working on elections, 
executives and ministerial careers, these intermediary periods did not receive the 
same research attention, however. Literature on caretaker governments is par-
ticularly scarce (Boston et al., 1998; Courtenay Ryals & Golder, 2010; Schleiter 
& Belu, 2015) and comparative works are lacking. Yet, many West European 
countries have witnessed more or less long periods of caretaker governments, 
mostly in-between elections or in relation to government formation. Think, for 
instance, about the political and institutional relevance of caretaker governments 
in Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain in recent years.
But compared to Belgium, these countries compete in the featherweight or 
lightweight categories. Belgium is without any doubt the most famous player 
of the heavyweight category of caretaker cabinets. Between 2007 and 2020, 
Belgium was governed for no less than 1485 days by a caretaker government, 
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which equals to more than four full calendar years. In comparison, Poland expe-
rienced 414 days without a duly mandated government in office between 1991 
and 2008 (Courtenay Ryals & Golder, 2010). The longest episode of caretaker 
government is spread over 597 days (in 2010–2011) in Belgium while the record 
in the Netherlands is ‘only’ of 208 days without a full-powered government in 
1977 (Diermeier & Van Roozendaal, 1998). During this period, Belgium coped 
with the financial crisis and even nationalized banks, went to war with Libya, 
sent humanitarian support to other countries and successfully presided over the 
European council for half a year.
Given its importance in contemporary politics, it is not surprising that polit-
ical science in Belgium is interested in the study of this recurring phenomenon. 
The root causes leading to lengthy caretaker governments are well known and 
covered in the relevant literature. In fact, we are now fully capable of explaining 
why Belgian fights alone in its own category. Yet, we know surprisingly little 
about the actual consequences of these caretaker governments when we look at 
the international scholarly literature. Most comparative datasets simply ignore 
caretaker governments and prefer to focus on the political and policy impacts of 
the ‘normal’ governments. Therefore, in this chapter, we open the black box of 
caretaker governments by investigating their political and policy consequences 
in the Belgian context.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 sets out the definition and main 
characteristics of caretaker governments and gives a brief quantitative account of 
the importance of this political phenomenon in the last two decades in Belgium. 
Section 8.3 investigates the consequences a caretaker government generates for 
the stability and popularity of the sitting cabinet. Section 8.4 analyzes the types of 
actions that caretaker governments can undertake and tests whether the scope of 
actions tends to increase over time. Finally, and based on the detailed analysis of the 
Belgian caretaker cabinets between 2007 and 2020, Section 8.5 discusses the main 
empirical findings that we have brought forward in this chapter.
8.2  Definition and measurement of caretaker 
governments in Belgium
After its resignation or its removal by parliament, an executive is supposed to 
cease its activities immediately. The rationale behind this is that the dismissed 
cabinet cannot take any further decisions or actions that would compromise 
the future responsibilities of the next cabinet. In parliamentary regimes (and in 
consociational democracies in particular), a new full-fledged cabinet only takes 
power after its investiture vote in parliament; after new elections; after a transi-
tory government1; and/or after an agreement between the main political actors 
(Boston et al., 1998). These events often take weeks, if not months. In the mean-
time, the sitting government remains in power until it has been replaced and is 
henceforth labeled as ‘caretaker’. Using the words of Hooghe (2012b), “no matter 
how long that might take, the earlier government simply has to soldier on”.
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The comparative international literature investigated caretaker governments 
and identified a shared set of key characteristics. A first characteristic of a care-
taker government is that it ensures continuity. Indeed, it is necessary to avoid a 
complete absence of the executive power since this could be detrimental to the 
country and the population. Therefore, the resigning or removed cabinet cannot 
immediately leave office but instead needs to remain in power until its successor 
is appointed (Schleiter & Belu, 2015). In that way, caretaker governments ful-
fill a ‘bridging role’ between the duly mandated governments (McDonnell & 
Valbruzzi, 2014).
The second characteristic of a caretaker government concerns its limited 
scope and range of political actions. Such a government is only ‘taking care’ of 
those cabinet functions and duties for which continuity seems essential. The gov-
ernment refrains from taking any further decisions that may burden the incom-
ing government, whereby it restricts itself to preserving the ‘policy status quo’ 
(Boston et al., 1998; Davis et al., 2001; Schleiter & Belu, 2015). Thus, a caretaker 
government does not undertake new political initiatives and postpones all signif-
icant decisions until the new government takes over.
A third and last characteristic deals with the fact that caretaker governments 
do not enjoy large political legitimacy. The sitting cabinet may have lost a vote 
of confidence in parliament without new legislative elections and/or a new vote 
of confidence in parliament took place. This conflicts with the principle of the 
political accountability of the executive branch vis-à-vis the legislative branch. 
Since the former government has resigned or is removed, its actions can no 
longer be controlled by the parliament. The legislative power cannot cast another 
vote on a motion of no confidence against an – already – removed executive.2
Given their high presence throughout the last two decades, caretaker gov-
ernments have become relevant political phenomena in Belgium. This uprising 
has not gone unnoticed by political scientists: important pieces of literature on 
federal politics in Belgium investigate caretaker governments. Scholarly works 
explored the problems of public governance at the federal level and discussed 
reasons why caretaker governments emerge. Several structural explanations have 
been put forward such as the consociational system of decision-making, the elec-
toral system, the fragmented party system, the absence of national parties and 
the linguistic and territorial conflicts, as well as conjunctural explanations such 
as the success of a nonmainstream party, the disagreement on territorial reforms, 
the ideological distance between the mainstream parties or even the chicken 
game during the negotiation talks (Albalate & Bel, 2020; Brans et al., 2016; 
Deschouwer, 2012; Golder, 2010; Hooghe, 2012a; Van Aelst & Louwerse, 2014). 
Works in the Belgian academia also question the robustness and the resilience of 
the political system and scholars have tried to explain how a complex country 
such as Belgium can continue to function even when a caretaker government is 
in the driving seat (Albalate & Bel, 2020; Bouckaert & Brans, 2012; Brans, 2012; 
Brans et al., 2016; Deschouwer, 2012; Devos & Sinardet, 2012; Hooghe, 2012a,b; 
Pilet, 2012).
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As for the specific Belgian context, there is no tailor-made definition for what 
resembles a caretaker government. Like in many other parliamentary regimes 
(Boston et al., 1998), the political phenomenon of a caretaker government is 
absent from the legal constitutional framework. Caretaker governments are only 
briefly mentioned in the special Law on Institutional Reforms of 8 August 1980, 
where it is stipulated that “as long as it has not been replaced, the demissionary 
cabinet remains caretaker”. Instead, the definition of a caretaker cabinet is deter-
mined by customary law and practice (Bernard, 2020; Rigaux, 2020), which has 
been confirmed by the Council of State in 2016 (decision 234.747 on 17 May 
2016). In that respect, a common standard acceptance is that caretaker govern-
ments in Belgium limit themselves to just certain types of actions, like daily 
matters, ongoing matters (i.e. policy continuity) and urgent matters. However, 
there is little consensus among scholars about that the exact list of these actions 
(see Section 8.3).
For sure, there have been various types of cabinets in Belgium over the last 
decades: coalition cabinets, minority cabinets, transitory cabinets, etc. To dis-
tinguish caretaker governments from these other types, we define a caretaker 
period as the time interval during which either one of the two political branches 
(executive or legislative) does not enjoy its full powers (Bernard, 2020; Dandoy 
& Terrière, 2021; Rigaux, 2020).
Following this straightforward definition of a caretaker government, we can 
measure the exact length of caretaker periods for the last decades in Belgian 
political history. The three longest caretaker governments are all in recent years: 
235 days in 2007, 457 days in 2018–2020 and 597 days in 2010–2011. When add-
ing the other (shorter) caretaker governments in recent history, we account that 
Belgium was ruled by a caretaker government for no less than 1485 days between 
2007 and 2020. This corresponds to 29.04% of the total period between the 1st 
January 2007 and the 31 August 2020, or more than four (!) full calendar years.3
8.3 The political consequences of a caretaker regimen
A caretaker cabinet does not only affect the capacity of the executive but also of 
other political institutions. We highlighted in the first section that issues related 
to democratic legitimacy are crucial in the context of caretaker governments – 
who cannot be held accountable by their parliaments. In that respect, the nature 
of the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch has been 
at the center of attention of the specific scholarly literature on caretaker gov-
ernments (e.g. Devos & Sinardet, 2012). Since the cabinet is already dismissed, 
a caretaker government cannot be sanctioned once again by parliament. This 
eliminates a major instrument of political power held by the members of parlia-
ment in a normal democratic system.
In a parliamentary democracy such as Belgium, the executive is controlled 
by the legislative branch but it surely dominates the overall lawmaking pro-
cess. Prior works on caretaker cabinets in Belgium investigated this institutional 
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relationship and tested whether parliament has larger influence on the legisla-
tive process in caretaker periods (cf. Brans et al., 2016; Pilet, 2012; Van Aelst & 
Louwerse, 2014). Empirical analyses of the 2007–2011 period show a nuanced 
picture. If the parliament took more legal initiatives than in normal times, care-
taker periods did not lead to drastic changes in the legislative–executive relation-
ship but rather permitted a modest correction to the extremely weak position of 
the Belgian parliament (Van Aelst & Louwerse, 2014).
In Belgium, MPs are constrained by partisanship and party discipline. 
Scholars have investigated whether MPs enjoy more freedom in caretaker peri-
ods since one would expect that there is less party discipline. Empirical analyses 
of the 2010–2011 caretaker period have demonstrated that, despite the caretaker 
regime, parties have remained extremely cohesive, party discipline has remained 
strong and vote dissention was still exceptional (Brans et al., 2016; Pilet, 2012). 
Moreover, Van Aelst and Louwerse (2014) observed that, in times of institutional 
crisis, parties are even more coherent in terms of voting than in regular peri-
ods. The government-opposition divide still leads to clustered legislative party 
positions, and this even if alternative majorities sometimes emerge – especially 
between parties negotiating for the formation of a next federal cabinet (Baeselen 
et al., 2014; Pilet, 2012; Van Aelst & Louwerse, 2014).
While caretaker periods might affect the functioning of federal entities (e.g. 
parliament or administration4 and their relationship vis-à-vis the executive), the 
relevant literature on caretaker cabinets in Belgium overlooks its impact on the 
sitting government itself. Therefore, in this section, we investigate the political 
consequences for those parties that take part in the caretaker cabinet. First, we 
investigate whether cabinets are more stable during caretaker periods. Since one 
of the main characteristics of a caretaker government is that it ensures continuity 
and that the country should never be without a functioning executive, the same 
reasoning applies to individual ministers. Similarly to what we expect from the 
cabinet as a whole, ministers should remain in power until their successor is 
appointed.
We test this hypothesis of ministerial stability by a detailed analysis of the 
eight episodes of a caretaker cabinet between the 12 July 2003 and 31 August 
2020 and compare these with periods of ‘normal’ cabinets. Ministerial instability 
is an important phenomenon in Belgian politics: there are three resignations per 
year on average in recent decades (Dumont et al., 2008). From 2003 till 2020, 
this figure is slightly lower with just over two resignations per year on average. 
We observe in Table 8.1 that there are generally more ministerial resignations 
during caretaker periods than in normal periods. Specifically, a caretaker cabinet 
that lasts for one year witnesses no less than 2.46 resignations, which is signif-
icantly more than in a cabinet with full powers (i.e. 1.9 resignations per year). 
Hence, our hypothesis of higher ministerial stability in case of caretaker govern-
ment is rejected.
A detailed analysis of the rationales behind these resignations reveals an inter-
esting pattern. None of the ten ministerial resignations during caretaker periods 
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are due to political motives or scandals. Rather, all of these ten ministers or state 
secretaries resigned to occupy an alternative position in another institution, as, 
for instance, Didier Reynders who entered the European commission in 2019. 
In other words, it seems that caretaker ministers chose to boost their future 
political career when opportunities arise rather than to ensure the continuity of 
the federal cabinet. Similar observations are made when it comes to cabinet staff 
members, of whom a high proportion left the cabinet services well before the end 
of the caretaker period (Brans, 2012).
Until 2019, no Belgian prime minister ever resigned during a caretaker period. 
For instance, in 2011, Prime Minister Yves Leterme kept his future leadership 
position within the OECD on hold until the Di Rupo cabinet finally took office. 
Yet, in October 2019, Prime Minister Charles Michel left the federal cabinet to 
prepare for a new international role as president of the European Council. Sophie 
Wilmès was appointed on the same day as Michel’s resignation. She confirmed 
that the rest of the cabinet’s composition would remain unchanged, and it kept 
in a caretaker mode until a new full-fledged coalition government would take 
office.
Next to the analysis of ministerial stability in caretaker governments, this 
section also investigates the effect of caretaker periods on election results and 
on party popularity. As one can imagine, these delicate moments in political 
history did not remain unnoticed by the population. For example, during the 
2010–2011 caretaker episodes, there were frequent marches on the streets of 
TABLE 8.1 Ministerial stability in the federal cabinet





2003–2007 Full powers 1390 11
2007 Caretaker 235 2
2007–2008 Full powers 88 0
2008 Caretaker 3 0
2008 Full powers 114 1
2008 Caretaker 3 0
2008 Full powers 155 0
2008–2009 Caretaker 14 0
2009 Full powers 327 4
2009 Caretaker 3 0
2009–2010 Full powers 146 0
2010–2011 Caretaker 597 1
2011–2014 Full powers 866 3
2014 Caretaker 175 4
2014–2018 Full powers 1524 6
2018–2020 Caretaker 457 3
2020 Full powers 165 0
Total Full powers 4775 25 1.91
Total Caretaker 1485 10 2.46
*Prime ministers excluded.
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Brussels, combined with public initiatives to start direct dialogues between the 
linguistic communities (Bouckaert & Brans, 2012). The question is then whether 
parties who participate in such caretaker governments are punished or rewarded 
by the population and the electorate.
First, we assess the electoral performance of parties in caretaker governments. 
We know from prior works that Belgian governing parties tend to lose the 
elections that follow their cabinet participation (Dandoy, 2018; Dumont & De 
Winter, 1999). With the exception of the Verhofstadt I cabinet in 2003, govern-
ing parties have always lost an important share of votes in the consecutive elec-
tions since 1999. Governments in a long caretaker period before the elections are 
no exception to these findings. For instance, while the coalition parties of Michel 
II were in caretaker mode for already more than five months, they suffered a 
combined loss of 6.04% vote shares in the 2019 elections. This is not significantly 
different from the electoral losses of governing parties in shorter caretaker peri-
ods. Thus, the fact that a cabinet resigns (long) before the end of the legislative 
term does not impact its electoral performance.
Second, we measure the popularity of parties in the caretaker government. In 
a caretaker cabinet, the classic divide between government and opposition does 
not apply. Voters may want to reward parties for holding up the country during 
a political crisis or, on the contrary, may want to punish these same parties for 
not finding a proper solution to this crisis. Analyzing opinion polls for the period 
2008–2013, we observe that a caretaker period does not generate an important 
impact on the popularity of governing parties. In general, political parties in 
government become more unpopular over time, and this independent from the 
nature of the cabinet, i.e. a caretaker one or one operating in its full capacity.
8.4 Caretaker governments and actual policymaking
The absence of a democratic mandate to operate in its full capacity limits the 
political maneuvering space of any caretaker government. Deprived of the 
required electoral legitimacy and parliamentary support, these cabinets will need 
to thread with caution. Yet, public governance and decision-making need to 
continue, even under these inconvenient circumstances, to safeguard the vital 
interests of the country and its inhabitants. This third section investigates the 
broad academic consensus that lives under both legal experts and political sci-
entists about which specific policy initiatives a caretaker government can (not) 
undertake. In what follows, we bring together the current scholarly literature 
by drafting an own typology of six different actions that fall under the scope of 
caretaker governments.
In addition, we hypothesize that there is a strong tendency to stretch the polit-
ical range of action – for each of these six types of actions – the longer the care-
taker cabinet remains in executive office. Previous scholars (Boston et al., 1998; 
Bouckaert & Brans, 2012; Pastorella, 2016) have suggested that such a dynamic 
may exist for some specific governmental acts. Yet, if such a renewed political 
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assertiveness appears as an overall and reoccurring phenomenon, one may argue 
that it is actually deliberate strategy of a caretaker government to regain its for-
mer political maneuvering space.
Most prior works (e.g. Bouckaert & Brans, 2012; Devos & Sinardet, 2012; Van 
Aelst & Louwerse, 2014) investigating the impact of caretaker governments on 
actual policymaking in Belgium have focused on the long-lasting political crisis 
of 2010–2011. Instead, we opt to turn the spotlight on the more recent political 
stalemate of 2018–2020, which started with the downfall of the full-fledged coa-
lition government Michel I. Interestingly, legislative elections were organized 
halfway through this long-lasting crisis (May 2019), after which the caretaker 
period simply continued to drag on. Since the occurrence of elections in the 
middle of a caretaker period is highly unusual, we test whether this event had an 
impact on the kind and the nature of the decisions taken by the caretaker cabinet 
before and after the elections – and thus also: before and after the installation of a 
new parliament. Inserting this reference point enables us to get more insight in 
a caretaker cabinet’s (increasing) range of actions over time, and whether such 
specific events generate an impact here. Also, we compare our findings with 
those from the 2010–2011 crisis (597 days) to better understand the 2018–2020 
stalemate (457 days).
This section relies on the analysis of the minutes of the weekly cabinet deci-
sions taken between 9 December 2018 (i.e. the downfall of the Michel I cabinet) 
and 19 March 2020 (i.e. when the Wilmès II cabinet obtained the vote of con-
fidence in Parliament). In Belgium, joint cabinet meetings are organized once a 
week, usually on Friday mornings. It is during these recurring key moments that 
most political decisions are taken for the various federal departments: ministers 
present and defend their policy proposals to their colleagues and this is followed 
by a discussion and bargaining procedure. Afterward, a brief report of the out-
come is published on the website of the Belgian government. These weekly 
summaries of the main policy decisions are a transparent and reliable instrument 
to measure the evolving policy scope of the sitting government.
Mapping these documents provides us with empirical evidence to test both 
hypotheses: can we speak of (a) an increasing range of actions and if so, is it (b) a 
reoccurring phenomenon throughout the six different types of political actions? 
We expect that in an early stage, the resigning executive is cautious not to spread 
its operational wings too much. This initial self-restraint is likely to be eased as 
time progresses, however. In this respect, earlier authors (e.g. Hooghe, 2012a) 
refer to situations where negotiations kept dragging on, leading to unprece-
dented lengths of a caretaker period.
In a belated stage, the caretaker cabinet may take up a more proactive stance 
and even initiate new political initiatives (Schleiter & Belu, 2015). We concur 
with this reasoning and hypothesize that, once new elections took place and a new 
parliament is installed, a more expansive approach from the caretaker government 
vis-à-vis actual policymaking becomes visible. In addition, we may also expect a 
larger scope of actions when there is a change in the position of prime minister. 
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Namely, a new PM means new dynamics and he/she may not feel bound to the 
cautious behavior of her/his predecessor. Applied to this study, it means that after 
26 October 2019, we may expect the caretaker government to display a signifi-
cant (quantitative and qualitative) increase in its range of political actions, since 
from that moment onward, Sophie Wilmès took over from Charles Michel, who 
became President of the European Council. Last but not least, we might see a 
larger scope of action at the end of the calendar year since many legal initiatives and 
government programs are supposed to end on the 31 December – e.g. the annual 
budget laws. We investigate whether these expectations are true for key federal 
policy domains such as budget, defense, asylum and migration and social security.
Underneath, we aim to summarize the academic consensus among legal 
experts and political scientists about which specific policy initiatives a caretaker 
government can (not) undertake. We distinguish no less than six different types 
of policy actions. Classic studies about caretaker cabinets in Belgium focus on 
the first three types (e.g. Brans et al., 2016; Devos & Sinardet, 2012; Hooghe, 
2012b) but more recent ones also add several others to these first categories (e.g. 
Schleiter & Belu, 2015; Van Aelst & Louwerse, 2014). The latter also focus on 
international obligations (4), new initiatives from parliament (5) and even new 
initiatives from the government itself (6). Especially the prominence of this last 
category makes Belgium an exceptional and deviant case from other countries 
(Davis et al., 2001; Hloušek & Kopeček, 2014; Tiernan & Menzies, 2007).
A first type of action of a Belgian government during a caretaker period con-
cerns the ‘daily management’ of the state (e.g. Baeselen et al., 2014). These deci-
sions generally do not concern political sensitive topics – take, for instance, the 
salary payments of civil servants or paying the energy bills of public buildings. 
Important nominations within the human resources management department 
fall outside of this scope. Initially, when looking at the political stalemate of 
2018–2020, new appointments in the administration, military and judiciary 
are put on hold. However, once the new PM Wilmès took office, the cabinet 
started to resolve high-level personnel matters, among which several appoint-
ments of key management positions within the public administration. For exam-
ple, it renewed the executive mandates for the sitting administrator-general of 
the Social Security e-services (approved on 24 January 2020) and Real Estate 
administrator of the Federal Government (approved on 31 January 2020) for 
another six (!) years.
A second type of actions constitutes issues that were approved and initiated in 
the past when the government still enjoyed its full powers (e.g. Baeselen et al., 
2014). Similar to the first type, the necessity of this category is based on the 
argument that the public governance of the country requires continuity. Taken 
together, these first two types of actions are often described by the notion of ‘cur-
rent affairs’ (e.g. Devos & Sinardet, 2012). Throughout the 2018–2020 caretaker 
period, the federal administration continued to function thanks to the guaran-
teed but temporary budget laws that were adopted – the so-called provisionary 
twelfths. These budget proposals were still initiated by the caretaker cabinet and 
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had to be formally approved by the Parliament every three months. At first, the 
budgetary framework was accepted without any further amendments. Yet, the 
version that was laid down in March 2020 was only approved after no less than 27 
plenary amendments from various political parties were put to the vote as well. In 
this last budget bill under the regime of a caretaker government, the initial path 
of ‘provisionary twelfths’ was diverted at several programs, among which the 
health-care budget was increased with several hundred million euros. After the 
new PM Wilmès took office, the initial restraint and continuity is swapped for a 
more extensive range of political actions. Take, for example, the cabinet decision 
to start building a new prison in the municipality of Dendermonde. This long-
awaited ruling by the Minister of Justice was finally taken on 14 February 2020. 
It is somewhat paradoxical that this highly delicate political decision – due to 
many years of continued international pressure to improve the facilities for pris-
oners as well as domestic arm-wrestling about where this extra capacity would be 
allocated – was taken by a caretaker government in its final days.
A third type of actions entails ‘urgent matters’ (e.g. Hooghe, 2012a). A care-
taker government may need to take measures because any delay or nonaction 
could cause damage to the state or its inhabitants. Just like in other categories, 
this concept is a ‘moving target’: its interpretation is susceptible to evolutions in 
the context and circumstances (Baeselen et al., 2014). During the 2018–2020 
period, the caretaker government was confronted with the upcoming deadline of 
the ‘Brexit’. Yet, it was only on 17 January 2020 (i.e. again after the appointment 
of a new PM) that a series of important fiscal transition measures were taken by 
the caretaker government to prevent important economic and financial losses. 
Furthermore, the unexpected outbreak of the Covid-19 forced the caretaker cab-
inet Wilmès I to introduce drastic sanitary and safety measures to contain the 
spreading of the virus. They did this even before 19 March 2020 – i.e. the day 
when the cabinet actually proceeded again under its full powers.
Fulfilling the international commitments and obligations (incl. EU and 
NATO) is a fourth type of actions that a caretaker government needs to cover. 
This includes, for example, also the speedily transposition of EU directives in 
Belgian legislation. When discussing the 2010–2011 period, scholars often refer 
to the decisions of the Leterme II cabinet to go to war with Libya (Bouckaert & 
Brans, 2012; Schleiter & Belu, 2015) and to participate in the EU programs to 
save the euro (Devos & Sinardet, 2012; Hooghe, 2012a). Likewise, during the 
2018–2020 period, the Belgian caretaker government lived up to its interna-
tional obligations. But it was only after Wilmès took over as PM that important 
new initiatives were undertaken such as the nomination of Didier Reynders as 
European Commissioner. On 7 February 2020, a series of measures were decided 
to prevent money laundering and the financing of international terrorism – as 
this was requested by several international organizations. Also, on 14 February 
2020, Belgium decided to send out a mission to Albania to provide immediate 
help and assistance after an earthquake had hit the region and to Bolivia where 
forest fires destroyed many people’s houses (20 December 2019).
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A fifth task that caretaker cabinets have to deal with is legal initiatives decided by 
parliament. Indeed, a resigning cabinet may open up opportunities for parliament 
to step in and to take up a larger role in policymaking, hereby creating ad-hoc 
coalitions for all kinds of legislative proposals. This happened in 2018–2020 as 
parliamentary initiatives were passed that even amended existing royal decrees and 
ministerial decrees. Bear in mind that, when adopting such detailed legislation, 
parliament actually treads on governments’ territory. Three vivid examples were 
the decisions (a) to improve the social tariffs on gas and electricity; (b) to grant a 
financial compensation to employees who go to work by making use of the e-bike 
and (c) and to increase the pensions for underground mine workers.
A sixth and last type are new initiatives that the caretaker government initiates 
by itself (Schleiter & Belu, 2015). This is actually a controversial category that 
many scholars do not even consider falling within the scope of a caretaker cabinet. 
Yet, it is surely present in Belgian political practice. The apparent switch in the 
function of PM also generates actions for this last type if we take a closer look at the 
2018–2020 caretaker period. Only in a belated stage, the caretaker cabinet began to 
initiate own and far-reaching policies that are a clear departure from the status quo. 
For example, the cabinet decided to change what kind of personal information 
needs to be mentioned on a citizens’ identity card (14 February 2020); obliged the 
registration of a person’s fingerprints on every identity card (12 December 2019) 
and approved a ‘national emergency plan’ in case of a terrorist attack including the 
erection of new surveillance structures and response procedures (24 January 2020).
Now that we have identified six types of actions, we add two important 
observations. These underline the strong tendency to increase the range of polit-
ical actions over time. First, it is only in the few weeks before and after an 
election, during which parliament is not in its full powers that we see a signifi-
cant increase in the number of royal and ministerial decrees undertaken by the 
caretaker cabinet. Surely, since it is temporarily more difficult to realize new 
legislation through the legislative branch because the cabinet is not supported by 
a parliamentary majority, the caretaker government may try to fulfill its agenda 
through alternative means within the executive branch.
Second, if parliament enjoys more leeway during a caretaker period, ministers 
may feed parliamentarians even more with ready-made bills. By making use of 
this institutional shortcut, individual ministers (even in a caretaker mode) try to 
speed up the decision-making process and complete some of their initial projects. 
For parliamentarians, it means an opportunity to score publicly without the effort 
of having to write a complex legal piece. A good example from the 2018–2020 
period is the legal proposal in Parliament to lower the costs of anti-conception 
for younger women approved on 16 July 2020 after this measure was agreed in 
principle during a prior meeting of the caretaker cabinet (21 February 2020).
This section has identified and discussed different types of actions that fall 
under the scope of a ‘caretaker cabinet’. Most of them enjoy broad academic con-
sensus among political scientist and lawyers. Through an assessment of the 2018–
2020 caretaker period in Belgium, we have demonstrated that long transition 
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periods trigger caretaker executives to expand their range of political actions 
over time. We provided empirical evidence for this expansive behavior for every 
different type of action. It actually seems a broad and general trend, which ren-
ders omnipresent in every type of action. Given this constituent and reoccurring 
pattern, one may argue that this is a deliberate strategy. More than a year after 
the downfall of the government, the remaining members of the executive branch 
will still have a longing desire to realize their initial agenda and the projects they 
had mind. This continued policy ambition could be an important explanation for 
this increasing range of political actions over time that we have observed.
8.5 Conclusion
Belgium is famous for the length of its government formation processes. During 
these periods, the former federal coalition government keeps acting as a care-
taker cabinet but it operates with limited political and policy powers. Yet, polit-
ical deadlocks are merely the tip of the iceberg, as federal elections and other 
major political crises have led to shorter or longer situations of a federal caretaker 
government. With a focus on the last two decades, this chapter observes that 
Belgium was ruled by a caretaker government for no less than 1485 days between 
2007 and 2020, corresponding to more than four full calendar years. In many 
ways, this situation is unique in contemporary politics around the world.
Rather than investigating the origins of caretaker governments and the factors 
behind such lengthy episodes, this chapter aimed at exploring the political and 
policy consequences of caretaker governments in Belgium. A first set of findings 
indicates that caretaker periods do alter the balance of power between federal 
institutions and political actors: the parliament is not significantly empowered 
and partitocracy still dominates federal politics. At the same time, our analy-
ses show that the cabinet becomes slightly more unstable (in particular when 
looking at ministerial turnover) and that parties in government are not par-
ticularly rewarded or sanctioned by the voters and the public opinion. Even if 
these periods saw the emergence of demands for more deliberative and/or direct 
democracy, the way representative democracy is functioning in Belgium seems 
to remain largely unchanged, and we observe that the main traditional political 
actors and institutional dynamics are not affected by caretaker governments.
From the scholarly literature, we derive no less than six different types of 
actions that fall under the scope of a caretaker government. Belgium is a deviant 
case from other countries since its caretaker governments even set up new initi-
atives on its own (type six). Through an exploration of the 2018–2020 caretaker 
period in Belgium, we have demonstrated that long transition periods trigger 
cabinets to expand their range of political actions over time. We provided empir-
ical evidence for a constituent and reoccurring pattern for this expansion for 
every different type of action, indicating a deliberate strategy.
The way ahead is undoubtedly comparative. The analysis of political and policy 
consequences of caretaker governments apart from the exceptional Belgian case 
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may be challenging but will ultimately improve our comprehensive understanding 
of this complex phenomenon. Are long periods of a caretaker government simi-
larly not affecting the political and party systems in other West European coun-
tries, such as Italy, the Netherlands or Spain? It would also be interesting to include 
technocratic and partisan caretaker governments in the comparative analysis, such 
as the ones we observe in Finland, Portugal, Sweden or in Central European coun-
tries. We particularly call for closer collaboration between researchers studying 
parties and governments and those analyzing public policies.
Another future field of comparative analysis is related to the impact of the global 
context and external pressures on the performance of caretaker governments. We 
know from the Italian case that international actors such as the EU or the IMF 
have contributed to the thankless implementation of socially difficult reforms. The 
underlying idea is that, in an extraordinary situation, decision-makers may appre-
ciate a temporary ‘relief ’ of responsibilities for unpopular decisions to a caretaker 
government (Hloušek & Kopeček 2014). Even if the financial and economic crisis 
proved to have only little effect on the Belgian caretaker government in 2010–2011, 
it would for instance be interesting to observe the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on 
the politics and policies of the respective caretaker governments. In Belgium, the 
exceptional sanitary situation led to a sudden end of the Wilmès I caretaker cabinet 
and triggered the establishment of a temporary minority cabinet.
Notes
 1 Caretaker governments have to be distinguished from interim or transitory governments. 
This latter kind of cabinets is specifically appointed to make the transition between two 
governments that benefit from full powers. Alternatively, their sole purpose is to bring 
the country to (early) elections. Examples of such transitory cabinets can be found in 
countries such as Italy, Finland, Portugal or Sweden (Beckman, 2007; Courtenay Ryals 
& Golder, 2010; Hloušek & Kopeček, 2014; Larsson, 1994; Magone, 2000; McDonnell & 
Valbruzzi, 2014; Zafarullah & Yeahia Akhter, 2000).
 2 Even if parliament cannot sanction the caretaker government as such, it can still control 
it in principle. For instance, it is not rare to see their ministers being questioned publicly 
during plenary or committee meetings. Parliamentary consent is also still needed to pass 
any new legislation.
 3 For more information about how to measure caretaker periods and the types of caretaker 
governments, see Dandoy and Terrière (2021).
 4 Devos and Sinardet (2012) observed no increase in the power of the bureaucracy even in 
times of crises and limited powers. Although the public administration was indispensable 
in the daily management of current affairs and during the EU presidency in 2011, the 
authors conclude that bureaucrats did not take over from politicians.
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THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF 
BELGIAN FEDERALISM
Is there a reversal of the 
paradox of federalism?
Laura Pascolo, Daan Vermassen, Min Reuchamps and 
Didier Caluwaerts
9.1 Introduction
Ever since the 1970s, Belgium has witnessed a process of constitutional reform. 
This transformation of Belgium from a unitary state into a federal state was 
propelled by the paradox of federalism (Erk & Anderson, 2009). After all, 
granting autonomy to the linguistic groups was initially considered a means of 
pacifying ethnolinguistic tensions, but at the same time it also legitimized and 
exacerbated the underlying identity conflicts. The decentralization, known in 
Belgium as ‘defederalization’ of competences, thus, seems to have increased 
demands for further regionalization and set in motion fundamental institu-
tional reforms.
However, in recent years, the country seems to be experiencing a reversal of 
the paradox of federalism (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2020). In response to the 
ethnolinguistic stalemate and perceived inefficiency of Belgian politics, politi-
cians have increasingly started advocating the ‘refederalization’ of certain com-
petences. Federalism, they argue, has not delivered on its promise of efficiency 
and effectiveness, so the aim should be to lift competences back to the federal 
level. Yet very little is known so far about the positions and arguments in favor 
of de- or refederalization, or about the political elites’ position in this debate. To 
map this increased attention to refederalization, this chapter aims to take stock 
of the positions of political elites in favor of defederalization or refederalization 
in Belgium. The objective is to conduct a longitudinal analysis of the argumen-
tative logics mobilized by the political elites to justify their positions. The lon-
gitudinal analysis is carried out, on the one hand, on the electoral manifestos of 
the Belgian political parties and, on the other hand, on the interventions of the 
political elites in the written press from the end of 1990 until the last federal and 
regional elections of 2019.
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 looks at Belgium’s process 
of federalization, more specifically as a conflict management technique from 
the perspective of consociational democracy. Section 9.3 includes a theoretical 
discussion of the paradox of federalism. Then comes the methodological part 
including the presentation of the two corpus and the methodological considera-
tions. In Section 9.5, the analyses are presented, showing the main claims of the 
parties according to defederalization and refederalization propositions and argu-
ments. Section 9.6 concludes and discusses the findings of the chapter.
9.2  Consociational democracy in Belgium: from 
conflict to compromise and back?
Belgium has long been considered a divided society because of its deep, coincid-
ing cleavages. Ever since its foundation in 1830, economic, social, religious and 
linguistic fault lines have mutually reinforced each other. However, “[w]hat is 
remarkable about Belgium, is not that it is a culturally divided society – most of 
the countries in the contemporary world are divided into separate and distinct 
cultural, religious, or ethnic communities – but that its cultural communities 
coexist peacefully and democratically” (Lijphart, 1981, p. 1). What the Belgian 
case clearly shows is that deep divisions among the population need not neces-
sarily lead to democratic disintegration. A deeply divided society can, thus, be 
governed in a relatively stable manner.
However, the question that has always attracted academic scrutiny is how the 
Belgian political system withstood the lure of centrifugalism. How come the 
Belgian state did not disintegrate, even though its societal structure was con-
flict-ridden? To understand this seemingly paradoxical finding, we need to take 
a closer look at the country’s institutional set-up. Belgian political institutions are 
set up in such a way as to reduce tensions and facilitate power-sharing between 
the conflicting groups. In this sense, it is a prime example of what scholars of 
ethnic conflict call the consociational model of democracy.
The idea of consociational democracy was first developed by the Dutch aca-
demic Arend Lijphart (1968, 1981), who stated that “[d]ivided societies [need] a 
democratic regime which emphasizes consensus instead of opposition and which 
includes rather than excludes all the disparate components” (Lijphart, 1981, 
pp. 3–4). The accommodation of ethnolinguistic tensions in a conflict-ridden 
nation such as Belgium, thus, requires institutions that accommodate, rather 
than exacerbate, conflicts. They require institutions that force the elites to sit 
together and work out their differences. Lijphart identifies four of such pow-
er-sharing institutions.
First of all, deeply divided societies require grand coalitions. All societal groups, 
i.e. both majority and minority groups, should be included in executive power 
sharing. Consociational systems, thus, rarely settle for minimal-winning or one-
party cabinets, which exclude minorities. In Belgium, this principle is imple-
mented by the constitutional requirement that the federal government consists 
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of members of both linguistic groups, and that there is an equal number of 
Dutch-speaking and French-speaking cabinet members (i.e. the linguistic parity 
requirement). In practice, this often results in significantly oversized government 
coalitions consisting of five or more political parties which have to engage in 
consensual decision-making.
Second, the grand coalition is complemented by the principle of proportionality. 
Proportionality can be implemented first of all through the electoral system. 
Electoral proportionality allows “all groups [to] influence a decision in propor-
tion to their numerical strength” (Steiner, 1971, p. 63; see also Lijphart, 1977, 
p. 39). However, proportionality has to be interpreted in a much more funda-
mental way: it is an impartial procedural device capable of redistributing gov-
ernment resources (financial means, appointments to public office…) among all 
societal segments (Huyse, 1970, p. 154; Steiner, 1971, p. 63). As such, it is an 
effective means of removing potentially explosive issues from the government 
agenda ensuring that “the essence of political action has shifted from strife to 
distribution” (Daalder, 1964, p. 24). Examples of proportionality are numerous 
in Belgian politics. Not only is about 60% of the seats in the federal parliament 
reserved for Flemish parties and 40% for Francophone parties, but proportional-
ity is also at the basis of Belgium’s infamous waffle iron politics: every investment 
in Flanders has to be proportionally matched by investments in Wallonia and 
vice versa.
Even though their representation in grand coalitions and the application of 
proportionality offer minority segments a good chance of influencing policies, 
minority segments should also have the right to veto any decision they consider to 
be disadvantageous to their interests. Because the very stability of the system is at 
stake, the decision-making rule should approach unanimity. This gives minor-
ities a de facto veto right, which is a far-reaching protection mechanism, that is 
needed to maintain the balance and avert democratic disintegration. In Belgium, 
this is implemented by requiring a double majority for constitutional reforms 
(i.e. a two-thirds majority in each assembly of the federal parliament and a simple 
majority within each linguistic group) and by installing a so-called alarm bell 
procedure. When one of the linguistic groups is convinced that a law violates 
its interests, that group can ring the alarm bell and suspend the parliamentary 
procedure. The federal government, which is composed of an equal number of 
French and Dutch speakers, then has to find a compromise.
The final institution aimed at reducing ethnolinguistic tensions is the granting 
of autonomy. When issues spark fierce debate and conflict at the national level, 
decision-power should ideally be delegated to the segments themselves. The aim 
of granting self-rule is therefore “not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages 
but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive ele-
ments of stable democracy” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 42). Belgium has implemented 
this final institution by evolving from a unitary state into a federal state through 
six state reforms since 1970. Because the initial demands from the north and the 
south of the country were so different, a unique bipolar federation was created. 
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Flanders primarily wanted cultural and linguistic autonomy, and protection from 
the francophone cultural dominance. Wallonia, on the other hand, witnessed a 
severe economic decline and wanted economic control. The institutional archi-
tecture of Belgian federalism was modeled after these dual demands, which led 
to two types of federalized entities: communities, which met Flemish demands 
and received cultural, linguistic and person-related competences, and regions, 
which would focus on economic policy (Witte & Meynen, 2006, p. 103).
9.3 The paradox of federalism
These four institutional innovations foster prudent leadership and a ‘spirit of 
accommodation’ (Lijphart, 1975). They made it virtually impossible for the 
Flemish demographic and political majority to impose its will on the French-
speaking segment, and they persuaded the elites of the linguistic subgroups 
to sit together and resolve the matters at hand (Deschouwer, 2006, p. 902). 
Nevertheless, scholars have pointed out that there are inherent dangers to power- 
sharing democracy, chief among which is the ‘paradox of federalism’ (Erk & 
Anderson, 2009; Nordlinger, 1972). It is after all claimed that federalism removes 
contentious issues from the agenda, but at the same time, it sets in motion 
demands for more autonomy. As such, segmental autonomy, which is initially 
aimed at weakening centrifugal forces, actually reinforces them and could lead 
to separation in the long run (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2015).
One of the explanations for this paradox is that federalism strengthens 
regional identities instead of creating overlapping ones (Tierney, 2009, p. 246). 
In their early works, consociational scholars claimed that power-sharing institu-
tions would force the elites to create overarching loyalties: by working together 
in the search of accommodation and compromise, the elites would over time 
come to trust each other, and initial segmental identities would become less 
salient ( Jarrett, 2016). This would in turn trickle down to the general popula-
tion and the initial dividing lines would become less relevant. However, rather 
than reduce identity salience, consociation was found to strengthen identities 
(Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2015). On the one hand, this is because granting 
autonomy implicitly recognizes the validity of the underlying identity claims. 
Federalizing competences on culture, language and identity to the level of the 
communities has implicitly recognized that identity claims based on language 
and culture were valid. As such, further claims for autonomy and recognition 
were legitimized as well. On the other hand, federalism also enables the passing 
of legislation that promotes the development of specific regional cultures and 
identities (Bunce, 1999; Roeder, 1991). “[F]ederalism [thus] entrenches, perpetu-
ates, and institutionalizes the very divisions it has designed to manage” (Simeon, 
1995, p. 257).
Even though a cursory look at the Belgian state reforms in the last 50 years, 
with its ever-increasing levels of defederalization, seems to suggest that the par-
adox of federalism is unfolding, we know surprisingly little about the dynamics 
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of this process. Previous studies on Belgium have not yet validated the claim 
that federalization led to more demands for federalization, or whether there 
were actually counterclaims to refederalize competences. In the next sections 
of this chapter, we will map the debate by identifying claims made by pol-
iticians to defederalize and refederalize competences in Belgium over time. 
Moreover, we will also analyze the underlying motives for de- or refederaliz-
ing competences.
9.4 Data and methods
9.4.1 Two types of corpora
To make a map of the argumentative logics supporting Belgian political parties’ 
positions in the debate about defederalization or refederalization, this chapter 
performs a critical frame analysis on two types of corpora: the electoral mani-
festos of 13 Belgian political parties and the interventions of political decision- 
makers in the French- and Dutch-speaking print media from 1999 until 2019.
Analyzing electoral manifestos is particularly relevant to assess the impor-
tance dedicated to a theme or specific issue for the political party in question. 
The electoral manifesto is in fact the ultimate reference document regarding 
the position of a political party for a given electoral campaign (Reuchamps, 
2015). Furthermore, it serves several functions: it is an official document that 
unites all party members during the election campaign, it outlines the party’s 
position on a number of salient issues and it is an essential source of information 
for voters and a guide for the actions of elected officials after the election (Biard 
& Dandoy, 2018).
The electoral manifestos of Belgian political parties have been coded and 
analyzed, beginning from the federal election in 1999 to the last federal and 
regional elections in May 2019. In addition, only those parties were chosen that 
had obtained at least one seat in at least half of the considered elections. A total 
of 13 Belgian political parties1 (6 French-speaking, 6 Dutch-speaking parties and 
1 unitary party) were analyzed in this way in 12 elections. In years with simulta-
neous (regional and federal) elections, political parties may file multiple electoral 
manifestos, so no fewer than 115 manifestos have been coded and analyzed in 
this research.
In addition to electoral manifestos, the second corpus consists of the media 
interventions by political decision-makers in the Belgian written press, i.e. in 
French and Dutch-speaking daily newspapers.2 After all, even if the manifesto 
is a good indicator of a party’s position, the electoral campaign and competition 
may require adjustments on the part of political parties with regard to the differ-
ent positions adopted in their electoral manifesto (Reuchamps, 2015). The use 
of this corpus provides a broader view of the positions of political elites through 
their interventions on issues and captures of the possible evolution of their posi-
tions across time.
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The collection of this second corpus is carried out over the same period (from 
1999 to 2019). In addition, the data collection is carried out for the entire elec-
tion year (i.e. 1 January to 31 December), so that it includes the pre-campaign 
period, the election campaign, as well as the formation of coalitions and the 
underlying negotiations during the constitution of the executives. The selec-
tion resulted in 278 press articles that contained directly quoted interventions by 
political elites and were subsequently coded. Opinion pieces, political columns 
and interventions and analyses by experts in the broadest sense were excluded.
9.4.2 Critical frame analysis
To identify the arguments surrounding the defederalization or refederalization 
debate in Belgium, we conducted a critical frame analysis (Verloo, 2005). Critical 
frame analyses allow implicit or explicit interpretations of the political problem 
to emerge by highlighting how political actors think about the problem and 
present solutions (Meier, 2008). Indeed, this approach makes it possible to draw 
up an in-depth study of the diagnostic and prognostic dimensions by insisting 
on the implicit or explicit representations of the actors, causes, consequences and 
actions to be undertaken.
For the purposes of this chapter, electoral proposals and media interventions 
have been coded according to a two-fold scheme. On the one hand, we have coded 
the diagnostic frames that seek to highlight the diagnosis of the problem (what is 
the problem?), its justification (why is it a problem?), causality (what caused the 
problem?) and attribution (who is responsible for the problem?). On the other hand, 
we also coded the prognostic frames concerning the prognosis (what is defined as 
the solution?), the actions (how can we solve the problem?) but also the different 
objectives, values and highlighted norms. These two types of frames make it possi-
ble, on the one hand, to look at how political parties and their elites define de- and 
refederalization and, on the other hand, to understand why they support the de- 
and refederalization of competences and responsibilities. Finally, by understanding 
the diagnostic and prognostic frames, it is possible to highlight the argumentative 
logics mobilized by political elites to justify such transfers of competences (toward 
a centrifugal of defederalization or centripetal of refederalization trajectory).
9.5 Findings
9.5.1 The evolution of the debate
Before presenting and elaborating on the different frames and arguments used by 
political elites to justify their positions for or against de- and refederalization, it 
is necessary to determine the extent to which these two issues have been actively 
discussed through the manifestos of political parties and in the interventions 
of their representatives in the print media. Figure 9.1 shows the evolution of 
the debate on the distribution of competences over time. The general trends 
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FIGURE 9.1  Evolution of the debate on de- and refederalization over time for 
Dutch-speaking parties and French-speaking parties (claims in absolute 
occurrences)
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show that demands for defederalization of competences are more numerous in 
the earlier elections. Moreover, a peak of these demands is observed in the 2010 
elections and in the first phase of the 6th and currently last reform of the state 
in 2012–2014. However, in the last two federal and regional elections (2014 and 
2019), there was a decrease in these claims for defederalization. The constitu-
tional reforms agreed upon during the last state reform seem to have satisfied 
some of parties’ appetite for further decentralization of competences.
However, although previous state reforms have historically and systematically 
generated centrifugal transfers of competences, we also observe that demands for 
refederalization have increased since the 2007 federal elections. However, it is 
during the regional and federal elections of 2010 and 2019 but also after the last 
state reform finished in 2014, that the demands for refederalization of compe-
tences were the most important.
A number of additional observations should also be highlighted. First of all, 
even if the demands for refederalization seemed to be more important in the last 
two election years, they are not shared in the same way by the political parties in 
the north and south of the country. Indeed, the Dutch-speaking political parties 
have almost systematically made more demands for defederalization both in their 
electoral manifestos and in the interventions of the political elites. However, in 
the federal and regional elections of 2019, demands for the refederalization of 
competences have become more prominent in the speeches of these political elites 
(see Table 9.1). In addition, the demands for the defederalization of competences 
are, among others, mainly and predominantly driven by Dutch-speaking parties, 
including the N-VA and the VB. In contrast, representatives of the so-called 
traditional political parties such as the liberal Open VLD, Christian-democratic 
CD&V and socialist SP.A have formulated multiple demands with a high rela-
tive weight through their interventions in the media. However, media analyses 
show that representatives of the three traditional Dutch-speaking political parties 
(CD&V, Open VLD, SP.A) also put forward positions and demands for the refed-
eralization of competences and responsibilities. The only Dutch-speaking party 
that has included demands of refederalization in the interventions of its political 
elites in print media but also in its electoral manifestos is the green party, Groen.
Demands for defederalization have also been formulated on the other side of 
the language border. The traditional French-speaking parties (cdH, MR, PS) 
formulate them both in their electoral manifestos and in their media interven-
tions. However, starting with the 2007 federal elections, French-speaking parties 
almost systematically made more demands for refederalization than defederaliza-
tion. The two parties with a large share of claims referring to the refederalization 
of competences in their electoral manifestos are, on the one hand, the French-
speaking liberal party, MR and, on the other hand, the only Belgian unitary 
party, the far-left party PTB/PVDA.
Before closing this section presenting the evolution of the debate, it is inter-
esting to highlight a consideration about an intermediate position, a balance 
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TABLE 9.1 Claims on de-/refederalization by political parties (in absolute and relative occurrences)
Defederalization Refederalization
Manifestos Media Manifestos Media
Christian-democrat cdH 3.40% (N = 5) 0.97% (N = 1) 7.14% (N = 4) 10.64% (N = 5)
CD&V 6.12% (N = 9) 16.50% (N = 17) 0% (N = 0) 6.38% (N = 3)
Ecologist Groen 3.40% (N = 5) 0.97% (N = 1) 12.50% (N = 7) 4.26% (N = 2)
Ecolo 5.44% (N = 8) 0% (N = 0) 14.29% (N = 8) 8.51% (N = 4)
Liberal Open VLD 8.84% (N = 13) 20.39% (N = 21) 0% (N = 0) 10.64% (N = 5)
MR 3.40% (N = 5) 5.83% (N = 6) 23.21% (N = 13) 17.02% (N = 8)
Regionalist N-VA 23.81% (N = 35) 23.30% (N = 24) 0% (N = 0) 0% (N = 0)
FDF/Défi 2.04% (N = 3) 0% (N = 0) 5.36% (N = 3) 0% (N = 0)
Radical right VB 28.57% (N = 42) 1.94% (N = 2) 0% (N = 0) 0% (N = 0)
PP 4.08% (N = 6) 0% (N = 0) 7.14% (N = 4) 0% (N = 0)
LDD 1.36% (N = 2) 0% (N = 0) 0% (N = 0) 0% (N = 0)
Socialist PS 7.48% (N = 11) 7.77% (N = 8) 8.93% (N = 5) 31.25% (N = 15)
SP.A 2.04% (N = 3) 23.30% (N = 24) 0% (N = 0) 6.38% (N = 3)
Radical left PTB/PVDA 0% (N = 0) 0% (N = 0) 21.43% (N = 12) 4.26% (N = 2)
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media interventions for the last federal and regional elections. During the 2019 
election year, and particularly in the debates and discussions concerning a possible 
7th reform of the state, intermediate positions on the trajectory to be taken by 
the transfer of competences and responsibilities emerged.
The political elites in this ‘in-between’ position stressed that a future reform 
of the State should encompass both a defederalization of competences and a 
refederalization of particular competences. These political elites highlight a tra-
jectory not yet planned in previous state reforms, which would consist of a mixed 
trajectory between a centrifugal and a centripetal approach to the transfer of 
competences. These ‘intermediate’ positions were advocated by various political 
representatives from political parties in both the north and the south of the country. 
However, such a hybrid trajectory is far from being shared by all political elites 
and also tends to reflect rather individual positions of the elites within their 
political parties. However, this intermediate position is mentioned in the latest 
government agreement (30 September 2020), which indicates in particular the 
bases for a possible 7th reform of the State. The government agreement seems to 
address a new way of distributing competences and powers, presenting, on the 
one hand, an increase in the competences and autonomy of the federated entities 
and, on the other hand, a strengthening of the powers of the Federal Authority.
9.5.2 Critical frame analysis on de-/refederalization
Now that we have mapped the debate on de- and refederalization over the last 
20 years, we should identify the argumentative logics underlying the debate. 
Political elites are after all actively engaging in defining and constructing prob-
lems related to management and competences transfer according to different 
diagnostic frames. Indeed, to justify their claims for or against re/defederaliza-
tion, they highlight various dysfunctions underlying the practices and modalities 
at the heart of the Belgian federal political system which are both perceived as 
causes and consequences of the federal dynamics that have shaped the Belgian 
federation. Furthermore, the different frames mobilized by the political elites 
to justify centrifugal or centripetal responses have highlighted different argu-
mentative logics adopted by the political elites in their demands in favor of or 
against the re-/defederalization of competences. The different argumentative 
logics can be divided into two main types of argument categories: on the one 
hand, identity-based arguments highlighting the differences between commu-
nities in terms of language, culture and politics and, on the other hand, func-
tional, efficiency-based arguments which focus on considerations of economic 
efficiency, homogeneity of competences or cost reduction (see Table 9.2).
Two diagnostic frames are used by proponents of defederalization, as well as 
by proponents of refederalization, although the arguments differ. The first frame 
concerns the lack of coherence which refers to the heterogeneity, fragmentation 
and dispersion of competences. Indeed, policy areas have been devolved to dif-
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to the same extent. As a result, they point out a lack of coherence in the man-
agement of a particular policy area due to a nonhomogeneous distribution of 
competences from the same policy area. This lack of coherence is illustrated 
in different policy areas subject to de-/refederalization. In fact, in the field of 
public health, different parts of competences and responsibilities are dispersed 
between the different levels of government. Moreover, the solutions proposed to 
resolve of this lack of coherence can go in completely opposite ways according 
to political elites. Some claim that coherence can be solved by further devolving 
competences; others claim that the solution lies in refederalization. Nevertheless, 
the centrifugal or centripetal response addressed to this diagnostic frame is jus-
tified by the political elites through the use of argumentative logics of efficiency, 
highlighting economic prosperity, homogeneity and coherence in the transfer of 
competences. The political elites favoring the refederalization of competences 
have largely mobilized this diagnostic frame in their manifestos.
The institutional architecture is the second frame shared by the political parties, 
which propose different trajectories concerning the distribution of competences. 
The main causes and origins of this complex institutional architecture stem from 
the different institutional reforms that have successively taken place in the course of 
arrangements and negotiations. The institutional mechanisms, which is considered 
complex, are highlighted by the political elites to underline and justify a solution 
whose objectives aim to overcome various institutional dysfunctions. In reality, the 
dysfunctions highlighted by the political elites differ according to the prognostic 
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frameworks, between the two trajectories advocated by the political elites. The 
advocates of a defederalization of competences emphasize the difficulties and dys-
functions linked to asymmetrical principles and instruments of so-called coopera-
tive federalism such as solidarity mechanisms, veto rights inherent in the principles 
of consociational democracy or other measures requiring coordination at the level 
of the federal authority. These political elites justify the resolution of these dysfunc-
tions through the defederalization by highlighting arguments such as the strength-
ening of the equality of the constituent entities but also of the democracy and the 
modernity of Belgian institutional system. This diagnostic frame underlines the 
dysfunction of institutional instruments and mechanisms and has been strongly 
mobilized by political elites in favor of defederalization in their manifestos.
Meanwhile, the political elites advocating refederalization argue that the elec-
toral system underlying this institutional architecture does not allow the election 
of a part of the political representatives over the entire political territory via, in 
particular, a federal constituency. In fact, some political elites mobilize argu-
mentative logics of identity but also of efficiency that underline a common his-
torical and cultural identity which, due to the divided and complex institutional 
architecture, seems to be broken down. They also highlight the fact that within 
this federal system, there is a multiplication of levels of power that generates 
numerous costs and dysfunctions of governance while exacerbating a competi-
tive federalism and a competition between levels of power. They therefore pro-
pose to resolve various dysfunctions through refederalization of competences by 
emphasizing democratic but also functional considerations of simplification and 
modernization. Moreover, this frame seems to be close with the frame ‘lack of 
coherence’. However, they differ in the sense that the institutional architecture 
frame rather emphasizes the institutional processes and mechanisms while the lack 
of coherence frame points to fragmentation in the distribution of competences.
However, if we look at the other diagnostic frames that were used by the 
political elite, the frames used by the proponents of defederalization and the 
advocates of refederalization are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, 
the political elites who stress the lack of coordination emphasize the concern to 
obtain a uniform policy to the detriment, for example, of Belgium’s representa-
tion on the international scene. On the other hand, this need for coordination 
is also stressed in relation to more cross-cutting issues which advocate a unity 
of command to manage and coordinate policies in these areas of competence. 
This diagnostic frame that highlights the lack of coordination in the manage-
ment of common policies is particularly emphasized by the political elites who 
favor centripetal solutions. On the other hand, the political elites arguing for 
a defederalization of competences do not favor policy coordination but rather 
express a desire for greater autonomy in the representation of their interests at 
the level of international institutions and also in the management of more cross- 
cutting issues. These political elites advocating a centrifugal trajectory juggle 
with different argumentative logics by coupling and underlining their justi-
fications with identity-based arguments that protect their own interests and 
150 Laura Pascolo, Daan Vermassen, Min Reuchamps et al. 
identity, but also with arguments of efficiency highlighting considerations of 
subsidiarity and coordination of their specific competences.
Furthermore, by considering these opposing diagnostic frames, political elites 
who seek a centrifugal or centripetal response construct and attribute the under-
lying difficulties to their justifications around frames that can be understood as 
frames of responsibility. That is between, on the one hand, the intrinsic differ-
ences in ideological, political or even cultural visions between the two com-
munities and, on the other hand, the centrifugal pressures and demands fed by 
political elites with ever-increasing demands for the defederalization of com-
petences. Indeed, the problems are sometimes construed around the idea that 
there are fundamental differences in points of view and visions between the two 
communities. According to the political elites who mobilize this frame, political, 
economic and cultural differences do not allow for effective cooperation and 
work on common policies. In contrast, the political elites supporting the refed-
eralization attribute responsibility for competence management problems to the 
protagonists who have shaped federal dynamics and previous state reforms in a 
centrifugal movement of defederalization of responsibilities and competences. 
They propose the refederalization of competences by supporting, among other 
things, considerations of solidarity between different communities.
Finally, the last two frames underline the difficulties and problems concerning 
the management of particular competences and responsibilities at the level of 
power where they reside. On the one hand, supporters of defederalization argue 
that many competences and powers are still exercised by the federal authority 
and that, as a result, federalism is not yet fully achieved. This frame concerns the 
main diagnostic frame underlying the distribution of competences and powers 
mobilized by political elites in their media interventions to justify a defederal-
ization of competences. These political elites mobilize argumentative logics of 
efficiency, emphasizing that the substate levels are more qualified in terms of 
expertise and transparency but are also closer to the citizens to manage the com-
petences still devolved to the federal authority. On the other hand, supporters 
of refederalization point out that certain competences, responsibilities that were 
devolved during previous state reforms, do not function properly at the level of 
power where they are exercised and therefore justify a refederalization of these 
competences. Moreover, the political elites who point out these dysfunctions 
justify that a transfer of competences and responsibilities following a centripetal 
trajectory will allow for simplification but also for greater transparency and uni-
formity in the management of these institutions.
9.6 Conclusion
In recent years, the dynamics of Belgian federalism seem to have changed and 
highlight a reversal of the paradox of federalism. Through this chapter, the objec-
tive of this longitudinal analysis of the critical frame was to draw up and explore 
the positions and underlying argumentative logics mobilized by the political elites 
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to justify their centripetal or centrifugal positions regarding the distribution of 
powers and competences. The critical frame analysis has made it possible to high-
light various similar but also divergent diagnostic frames mobilized by political 
elites to correct dysfunctions in the distribution of powers and responsibilities 
along diametrically opposed trajectories (de-/refederalization). The political elites 
particularly mobilize argumentative logics of efficiency to justify their positions.
Moreover, this research highlighted the fact that the Belgian federal dynamics 
are being transformed. Indeed, although all six institutional reforms have sys-
tematically been driven by a centrifugal dynamic, the demands for defederaliza-
tion still seem to be important, particularly with regard to the Dutch-speaking 
political parties. However, since the last federal and regional elections in 2019, 
centripetal demands for refederalization of competences have become more 
prominent. These centripetal demands are particularly highlighted in the inter-
ventions in the written press of representatives of various political parties in the 
north of the country. However, the French-speaking parties have given greater 
support to these refederalization demands at least since the 2007 federal elections. 
In addition, during the 2019 election year, intermediate positions proposing a 
combination of the centrifugal and centripetal approaches appeared in the dis-
course of some political representatives from the north and south of the country. 
However, it is important to point out that these demands for refederalization or a 
hybrid trajectory are not shared by all political elites. However, the increasingly 
widespread demands by French- and Dutch-speaking political parties and elites 
for the refederalization of competences and the advent of this hybrid trajectory 
seem to indicate that a reversal of the paradox of federalism could prove probable 
and take shape in a possible future 7th reform of the state, the agreement sealing 
the current legislature of which seems to have laid the foundations for future 
discussions and talks.
Notes
 1 The French Christian-democrats (cdH), the Dutch Christian-democrats (CD&V), the 
French ecologist party (ECOLO), the French regionalist party (FDF/Défi), the Dutch 
ecologist party (Groen), the Dutch radical right party (LDD), the French liberal party 
(MR), the Dutch nationalist party (N-VA), the Dutch liberal party (Open VLD), the 
French radical right party (PP), the French socialist party (PS), the single unitary and 
radical left party (PTB/PVDA), the Dutch socialist party (sp.a), and the Dutch radical 
right party (VB).
 2 The main dailies selected for this research are for the Dutch-speaking press: De Morgen, 
De Standaard, De Tijd, Het Gazet van Anterwpen, Het Belang van Limburg, Het Nieuwsblad, 
Het Laaste Nieuws. For the French-speaking press: L’Avenir, L’Echo, La Dernière Heure, La 
Libre Belgique, Le Soir, Sud presse.
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VOTING FOR ‘THE OTHER SIDE’? 
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE 
BRUSSELS CAPITAL REGION
Benjamin Blanckaert, Didier Caluwaerts and  
Silvia Erzeel
10.1 Introduction
How should democracy be organized in countries that are deeply divided along 
ethnic, linguistic or religious lines? For decades, this question has sparked a 
fierce debate between two camps of constitutional engineers. Scholars follow-
ing Lijphart’s consociational model argue that deeply divided societies require a 
political system that institutionalizes conflict lines and turns ethnic, linguistic or 
religious identities into “constructive elements of a stable democracy” (Lijphart, 
1977: 42). Consociational democrats therefore follow a logic of separation in 
which voters, as bearers of ascriptive (ethnic, religious, linguistic…) identities, 
are supposed to support a party of their own ethnic bloc (so-called co-ethnic 
voting) and political parties are expected to seek votes among co-ethnic voters 
(‘co-ethnic vote-seeking’). The traditional examples are Northern Ireland, 
Burundi, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Belgium.
Centripetal democrats, in contrast, claim that divided societies are best served 
by electoral institutions that bring groups together and foster overarching identi-
ties (Horowitz, 1985, 1991; Reilly, 2001). They advocate institutions that encour-
age “inter-communal moderation by promoting multi-ethnic political parties, 
cross-cutting electoral incentives and intergroup accommodation” (Reilly, 2012: 
260). Ethnic conflict management is thus achieved by building institutions that 
foster cross-ethnic voting and require political candidates to seek cross-commu-
nity support, i.e. cross-ethnic vote-seeking (Horowitz, 1997; McCulloch, 2013). 
This model can be found amongst others in Fiji, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and South 
Tyrol.
In this enduring debate between consociational and centripetal democrats, 
the case of the Brussels Capital Region (BCR) in Belgium constitutes an inter-
esting anomaly. After all, contrary to Flanders and Wallonia, it is possible in 
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the BCR to engage in cross-ethnic voting1. In the officially bilingual region 
of Brussels, both French-speaking and Dutch-speaking parties field candidates, 
and voters are able to cast votes for parties from the other ethnolinguistic group. 
Hence, the BCR constitutes an interesting case to explore cross-ethnic voting in 
“the most perfect example of a consociation” (Lijphart, 1981: 8).
However, despite the theoretical possibility of Brussels voters to engage in 
cross-ethnic voting, little is known empirically about whether they actually do 
so. Our central question is therefore to what extent voters in the BCR cast 
votes for parties of the other linguistic group. In this chapter, we show that a 
fair number of voters do vote for ‘the other side’. More specifically, we find that 
French-speaking voters in Brussels find their way to right-wing conservative 
Flemish parties, and that this is due to the party offer within their linguistic 
group. Right-wing francophone voters, who arguably feel ‘unserved’ by the par-
ties on their side of the linguistic divide, cross-linguistic boundaries to vote for 
Flemish right-wing parties.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first discuss the consociational nature 
of the Brussels political system. Then we focus on the previous literature on 
cross-ethnic voting, before outlining the methods and the results.
10.2 Consociationalism in the BCR: Compromis à la belge
In Belgium’s consociational structure2, the BCR—officially created in 1989—
has always occupied a particular position and status. The Brussels political model 
is based on the pacification of conflicts between the Flemish and the French 
language community ( Janssens, 2018b). Language is an ethnic marker but 
unlike the two other unilingual regions in Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), 
the Brussels region is officially bilingual (and, in reality, even multilingual). The 
French speakers currently constitute a majority (80–85%) in the Brussels region, 
but before its ‘Frenchification’, Brussels has always been a primarily Dutch-
speaking region ( Janssens, 2018a; Witte & Van Velthoven, 2010). In Brussels 
(and Belgium), the ethnolinguistic cleavage mainly dominated the political scene 
from the 1950s to the 1980s. Nevertheless, the Brussels consociational model 
has largely managed to capture and absorb the tensions between both language 
communities, and frictions did never really turn violent.3
The BCR should not only be understood as a constituent region but also as 
a microcosm of the federal consociational system (Cochrane et al., 2018: 53). 
Exemplary of consociational power-sharing in Belgium, the Brussels Parliament 
consists of two linguistic groups (Dutch/French) and reserves 17 out of its 89 seats 
for Dutch-speaking politicians. Moreover, the double majority rule and the 
‘alarm bell’ procedure also protect the Dutch-speaking minority. At government 
level, the Dutch speakers are entitled to at least two ministerial positions and have 
de facto veto power (Coffé, 2006: 101). Central to its decision-making procedure 
are the principles of collegiality and consensus. All these mechanisms of minority 
protection, however, have substantially modified proportional representation 
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in the Brussels region (Bodson & Loizides, 2017). Hence, the Dutch-speaking 
minority in Brussels is overrepresented at parliamentary and governmental levels 
(so-called protective disproportional representation) (Bodson & Loizides, 2017: 87, 
Cochrane et al., 2018: 69).
This Dutch overrepresentation at the Brussels regional level, however, cannot 
be separated from the protective mechanisms granted to the French-speaking 
minority at the federal level. Furthermore, the Brussels’ system combines a pro-
portional list design with flexible lists, optional preferential voting and legally 
binding gender quotas. Voters can cast a vote for an entire party list or give one 
or more preferential votes to candidates on a list, but voting for (candidates on) 
different lists is not allowed.
Contrary to the two other regions in Belgium, both Dutch-speaking and 
French-speaking parties can field candidates in Brussels.4 This means that it is 
the only region in Belgium where cross-ethnic voting and vote-seeking are 
theoretically possible.5 Dutch-speaking voters in Brussels can vote for French-
speaking parties if they so desire, and vice versa. The language group to which 
voters belong is, moreover, not fixed. Since there is no sub-nationality or lin-
guistic nationality, voters are free to choose their language group at each election 
(Deschouwer, 2012; Pilet, 2005). Voters first have to indicate whether they want 
to vote for a Flemish or francophone list and only thereafter can they cast their 
vote for a specific party ( Janssens, 2018b).
For candidates on party lists, the language choice is more stringent: candi-
dates have to register on a list for either the Dutch or the French language group. 
The language in which the elected candidate takes the oath defines his or her 
language group and this choice is irreversible (Deschouwer, 2012). However, 
the oath has been broken several times in the past (Witte & Van Velthoven, 
2010). In 1971, for instance, Rassemblement Bruxellois placed candidates with a 
Dutch identity card that supported the FDF program on the Dutch-speaking list. 
These so-called faux Flamands or Flamands modérés were thus able to block the 
protection mechanisms for the Dutch-speaking minority.6 Furthermore, newly 
formed political parties also need to register as belonging to either the Dutch-
speaking or French-speaking language group. This means that, despite the bilin-
gual nature of the region, ‘bilingual parties’ do not exist7, but voting for a party 
of the other linguistic group is possible. Therefore, we will describe ‘cross-ethnic 
voting’ in greater detail in the next section.
10.3 Cross-ethnic voting
Cross-ethnic voting refers to the process whereby voters in deeply divided soci-
eties electorally support parties from other ethnic (or in Belgium: ethnolin-
guistic) groups (Reilly, 2020: 2–3). It is believed that such cross-ethnic voting 
would incentivize politicians to adopt moderate positions and policies and would 
as a result induce political stability. However, theory and empirical results on 
cross-ethnic voting are often contradictory. After all, the theoretical assumption 
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that parties in systems that allow for cross-ethnic voting and vote-seeking, will 
moderate their position to attract voters from the other ethnic groups (Horowitz, 
1985, 1991; Reilly, 2001, 2020), is widely discussed. Hulsey (2010) and Touquet 
(2011), for instance, demonstrated that cross-ethnic appeals and moderation 
toward voters from the other ethnic group(s) can be costly strategies for political 
parties. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the majority of voters in deeply divided 
societies cast votes for co-ethnic, rather than cross-ethnic, parties and candidates 
(Chauchard, 2016; Coakley & Fraenkel, 2017; Horowitz, 2000, Lijphart, 2004; 
O’Leary, 2013).
Although some voters do support parties from other ethnic groups, this 
cross-ethnic voting most likely occurs in majoritarian elections where voters are 
left with fewer parties on each side of the ethnic divide, and where crossing the 
ethnic divide increases party offer and choice (Horowitz, 1991; Stojanović & 
Strijbis, 2019). Proportional elections, in contrast, favor co-ethnic voting because 
there is much party offer on voter’s own side of the ethnic cleavage (Horowitz, 
1991; Reilly, 2012). Moreover, voters who do cross the ethnic divide in the elec-
toral arena are more likely to do so when parties have consistently held moderate 
positions (Garry, 2014). A party that previously presented itself as a defender of 
its ethnic group’s interests but now moderates its position might win more votes 
within its own ethnic bloc (McGlinchey, 2019) but might be less credible as an 
ethnic catch-all party for the voters of the rival group (Garry, 2014). Garry (2014) 
further argues that voters’ tendency to support parties from ‘the other side’ is based 
on the perceived ability to perform well in terms of representing all groups in 
society. In that sense, ethnic catch-all parties, i.e. parties that explicitly adopt mod-
erate positions on ethnic issues, would benefit more from cross-ethnic voting than 
their radical counterparts. Whereas the former moderate their policies (and avoid 
extreme positions) to appeal to a broad array of interests, the latter appeal to voters 
on the basis of their ethnic identification and maximize votes by adopting more 
extreme positions than their co-ethnic competitors (Horowitz, 1985).
10.4 The 2019 elections in Brussels
In this chapter, we study patterns of cross-ethnic voting in the regional elec-
tions of May 26, 2019 in Brussels. Regional elections are held every five years 
in Belgium, and since 2014, they have been concurrently organized with federal 
and European elections.
One of the main characteristics of the party system in Brussels is that it is 
highly fragmented. In the parliament of the BCR, 14 parties are represented. 
They belong to several party families, including the radical left (PTB, PVDA), 
greens (Ecolo, Groen), social democrats (PS, one.brussels-sp.a), Christian dem-
ocrats (cdH, CD&V), liberals (MR, Open VLD), regionalists (DéFI, N-VA) 
and the radical right (Vlaams Belang). In addition, two single-issue parties, 
DierAnimal and Agora, also each won one seat in 2019. The strength of the 
different parties varies, as shown in Table 10.1. Socialist and liberal parties in 
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both language groups and the regionalist party FDF in the French-speaking 
group, have been traditionally strong in the Brussels region, and continue to be. 
However, the ‘clear winners’ in the Brussels elections of 2019 were the green 
parties (especially Ecolo which obtained 15 seats in 2019 compared to 8 seats 
in 2014, but also Groen) and the radical left party PTB in the French-speaking 
group (Reuchamps et al., 2020: 346). The major losses were shared by the tra-
ditional parties on both sides of the left-right spectrum, including the socialist, 
liberal and Christian democratic parties. These results mirror trends found at 
the federal level in Belgium and in other regions as well (Pilet, 2021; van Erkel 
et al., 2020). After the election, a center-left coalition government was formed in 
Brussels, consisting of PS, Ecolo, DéFI, Groen, Open VLD and one.brussels-sp.a.
Of the 14 parties that are represented in the Brussels parliament, 3 most 
clearly articulate the interests of their own ethnolinguistic bloc: DéFI, N-VA 
and Vlaams Belang. DéFI and N-VA are ‘regionalist’ parties in the sense that they 
originated on the center-periphery and organize to represent “geographically 
concentrated peripheral minorities (…) by demanding recognition of their cul-
tural identity” (Türsan, 1998: 19). DéFI (before: FDF) grew out of the movement 
of francophones in Brussels, which defended the French language and the rights 
of French speakers in Brussels (van Haute & Pilet, 2006). The party competed for 
the first time in the 1965 general elections and quickly became, and remained, 
an important electoral player in Brussels. The party does not argue in favor of 
secession but supports a federal structure with a strong status for Brussels (van 
Haute & Pilet, 2006). Ideologically speaking, it is considered to be center-right 
on socioeconomic issues, but center-left on cultural ‘new politics’ issues such as 
lifestyle politics, identity and migration (Pilet, 2021; Walgrave et al., 2020b).
TABLE 10.1 Percentage of seats in the Parliament of the Brussels Capital Region, by party
Language group Party Number of seats Percentage of seats






Dutch-speaking Groen 4 4.5









Note: Percentages reflect the distribution at the start of the legislative term in 2019.
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The Dutch-speaking N-VA was created in 2001. It is linked with the Flemish 
movement and articulates the political interests of Flanders and the Flemish lan-
guage. N-VA initially struggled to meet the 5% electoral threshold in Belgium 
but recovered and became one of the major parties in Flanders, although its 
success in Brussels remains somewhat more limited (van Haute & Pilet, 2006; 
van Haute et al., 2018). The party aims to establish an “independent republic of 
Flanders”, which should develop as a result of “a gradual process of disappearance 
of the Belgian state” (van Haute et al., 2018: 959). N-VA is furthermore a right-
wing conservative party on both the socioeconomic and cultural dimensions 
(Pilet, 2021; Walgrave et al., 2020b).
Vlaams Belang, finally, is a populist radical right party that combines elements of 
nativism, authoritarianism and populism in its ideological program (Mudde, 2007). 
The party promotes Flemish secession and the immediate creation of an inde-
pendent Flemish state (van Haute et al., 2018). Despite its electoral successes in 
Flanders, the party is weaker in Brussels. As a result of the cordon sanitaire (see 
Chapter 5 in this volume), the party is never invited to become part of a coalition 
government.
10.5 Data and methods
For our exploration of cross-ethnic voting in the BCR, we rely on the EOS 
RepResent voter survey organized in Brussels at the occasion of the 2019 regional 
elections (Walgrave et al., 2020a). The EOS RepResent survey is a panel survey 
that was conducted among a representative sample of citizens in the Brussels, 
Flemish and Walloon regions at the occasion of the 2019 regional, federal and 
European elections. The organizing body of the survey was EOS RepResent, a 
research consortium funded by the FWO/FNRS Excellence of Science program, 
involving the Universiteit Antwerpen, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Université 
libre de Bruxelles, KULeuven and Université catholique de Louvain. The EOS 
RepResent interuniversity team was responsible for the development, organiza-
tion, and supervision of the survey.
The survey consisted of one pre-electoral and one post-electoral wave organized 
around the elections of May 26, 2019. The first wave involved 7,351 online inter-
views with eligible voters, of which 1,028 were in Brussels. The sample was intended 
to be representative of the voting-age population in terms of gender, education, 
age and party choice. In the final sample, higher educated voters, and age-groups 
between 45 and 65, were slightly overrepresented (van Erkel et al., 2020), and as is 
often the case in Brussels surveys, Dutch speakers were underrepresented due to 
difficult sampling conditions. Respondents who were successfully contacted in 
the first wave were asked to participate in the follow-up online survey conducted 
immediately after the elections. The second wave included a sample of 3,971 
respondents, of which 510 in Brussels. The response rate for this second wave 
was 53.3% in total and 49.6% in the Brussels region specifically. The two consec-
utive waves ran from April 5, 2019 until June 18, 2019. The pre-electoral waves 
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gathered information on voters’ sociodemographic background, their political 
resources, political engagement, ideological viewpoints, attitudes toward rep-
resentation and democratic resentment, voting intentions etc. The data gathered 
in the weeks following the election focused on respondents’ actual voting behav-
ior (Walgrave et al., 2020a).
Our main interest in this chapter is voters’ support for parties on the other side 
of the ethnolinguistic divide; hence, French-speaking voters’ support for Flemish 
parties and Dutch-speaking voters’ support for francophone parties in Brussels. 
In order to measure party support, we rely on two survey questions. The first 
question asked voters to indicate their vote intentions in the pre-electoral wave: 
“If there were elections for the Parliament of Brussels today, for which party 
would you vote?”. The second question asked voters to indicate their actual 
vote choice in the post-electoral wave: “For which party did you vote for the 
Parliament of Brussels during the regional elections of 26th May 2019?”. The 
answer categories were the same for both questions. Respondents could indi-
cate their preferred party from a list of 14 parties and a general category of 
‘other parties’, or they could indicate that they voted ‘blank or invalid’, ‘did not 
vote’, ‘cannot vote’ or ‘do not remember’. The Flemish parties included CD&V, 
Groen, N-VA, Open VLD, PVDA, one.brussels-sp.a and Vlaams Belang. The 
francophone parties included cdH, DéFI, Ecolo, MR, Parti Populaire, PS and 
PTB. Although both survey questions are widely used in voter survey research, 
each question also comes with some limitations. Voting intentions do not meas-
ure actual voting behavior, whereas questions on vote choice suffer from recall 
problems (Dassonneville & Hooghe, 2017). By considering the answers of voters 
on both survey questions, we conduct a mutual robustness check.
In our measurement of cross-ethnic voting, respondents’ voting intentions 
and vote choice are linked to their own language. The latter is measured by 
looking at the language respondents used to complete the survey. At the start of 
the questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate their preferred language 
(either Dutch or French). We consider this survey question to be a proxy for the 
language voters are most fluent in. Ideally, we would have used a more inform-
ative question with a more direct measurement of the language(s) voters speak 
on a regular basis and/or their linguistic identities, but unfortunately, such a 
question was not available in the survey. We also cannot rely on official language 
registration data because voters do not have to register in advance, and they can 
change language groups at each election.
Later in the chapter, we will also run multivariate analyses to explain 
cross-ethnic voting patterns in Brussels. For these analyses, we included two 
explanatory variables, out-group attitudes and left-right self-placement. Voters’ 
out-group feelings are measured on a 0–100 scale using the following survey 
question: “Could you use the scale below to indicate how you feel about the 
[other ethnolinguistic group]? (0–50 = not very favorable, 50 = neutral, 50–100 = 
very favorable)”. Left-right placement is measured on a continuous 0–10 scale by 
considering respondents’ answers to the following question: “In politics, people 
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often talk of ‘left’ or ‘right’. Can you place your own convictions on a scale from 
0 to 10, with 0 meaning ‘left’, 5 ‘in the centre’ and 10 ‘right’?”.
Finally, the multivariate models include control variables. Age is measured as 
a continuous variable. Respondents’ sex (female = 1) and educational attainment 
(recoded to three categories: ‘no or lower education’, ‘secondary education/high 
school’ and ‘higher education’) control for sociological vote determinants. Three 
scale variables (political interest, political trust and satisfaction with policy) control 
for differences in political attitudes and opinions. Political interest is measured 
by asking respondents how interested they are in politics in general with a scale 
ranging from 0 (‘not interested at all’) to 10 (‘extremely interested’). Political 
trust was measured by asking respondents to indicate on a scale ranging from 0 
(‘absolutely no confidence’) to 10 (‘complete confidence’) how much trust they 
had in four institutions: political parties, the federal parliament, politicians and 
the European Union (sum scale with Cronbach’s alpha = .927). Finally, political 
satisfaction is measured by considering to what extent they are satisfied with the 
policies implemented by the government of Brussels on a scale ranging from 0 
(‘very unsatisfied’) to 10 (‘very satisfied’).
10.6 Cross-ethnic voting in Brussels
Even though Brussels voters have the opportunity to cast a vote for a party from 
the other ethnolinguistic group, the BCR’s proportional representation (PR list) 
electoral system does not give them a lot of institutional incentives to do so. After 
all, its system is predominantly based on an electoral logic of separation, whereby 
Brussels voters are supposed to vote for a party of their own ethnolinguistic bloc.8
Despite the lack of institutional incentives, and despite the consociational 
nature of Brussels electoral institutions, we see that a fair number of voters 
do indeed cross the linguistic divide. Table 10.2 shows that about 11.6% of all 
French-speaking respondents intended to vote for a Dutch-speaking party (wave 
1 of the EOS survey), and that about 10.4% actually did so in the voting booth 
(wave 2). Moreover, and even though we should be careful drawing conclusions 
on the Dutch-speaking side due to the low N, we find that 28% of the Dutch 
speakers had a pre-electoral intention to vote for French-speaking parties, and 
in the end, about 15.8% actually did cast a cross-ethnic vote. Even though Table 
10.2 supports previous studies’ findings that cross-ethnic voting is rare compared 
to co-ethnic voting, the result that cross-ethnic voting does take place is strong 
and statistically significant. The conclusion is therefore that cross-ethnic voting 
not only theoretically can but also empirically does take place in the BCR, even 
if the political infrastructure is conducive to institutionalizing ethnolinguistic 
differences, rather than mitigating them.
The willingness to engage in cross-ethnic voting might be surprising, but we 
should bear in mind that voting across linguistic lines has been made ‘costless’ 
in Brussels. Due to the system of fixed allocation of seats between both lan-
guage groups (17 seats are reserved for Dutch speakers, 72 for French speakers), 
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voting for a party of the other group does not come at an electoral cost for one’s 
own group. This might explain why some—often highly educated—voters have 
voted for the other linguistic group, especially when there was a fear that radical 
parties could block the institutions.
Table 10.2 only gives us an indication of whether cross-ethnic voting takes 
place, but it does not give us a conclusive answer to the question of which parties 
benefit most from it. Previous literature would have us expect that ethnically 
(or ethnolinguistically) moderate parties would benefit most from cross-ethnic 
votes, whereas parties that explicitly claim to represent their linguistic group’s 
interest will be less successful in attracting votes from the other side. We there-
fore also disaggregated the results by parties (Table 10.3).
Because of the low number of respondents, the results for Dutch-speaking 
voters are not conclusive. The results on the francophone side, however, are 
much more interesting. Table 10.3 shows that few voters (intend to) cast a vote 
for ethnic catch-all parties, such as the socialist party one.brussels-sp.a, the liberal 
party Open VLD or the Christian democratic party CD&V. However, and most 
interestingly, the table also reports that 6.4% (n = 49) of the French-speaking 
respondents intended to vote for the Flemish N-VA and Vlaams Belang in the 
months before the election, and that 6.9% actually did so in the voting booth. 
Most French speakers who engage in cross-ethnic voting thus vote for right-
wing Flemish nationalist parties. This disconfirms previous findings (Chauchard 
2016; Horowitz, 2000) that voters who engage in cross-ethnic voting will sup-
port parties that explicitly position themselves as ethnic catch-all parties, or in 
the absence thereof, will support parties that do not explicitly present themselves 
as ethnic outbidders. We rather find that they vote for parties that position them-
selves as defenders of the other linguistic group’s interests.
The paradoxical finding that a significant number of French-speaking voters 
support parties that explicitly aim to undermine francophone interests begs the 
question of why French-speaking voters in Brussels decide to vote for these parties. 
TABLE 10.2 Number and percentage of Brussels voters engaging in cross-ethnic 
compared to co-ethnic voting











36 (72.0%) 89 (11.6%) 16 (84.2%) 41 (10.4%)
French-speaking 
party
14 (28.0%) 679 (88.4%) 3 (15.8%) 352 (89.6%)
Total 50 (100%) 768 (100%) 19 (100%) 393 (100%)
N = 818; Chi2 = 132.337; DF = 1; 
Cramer’s V = .402; p > .001
N = 412; Chi2 = 82.755; DF = 1; 
Cramer’s V = .448; p > .001
Note: Gray shades indicate cross-ethnic voting.
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One potential explanation is out-group attitudes. We can expect evaluations of the 
other linguistic group (and their leaders) to shape voters’ choices in the polling booth 
(McNicholl, 2018). The more voters trust ‘the other side’ and their representatives, 
the less hesitation they will demonstrate to support cross-ethnic parties and can-
didates. As such, more positive out-group evaluations can be expected to increase the 
propensity to engage in cross-ethnic voting.
The second potential explanation is party offer. In a context of partisan 
dealignment (Dalton, 2019), it is likely that some French-speaking voters 
are unsatisfied with the party offer within their own ethnic bloc and that 
such ‘unserved’ voters consider voting for a party from the other group. For 
instance, a francophone right-wing voter in Brussels might consider voting for 
a Flemish right-wing party because there simply is no right-wing party at offer 
within the French-speaking group. Even though no less than seven French-
speaking parties compete for the support of the voter, the ideological variation 
on the right side of the political spectrum is relatively limited. The only party 
that explicitly positions itself on the right side of the center is MR, but this 
party is only right-wing on economic issues, and much less on cultural, ‘new 
politics’ issues such as lifestyle politics, identity and migration. Since there 
is no real culturally right-wing party on offer on the French-speaking list, 
TABLE 10.3 Number and percentage of Brussels voters engaging in cross-ethnic voting 
by party












cdH 3 (6.0%) 29 (3.8%) 1 (5.3%) 21 (5.3%)
DeFI 2 (4.0%) 133 (17.3%) 1 (5.3%) 79 (20.1%)
Ecolo 5 (10.0%) 189 (24.6%) 0 (0%) 74 (18.8%)
MR 2 (4.0%) 149 (19.4%) 0 (0%) 71 (18.1%)
PP 1 (2.0%) 25 (3.3%) 0 (0%) 6 (1.5%)
PS 1 (2.0%) 90 (11.7%) 1 (5.3%) 57 (14.5%)




CD&V 9 (18.0%) 9 (1.2%) 4 (21.1%) 3 (.8%)
Groen 6 (12.0%) 14 (1.8%) 2 (10.5%) 3 (.8%)
N-VA 10 (20.0%) 37 (4.8%) 4 (21.1%) 18 (4.6%)
Open VLD 2 (4.0%) 9 (1.2%) 1 (5.3%) 4 (1.0%)
PVDA 0 (0%) 1 (.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
one.
brussels-sp.a
7 (14.0%) 7 (.9%) 4 (21.1%) 4 (1.0%)
Vlaams 
Belang
2 (4.0%) 12 (1.6%) 1 (5.3%) 9 (2.3%)
Total 50 (100%) 768 (100%) 19 (100%) 393 (100%)
N = 818; Chi2 = 174.886; 
df = 13; Cramer’s V = 
.462; p = .000
N = 412; Chi2 = 120.760; 
df = 12; Cramer’s V = .541; 
p = .000
Note: Gray shades indicate cross-ethnic voting.
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right-wing Flemish N-VA and Vlaams Belang, despite their anti-francophone 
and secessionist stance, seem to benefit the most from campaigning in both 
languages in Brussels.
Both expectations are confirmed by Table 10.4. The table analyses the deter-
minants for a cross-ethnic vote among French-speaking voters in Brussels. 
The results confirm that cross-ethnic voting among French-speaking voters is 
inspired by ethnolinguistic considerations, but only to a limited extent. French-
speaking voters with positive attitudes about Dutch speakers tend to vote sig-
nificantly more often for Flemish nationalist parties. However, the table also 
shows that ideological concerns (in particular left-right self-placement) are much 
more strongly related to a vote for Flemish nationalist parties. Voters’ choice is 
rather inspired by the ideological fault line, as is clear from the fact that left-right 
self-placement is the determining factor of a vote for N-VA or Vlaams Belang. 
These results suggest that right-wing francophone voters find their way to right-
wing Flemish parties because of their ideological stance.
A final explanation, which the data do not allow us to test empirically, could 
also be that Brussels voters can also cast a cross-ethnic vote for strategic reasons, for 
instance, to keep a party from the other bloc out of power (Verthé et al., 2017). The 
Brussels coalition is often a coalition of moderates. It can be expected that other 
Flemish parties will seek cross-ethnic votes to stop right-wing Flemish parties from 
becoming all too powerful in the small Dutch-speaking group. They can do so by 
convincing francophone voters of their own program or conducting a campaign 
against the right-wing Flemish parties by trying to get votes from francophone 
voters who fear the electoral success of such parties within the Flemish college 
(Pilet, 2005). In that sense, they would encourage strategic voting on behalf of the 
TABLE 10.4 Binomial logistic regression model predicting a francophone cross-ethnic 
vote for Flemish nationalist parties (N-VA and Vlaams Belang)
B(SE) Sign.
Constant −6.236 (1.555) .000
Sex Male REF
Female –.715 (.612) .243
Education None or lower education REF
Secondary education –1.361 (.911) .135
Higher education –.311 (.729) .669
Age –.014 (.016) .392
Political interest .110 (.114) .334
Political trust .069 (.133) .605
Satisfaction with Brussels 
government policies
–.122 (.118) .304
Attitude toward other 
linguistic group
.021 (.011) .046
Left-right self-placement .452 (.131) .001
Nagelkerke R2 25.7%
N = 768
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francophone voters to diminish the risk of an electoral victory for right-wing par-
ties within the small Flemish college. Furthermore, voters should be more willing 
to express support for a non-co-ethnic candidate who is endorsed by one of their 
own co-ethnic politicians (Arriola et al., 2017).
10.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focused on voting patterns in the BCR, an institutional anom-
aly in the Belgian political structure. Politics in Brussels is organized around the 
recognition of two linguistic groups, even though both voters and politicians 
are given the opportunity to engage in cross-ethnic voting and vote-seeking. 
Our results show that voters do indeed use this opportunity: about 10–11% of all 
voters do cast a vote for a candidate of the other linguistic group, and the parties 
most benefiting from cross-ethnic votes are Flemish right-wing conservative 
parties. Moreover, our data find that a francophone vote for a Flemish nationalist 
party is primarily driven by out-group attitudes and ideological self-placement. 
French speakers voting for the other side are generally more positive about the 
out-group and are generally more right-wing. The latter finding suggests that 
at least part of the francophone electorate feels ‘unserved’ by the francophone 
parties in Brussels. Even though this finding is interesting, qualitative follow-up 
research should reveal why French-speaking voters feel attracted to parties that 
explicitly defend the Dutch speakers’ interests.
Even though the motivations of voters are still unclear, what our results do 
show, however, is that a logic of separation (members from one segment must 
be represented by MPs belonging to the same segment) is not a conditio sine qua 
non to turn a divided society into a stable democracy. Even though cross-ethnic 
voting does take place, the BCR is quite stable. After all, it has a balanced gov-
ernment, the coalition is rather stable and there are relatively few protests against 
the Brussels government. Despite its complex institutional setup, the Brussels 
system is sustainable and well functioning.
Notes
 1 Throughout the chapter, we systematically use the term ‘cross-ethnic voting’ since it is a 
reference concept in the international literature on ethnic conflict management. How-
ever, in the context of Brussels, it is important to point out that cross-ethnic voting refers 
to the process whereby voters electorally support parties from other ethnolinguistic groups.
 2 For a more in-depth review of Belgium as a consociational democracy, see Chapter 9.
 3 Except maybe for the grim atmosphere during the Marsen op Brussel in 1961 and 1962, 
and the Louvain crisis in May 1968.
 4 That is why in Brussels, most candidates campaign and publish manifestos in both official 
(and sometimes even other) languages (Jarrett, 2016; Pilet, 2005). Given that roughly 80% 
of voters in Brussels are francophone, cross-ethnic campaign strategies are particularly 
interesting for Flemish parties. Even a small share of cross-ethnic votes can thus hugely 
impact the electoral results within the Dutch-speaking college. Flemish parties therefore 
make specific appeals to the francophone and other (non-Belgian) communities (Jarrett, 
2016).
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 5 In the past, cross-ethnic vote-pooling has sometimes been seen as controversial. Before 
2011, the Brussels Capital Region did not constitute a separate electoral district but 
formed the central electoral district of ‘Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde’ (BHV) that was com-
posed of 19 communes of the bilingual Brussels region and 35 communes of the province 
of Flemish Brabant in the unilingual Flemish region. This district crossed the language 
border and led to recurring conflicts between both language groups (Deschouwer, 2012; 
Sinardet, 2010), putting pressure on the country’s stability. An agreement was only found 
in 2011. The agreement included the splitting of the BHV district into a unilingual 
Dutch-speaking district of Flemish Brabant and a bilingual Brussels Capital district, as 
well as ‘special modalities’ for the French-speaking citizens in the six municipalities with 
language facilities surrounding Brussels (Goossens, 2017). Hence, since 2011, the possi-
bility for cross-ethnic vote-pooling remains only possible in the Brussels region.
 6 Eleven of them got elected in the ‘Agglomeratieraad’ in 1971.
 7 However, the party Pro Bruxsel, founded in 2008, claims to be Belgium’s first translin-
guistic party (Euractiv, 2009; Jarrett, 2016). During the 2009 and 2014 regional elections 
in Brussels, the party submitted both French and Dutch language group lists, but no one 
was ever elected at the regional level. A list needs to gather at least 5% of the votes within 
its language group (Cochrane et al., 2018: 78).
 8 Other institutions, such as Alternative Vote and Single Transferable Vote, are generally 
believed to foster more cross-ethnic voting.
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FEDERALIZATION OF THE  
BELGIAN NATIONAL PAST




Is Belgium exceptional in terms of memory issues? To address this question, 
this chapter focuses on Belgian authorities’ attitudes (whether at the federal or 
regional level) toward two controversial episodes in the national past, the col-
laboration with Germany during WWII and the colonization of Congo. Both 
episodes are comparable in terms of their demographic importance, as they had 
an undeniable impact on society while only concerning a tiny portion of the 
citizens.1 Moreover, these two events are particularly salient with regard to the 
crucial question of how groups with diverging memories coexist.
The current situation in Belgium reflects one of the critical questions that 
arise at a national level in numerous countries: how can communities digest 
“a past that is hard to swallow” (Conan & Rousso, 1994)? No Western state 
has been spared controversies relating to WWII (Mink & Neumayer, 2007). 
As for the colonial past, no country has found it easy to take on board a part 
of history that many people, especially young people, see as a mistake or fail-
ure (Spencer & Valassopoulos, 2021). However, there is one factor specific to 
Belgium: the language tensions gradually tearing apart the nation’s fabric. As 
this chapter suggests, the increasingly frequent doubts voiced as to how long 
the country will survive have influenced representations of Belgium’s his-
tory. After observing the ‘federalization’ of memories of WWII (Labio, 2002), 
can we detect the same process regarding memories of the country’s colonial 
legacy?
The aim of the chapter is not to present a thorough historiographical study 
of these two periods. Instead, it focuses on the ways in which they have been 
represented, and how these portrayals have evolved over time. To detect poten-
tial Belgian specificities, it is worth exploring the attitudes of other European 
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authorities toward collaboration and colonization.2 The limited scope of this 
chapter does not allow for a systematic comparative analysis. Nonetheless, it 
underlines some major similarities and contrasts with two neighboring coun-
tries, France and the Netherlands. France is one of the most emblematic cases 
in memory politics, as the evolution of the official representations of the Vichy 
regime and the colonization of Algeria demonstrates.3 The added value of the 
Dutch case results from a common feature with Belgium: the existence of 
a monarchy. In the three cases (Belgium, France, and the Netherlands), the 
same fundamental trend can be observed: the gradual fragmentation of a sup-
posedly smooth and reliable national version of history. However, beyond this 
common trend, the shift in the two narrative templates indicates the existence 
of some Belgian specificities. The guiding question throughout the analysis 
concerns the origins of these specificities: are they all related to the fact that 
Belgium is a “deeply divided society” (Guelke, 2012)? If so, does this charac-
teristic impact the official representation of collaborationism and colonialism 
in the same way?
The analysis is divided into three parts. The first underlines the research 
posture adopted in the study. The second looks at the gradual polarization 
of the representations of collaboration during WWII. The third stresses the 
references – or the lack thereof – made to the colonization of the Congo. From 
a methodological perspective, the chapter combines two main approaches. The 
first is based on a corpus of official speeches, parliamentary documents, news 
articles, and commemorative monuments. The second results from interviews 
with families affected by the repression of collaborators during WWII or the 
return of colonists in 1960.4 These interviews were conducted three generations 
from both sides of the linguistic border. Research on the intergenerational 
transmission of narratives and emotions reminds us that drawing a line between 
the past and the present is a far more complex process than it appears at first 
glance. The Belgian case indicates that this complexity is further increased in a 
context characterized by three main features: an ongoing federalization process, 
nationalist tendencies that emphasize particular narratives of the past to justify 
the need for independence, and relative indifference of the federal State, which 
does not provide a strong national counter-narrative (Hirst & Fineberg, 2012).
11.2 Research posture: broadening the approach
Human memory makes it possible to encode, preserve, transform, and restore 
lived and transmitted experiences. It refers to a set of psychological functions 
by which humans can update past impressions or information. In this regard, 
memory cannot be an exact and perfect reflection of the past: it is only its 
evocation or trace (Kensinger, 2009; Lavabre, 1994). Memories are not literally 
preserved but are reconstructed according to the present context. It is from this 
perspective that Halbwachs developed the concept of collective memory dur-
ing the interwar years. Contesting the notion of isolated individual memory, 
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the French sociologist emphasized the influence of the social on the content of 
individual memories (1997: 52). In Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, he demon-
strated that, over the course of an era, it is a group’s shared beliefs and its col-
lective experiences that shape the meaning of individual memories, and not the 
other way around (1994). When the notion of collective memory resurfaced 
at the end of the 1970s, it was in the realm of history, not sociology. As Nora 
argued, collective memory is “what remains of the past in the groups’ experi-
ences, or rather what these groups do with the past” (1978: 401). Since then, 
this notion has gradually spread throughout the humanities and social sciences 
(Kurze & Lamont, 2019; Olick, 2007; Olick et al., 2011).
Despite the wealth of existing literature, there remain two major limitations 
to collective memory studies. The first concerns the relatively partial nature of 
studies devoted to the management of conflicting memories. These generally 
focus on only one of the two dimensions that constitute the subject under exam-
ination. The first of these is the choice of the past, referring to how memory 
agents strategically mobilize the past (Assmann & Conrad, 2010; Langenbacher 
& Shain, 2010; Ricoeur, 2000). The second is the weight of the past: this aspect 
is more concerned with the traces or imprints left by the past on individuals 
and groups (Bell, 2010; Davoine & Gaudillière, 2006; Rosenblum, 2009). The 
aim of this chapter is to better understand the articulation between the macro 
level, most often reduced to the strategic dimension, and the micro level, which 
has been almost exclusively analyzed through the prism of ‘trauma’ (Margry & 
Sanchez-Carretero, 2011). It is thus critical to examine the intertwining mech-
anisms operating at the official and individual levels. In this regard, the Belgian 
case study is exemplary because political adversaries continually activate both 
dimensions (choice/weight of the past).
The second limitation of collective memory studies relates to the temporal 
dimension of the research conducted to date. Understanding the mechanisms of 
intergenerational transmission necessarily implies a broadening of the timescale. 
Rather than limiting itself to studying one generation of actors, this chapter is 
based on research projects that consider three generations within each family 
studied. This ambition is demanding, but it is a sine qua non condition for identi-
fying tensions, gaps, and even contradictions between one linguistic community 
and another and from one generation to the next.
One of the main questions that arise throughout the study concerns the 
degree of compatibility of the observed representations of the past. Do the 
various accounts of collaborationism and colonialism result from a series of 
different viewpoints or do they reveal fundamental contradictions, whereby 
one version of events is systematically denied by another? Addressing this 
question in the Belgian case is particularly stimulating since it allows us to 
combine two main variables: the linguistic community (French-speakers ver-
sus Dutch-speakers) and the generational dimension (G1: one of the children 
of the collaborator/colonist, G2: one of their grandchildren, G3: one of their 
great-grandchildren). Potential overlaps between G3 narratives on both sides 
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of the linguistic border would indicate the significance of a generational 
effect beyond the stories emphasized by each community’s representatives. 
Conversely, repetition of the same diverging narratives across generations 
on each side would indicate the depth of the divide between communities, 
independently of the generational effect. Accordingly, Belgian exceptional-
ism allows us to analyze closely the articulation between variables relevant in 
several countries in Europe.
11.3 Collaboration: long-lasting divisive memories
11.3.1 Historical context
During WWI, three categories of Belgians were classified as traitors: Flemish 
and Walloon activists, those who had made their fortune from the war, and 
spies paid by the occupying authorities. Reprisals against these traitors lasted a 
relatively short time. Between 1919 and 1922, 3900 cases were brought to court; 
a few dozen death sentences were pronounced, and none of them were ever 
carried out. The nationalist wing of the Flemish Movement would, however, 
during the interwar period and even beyond, preserve the memory of Flemish 
activists and portray these events as an injustice committed by the Belgian State 
against the Flemish cause. In January 1921, two Flemish Socialists put a ques-
tion to the Belgian government concerning the severity of the judicial meas-
ures taken against certain activists who ‘committed a political error in good 
faith’, and asked whether it might not be appropriate to extend clemency to 
them. The French-speaking press in Flanders reacted violently and equated the 
whole Flemish Movement with the shameful memory of a few activists. The 
stereotypical portrayal of a pro-German Flanders spread rapidly throughout 
the Francophone press and continued to grow stronger throughout the interwar 
period. Over a period of approximately 10 years, Belgian memories of the WWI 
became fragmented: Flemish and French-speaking historical versions began to 
diverge (Beyen, 2002; Rosoux and van Ypersele, 2012; Warland, 2019).
This fragmented memory of WWI had an undeniable impact on how peo-
ple acted in the WWII (Kesteloot, 2013). Thus, the VNV (Vlaams Nationaal 
Verbond, a Flemish nationalist party, 15% in the 1939 elections) collaborated 
with the German occupiers with a view to obtaining independence. This hope 
explains why collaboration was less contested in Flanders than in Wallonia, 
where there were also collaboration movements. One of the most famous exam-
ples is the extensive collaboration of the far-right party ‘Rex’, led by the French 
speaker Léon Degrelle.5
By 1945, some voices in Flanders demanded the consideration of mitigat-
ing circumstances for Flemish collaborators (again, citing the traitors’ idealism 
to mask their antidemocratic tendencies). On the Francophone side, there was 
a unanimous demand to strike uncompromisingly against traitors. This atti-
tude explains why any proposed amnesty was systematically rejected. In short, 
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repression crystallized new memory conflicts: the French intransigence once 
more gave the impression that the Belgian State was unduly harsh vis-à-vis 
the Flemings. However, this time, this impression was not only experienced 
in nationalist circles but also reached a large segment of Flemish public opinion 
(De Guissmé et al., 2017).
Today, in a context where the memory of the Holocaust has acquired a 
central place, Flemish historiography has stopped idealizing Flemish collab-
oration with the Nazi regime. Yet, current memories of the collaboration 
remain highly divergent (De Guissmé et al., 2017). A survey conducted in 2018 
confirms that, overall, Dutch speakers perceive collaboration as more morally 
acceptable, and more of them support an amnesty for former collaborators, than 
their Francophone counterparts (Bouchat et al., 2020). These findings indicate 
that, 75 years after its end, the issue of collaboration during WWII still divides 
Belgian society.
11.3.2  Belgian specificities: the absence of amnesty and  
the royal question
Beyond this divide, we can observe the same trend in Belgium, France, and 
the Netherlands: a shift from denial of the collaboration with Nazi Germans 
(thanks to a strong emphasis on resistance against them – see Lagrou, 2007) 
to acknowledgment (the collaboration was more than a simple blip). In 2007, 
the report Docile Belgium, commissioned by the Belgian Parliament, presented 
Belgium’s collaboration with the Nazis in detail (explaining its ‘economic, 
ideological and legal-administrative’ dimensions). In France, the 1995 speech 
by then-President Jacques Chirac acknowledging French responsibility for a 
major roundup of Jews in 1942, the ‘Vel d’Hiv’ roundup can be considered 
a turning point in terms of strategic narratives. Since then, except for some 
negationists, no one can decently deny the repressive, anti-Semitic, and pro- 
German collaboration that was official policy under Vichy. The deconstruction 
of the resistantialist myth started later in the Netherlands, where for a long 
time the official narrative focused on the collective opposition of Dutch society 
to German occupying forces. It was only in January 2020 that Dutch Prime 
Minister Mark Rutte apologized for the first time on behalf of the government 
for the wartime persecution of Jews, saying that too many Dutch civil servants 
“carried out the orders of the occupiers”.
Another common feature between the three countries is that the passage of 
time has not fully exorcised the ghosts of the past. To the Belgian sociologist Luc 
Huyse, the swift and severe purge option chosen after the war in the three coun-
tries6 resulted in a problematic relationship with the past: “In the Netherlands, 
the emotion reappears like malaria: years of silence alternate with periods of 
high tension. Belgium is a case of chronic fever. Discussions on what happened 
during and shortly after the war are never far away. In France, this element of 
the past is […] the source of an almost incurable neurosis” (Huyse, 1995: 77). 
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In the three countries, memories of humiliation, scorn, and unfair treatment 
have been transmitted down through the generations. The fact that collaborators 
were amnestied in France and the Netherlands, and not in Belgium, did not 
alleviate the memories related to the clampdown on collaborators. However, the 
absence of amnesty in Belgium explains to some extent the ongoing dimension 
of the debate between the two sides of the linguistic borders. All demands to 
rehabilitate collaborators or compensate “victims of postwar repression or their 
descendants” (to take the words used in a motion supported by Flemish-speaking 
far-right parties in 2011) have been systematically rejected by the Walloon 
Socialist Party (PS).7
Besides the issue of amnesty, one key aspect of Belgian exceptionalism 
is a result of one of the most serious crises faced by the monarchy: the Royal 
Question. From 1945 to 1951, there was significant tension between the Belgian 
government and King Leopold III about his role during the war. While the 
government went into exile in France, Leopold III remained in Belgium and 
was taken into captivity in 1944. After his liberation by the Allies in May 1945, 
the government suspected him of authoritarian sympathies and refused to allow 
the King to return to his functions. The popular consultation organized in 1950 
deeply divided the country. The narrow majority (57%) who called for the 
King’s return were mainly Flemish citizens, whereas citizens from Brussels and 
Wallonia generally opposed it. The King’s return to Belgium led to widespread 
demonstrations in Wallonia and a general strike. The deterioration of the situ-
ation led to Leopold III’s abdication in favor of his son Baudouin in July 1951. 
The Royal Question – for which there is no equivalent event in French or Dutch 
history – crystallized the linguistic question.
Since then, Belgian politicians from both communities have regularly 
exploited the issues of collaboration and amnesty for political purposes. In 
October 2014, for instance, criticism of the coalition between Liberals 
and Flemish nationalists of the N-VA party provoked a heated debate in the 
Belgian Parliament. Evoking the ‘noise of the boots’ that resonated within the 
Belgian government, one of the leading socialist MPs emphasized the links 
between some N-VA members and former WWII collaborators. Five years later, 
the same comment was made in the aftermath of the federal elections. In January 
2021, to give a final example, the inclusion of two Nazi collaborators in a profile 
of historical figures who were significant in the founding of Flanders as a leg-
islative region immediately led to national and even international controversy.8
All these elements show that political exploitation of the legacy of WWII has 
increasingly fueled tensions between the two linguistic communities and con-
tributed to their disunity. This fragmentation is also noticeable if we consider the 
way in which families affected by reprisals against collaborators refer – or choose 
not to refer – to this traumatic event. Admittedly, we can hardly categorize all 
Belgian citizens based only on their linguistic community. The case of bilin-
gual families or German speakers, for instance, not to mention the case of refu-
gees who recently migrated to Belgium, rapidly shows the limits of the exercise. 
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Nonetheless, it is striking that most Dutch-speaking families actively discuss 
collaboration, while French-speaking families still perceive this phenomenon as 
particularly stigmatizing. To take only one concrete example, several French-
speaking interviewees asked for their testimonies to remain anonymous because 
they were ‘afraid’ that their grandchildren ‘could lose their jobs’. Others expressed 
intense emotions, explaining that there was nobody to whom they could talk 
about this story. We have not, to date, observed these reactions among Flemish 
families. Similarly, the number of explicit references to ‘secrets’, ‘unspeakable 
realities’, and ‘unspoken words’ reveals that this past is still perceived as a burden 
in Wallonia.
In this respect, one interview was particularly telling. After speaking at length 
without any interruption, a woman concluded with the following words: “My 
father became very rich – millions [sic]. We had seven servants at home. But he 
did not know anything. He did not know that the Germans made lampshades 
from the skin of the Jews. He did not know that”. She then started crying before 
explaining that she never wanted to have children but that she had been a pedi-
atrician all her life - to help as many children as possible” (Brussels, October 3, 
2019). Interestingly, interviews also showed that family members who decided to 
talk about their experience during the war were mostly condemned for it by their 
siblings. Once again, the reaction of the granddaughter of a French-speaking 
collaborator is emblematic. Speaking to her sister, who wanted to further explore 
their ancestor’s responsibility for roundups of Jews during the war, she said, “We 
already organized a mass for the family 15 years ago. Stop that now” (Louvain-la- 
Neuve, October 28, 2019).
Do these reactions illustrate any Belgian specificity? Probably not. French and 
Dutch descendants of collaborators are also deeply affected (Venken & Röger, 
2015). However, what is specific to Belgium is the contrast between the reactions 
in the different communities. The dividing effect of these memory discrepan-
cies is reinforced by two key elements: the weakness or even inexistence of any 
unifying national memory of the war and the mutual ignorance of the other 
side’s media coverage. Since the news in the different parts of the country rarely 
coincides, this mutual ignorance favors the multiplication of misunderstandings 
between communities, stereotypes, and simplified visions of the other (Klein 
et al., 2012).
11.4  Colonization: consensual silence 
and memory resurgence
11.4.1 Historical context
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Belgian authorities represented 
the colonial past in such a way as to glorify the country’s achievements. Belgian 
school textbooks were remarkably similar to the equally uncritical Petit Lavisse 
schoolbook used by schoolchildren in France. All emphasis was placed on the 
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benefits of colonization since the concept of national identity made it incon-
ceivable for crimes to be committed on behalf of the State. In the view of the 
Belgian authorities, Belgium’s administration of a territory 80 times its size gave 
the impression to the outside world of the workings of a ‘model colony’.
Following independence and the shedding of some illusions, Belgium’s colo-
nial history was scarcely referred to in official addresses. State representatives 
systematically erased the bitter criticisms that had been leveled for decades 
against colonization. This concealment policy was excused either by the need 
to ‘normalize’ relations with the former colony, or by the slogan ‘Africa for the 
Africans’. Far from the Belgium caput mundi approach (Demoulin, 2000: 14), the 
Belgian authorities tried to avoid even the slightest accusation of neocolonialism. 
Within just a few decades, aspirations had changed completely. Henceforth, the 
aim would be to cease all involvement in the former colony’s affairs and respect 
a critical partner’s national sovereignty.
In 1999, the new government of Guy Verhofstadt would change this approach 
and encourage a critical acceptance of the country’s colonial heritage. The aim of 
Louis Michel, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, was clear: to promote ‘adult 
relations’ with the African Great Lakes Region (Liège, February 28, 2003). To 
do so, he would acknowledge that “former colonial powers, such as Belgium, 
owe a large part of their development to their former colonies”, and “it was 
thanks to ‘these colonies’ that we were able, in part, to create the country we are 
today, the twelfth richest country in the world - the fourth, if we follow the UN 
classification system” (Liège, February 28, 2003). This kind of acknowledgment 
became one of the spearheads of the ‘ethical diplomacy’ policy advocated by the 
minister.
This approach was again overturned in July 2004 with the appointment of a 
new Foreign Minister, Karel De Gucht. His attitude was far from apologetic, and 
he took an admonishing tone in his speeches. During his official visits to Central 
Africa, Karel De Gucht stirred up intense controversies by referring explicitly to 
the devastating effects of corruption, impunity, and violence in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). Rather than stressing Belgium’s ‘responsibility’ 
toward its former colony, the talk was now of the need to stop being ‘indulgent’ 
(Kinshasa, April 21, 2008). Karel De Gucht wished to put aside any ‘misplaced’ 
feelings of guilt. By way of response to accusations of paternalism, he recalled 
that colonization also involved ‘mass literacy campaigns’, ‘the setting up of an 
educational system’, and ‘generalized health coverage’ (Tervuren, February 3, 
2005).
From a radically different perspective, Belgian representatives launched a 
Parliamentary Commission in 2000 to determine the exact circumstances of 
the murder of Patrice Lumumba and the possible implications of Belgian polit-
ical responsibility therein. In 2019, former Belgian Prime Minister Charles 
Michel apologized for the kidnapping, segregation, and forced adoption of 
thousands of mixed-race children throughout Belgian colonial Africa. One 
year later, the murder of George Floyd and the subsequent ‘Black Lives Matter’ 
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movement impacted the Belgian political scene. In the aftermath of a demon-
stration that brought together more than 10,000 protesters in Brussels, the 
Belgian Parliament established a special Commission to confront its colonial 
past. At approximately the same time, King Philippe marked the 60th anniver-
sary of the independence of the DRC, expressing his ‘deepest regrets’ for acts 
of violence and brutality inflicted during his country’s rule over the Congo 
( June 30, 2020).
11.4.2  Belgian specificities: Leopold II and political 
interference
This progressive acknowledgment of the colonial past is indeed also noticeable 
in France and the Netherlands. The ongoing debates concerning the Algerian 
war in France or the mass violence at the end of the Dutch colonial empire in 
Indonesia illustrate a common trend. Descendants of the victims living in the 
three countries denounce long-lasting stereotypes and share common expecta-
tions, i.e., public apologies and reparations. In Paris, questions about the appro-
priateness of these gestures are at the core of the report written by Benjamin 
Stora on the Algerian colonization and war.9 In Brussels, they are initially 
being addressed by the panel of experts selected by the Belgian Parliament. In 
Amsterdam, the government is considering an apology for slavery in Suriname. 
In the three capitals, advocates and opponents of reparations emphasize con-
trasting arguments.
Official authorities in the three countries also commissioned reports on 
the return of looted art to their former colonies. In France, the Sarr-Savoy 
Report on the restitution of African cultural heritage was presented to French 
President Emmanuel Macron in November 2018.10 Two years later, a report 
written by experts from the Raad voor cultuur for the Dutch Ministry of Culture 
recommended that the Netherlands return looted artifacts to the countries 
from which they were stolen.11 At the same time, the ‘restitution policy’ of the 
Royal Museum for Central Africa (RMCA) recognized that its collections were 
acquired in the context of a policy of legal inequality: people were forced or 
placed under pressure to abandon objects, and they were too weak to negotiate 
the price when they wished to sell objects.12 Thus, in the three countries, the 
coming to power of a new generation favored the gradual acknowledgment of 
its historical responsibility vis-à-vis the colonial past. This evolution was rein-
forced by the arrival of a new generation of historians and descendants in the 
respective diasporas, and by the progressive opening of the archives.
Besides this common contextual variable, two major Belgian specificities are 
also worth mentioning. First, unlike French and Dutch colonization, the cre-
ation of the Congo was “one man’s personal adventure” (Stengers, 2007: 45). 
Between 1885 and 1908, the Etat Indépendant du Congo (EIC – Congo Free 
State) was in fact the personal property of King Leopold II. Whereas in Belgium, 
his constitutional role prevented him from taking any public action without a 
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minister’s approval, in the colony, the King enjoyed power often described as 
absolute. Only in 1908, mainly due to international pressure, did the Congo 
officially become a Belgian colony. Since then, Leopold II has become one of the 
most emblematic symbols of colonial brutality. Unsurprisingly, his statues were 
systematically targeted by recent protests against racism.
The second specificity results from the systematic political use of the past 
to deny the legitimacy of the federal State. The questioning of the country’s 
colonial past thus enabled certain Flemish nationalists to criticize the role of 
the monarchy and the influence of the former French-speaking élite. One draft 
piece of legislation tabled by a Vlaams Blok (a far-right and secessionist party) 
parliamentarian in 2002 illustrated this clearly. It proposed to discontinue sev-
eral allowances paid to the royal family, using the argument that the Saxe-
Cobourg family fortune originated from the Congo: “The royal family owes 
its fortune to the Congo, and the scandalous way in which it was acquired is a 
historical fact”.13 Militant nationalists are not alone in referring to the colonial 
past to disqualify ‘the other’. We need only to think of the controversy related 
to Karel De Gucht’s comments concerning the DRC. The diplomatic crisis 
provoked by the Foreign Minister stirred up criticism from all the French-
speaking political parties belonging to the government coalition. Isabelle 
Durant, a member of the Green Party, condemned what she referred to as a 
‘politics of scorn’. The Liberal MP Armand De Decker spoke of a counterpro-
ductive approach. Elio Di Rupo, President of the PS, reminded Parliament that 
“the colonial era, characterized by unilateralism, paternalism and arrogance, is 
now a thing of the past”. Minister De Gucht responded quickly, declaring that 
he had the impression that “French-speakers still seem to see the Congo as the 
tenth Belgian province, about which no critical comments can be made”. All 
these reactions confirm that the tensions between communities have under-
mined the national account of the past associated with the ‘Belgique de Papa’ – 
a unitary Belgium with power largely in the hands of French speakers. As one 
NV-A (‘New Flemish Alliance’, Flemish nationalist party) representative told 
me, “in Flanders, we have nothing to do with the Congo”.14 The sentence 
resonated with the idea often heard that “in Wallonia, we have nothing to do 
with collaboration”.
11.5 Conclusion
Admittedly, this mirror image is a caricature of the Belgian memory landscape. 
Yet it reminds us that in the absence of a coherent roman national of the type 
which exists in France or in the Netherlands, the federalization of the State 
has two major consequences. First, it strengthens the fragmentation of national 
memories in a binary way. However, research carried out among Belgian fam-
ilies does not show two homogeneous narratives. It reveals tensions and incon-
sistencies within each community and a dynamic set of palimpsestic narratives 
(Silverman, 2013). For instance, how could we understand the wealth of vivid 
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memories related to WWII without considering the often-tragic narratives 
transmitted in German-speaking families, not to mention Jewish families? 
Likewise, how could we grasp the memories related to colonization without 
listening to the stories of Congolese, Burundian, and Rwandan ancestors of 
Belgian Afro-descendants? None of these specific trajectories can be reduced 
to the oversimplified representations that dominate the political scene and the 
media. Additionally, the arrival of new waves of migrants reinforces the diver-
sity and sometimes divisiveness of the past experiences that are remembered. 
How would the Turkish/Kurdish remembrances of the past fit into the ‘us ver-
sus them’ boxes emphasized on the political stage? The same comment could 
be made regarding the memories of the war in the Balkans or the Rwandan 
genocide. From this perspective, the interactions between vivid memories 
resemble a crisscross of tensions rather than two homogeneous fields separated 
by a linguistic border.
Second, the fragmentation of memories along oversimplified lines prevents 
most citizens from making any reflexive effort. If the other community is col-
lectively responsible for the past violence that was committed on behalf of the 
State, there is no need for introspection. Weighing up past crimes is not on the 
agenda. The objective of this chapter is neither to distinguish between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’, ‘sound’, and ‘unsound’ narratives nor to regret the lack of a so-called 
common narrative for all. The dissemination of a sole, monolithic historical 
interpretation cannot be imposed from above. Citizens exposed to official dis-
courses are not merely empty vessels waiting to imbibe state-sponsored narratives 
without hesitation. Instead, they co-construct the messages conveyed to them. 
Moreover, not even a negotiated narrative based on common ground would 
resonate with the diversity of experiences and emotions privately expressed 
by Belgian families. Experiences associated with scorn, humiliation, grief, 
anger, resentment, shame, and/or guilt leave long-lasting traces that cannot be 
replaced by an external narrative, however nuanced and balanced it might be. 
What makes Belgium exceptional is not the selective and teleological character 
of memory, but the myriad of variables that come into play: cultural belong-
ings anchored in distinct emotional experiences, systematic use of the past to 
support a parochial political agenda, institutional fragility, recurrent questions 
about the responsibility of the royal family, successive waves of migration. The 
intertwining of these elements matters since it directly impacts the context that 
shapes political negotiations. The question is then: do the approaches adopted 
toward the national past enable the parties to move on, or do they reinforce the 
deadlock? Do they open citizens’ minds, or do they, rather, close them?
Notes
 1 At the end of WWII, 53,000 Belgian citizens were convicted of collaboration. On the 
eve of Congolese independence in 1960, around 88,000 Belgian colonists lived in the 
Congo.
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 2 This study was written as part of a larger research project initially anchored in COST 
Action IS 1205 on ‘Social psychological dynamics of historical representations in the 
enlarged European Union’ (2012–2016), and in the ‘Shared Society Project’ based at 
the University of Koblenz. This project brings together practitioners and scholars from 
seven countries (Germany, Israel, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Norway, Macedonia, and 
Belgium).
 3 On the French propensity for commemorations, see Johnston (1991), Nora (1994), and 
Mathy (2011).
 4 These interviews result from two main research projects: the TRANSMEMO project 
(‘The Sorrows of Belgium: WWII memories and family transmission’, Brain Belspo, 
2018–2020), and the RE-MEMBER project (‘The transmission of memories related to 
stigmatization’, ARC UCLouvain, 2020–2025).
 5 In Belgium, collaboration took many forms: political (Wouters, 2006), military and 
repressive (De Wever, 2003), economic (Nefors, 2006), and artistic and intellectual 
(Devillez, 2003). In the aftermath of WWII, 0.64% of Belgians were condemned for 
collaboration: 0.73% of Flemings and 0.56% of Francophones (see Van den Wijngaert 
et al., 2015).
 6 The number of prison sentences was about 53,000 in Belgium, 49,000 in the Nether-
lands, and 40,000 in France (Huyse, 1995: 67). In terms of severity, the level of repression 
of collaboration in the three countries is comparable (Kossmann, 1986; Huyse et al., 1991).
 7 The former socialist MP Philippe Moureaux explicitly highlights the ‘taboo’ dimension 
of this issue within the PS (see Brems et al., 2020: 75–79).
 8 The profiles were part of a special edition of the Belgian edition of Newsweek to celebrate 
the 50th anniversary of the Flemish Parliament. They initially included well-known Nazi 
collaborators August Borms (who was sentenced to death) and Staf De Clercq (leader 
of the pro-Nazi Flemish National League, VNV). After a succession of adverse reactions, 
the Flemish Parliament apologized and excluded these two controversial names from the 
list of noble contributors to the Flemish cause.
 9 Stora, B., Les questions mémorielles portant sur la colonisation et la guerre d’Algérie, January 20, 
2021, XXX.
 10 Sarr, F., & Savoy, B., Rapport sur la restitution du patrimoine culturel africain. Vers une nouvelle 
éthique relationnelle, November 2018, http://restitutionreport2018.com/sarr_savoy_fr.pdf
 11 Raad voor Cultuur, Advies Koloniale Collecties en Erkenning van Onrecht, October 7, 
2020, www.raadvoorcultuur.nl/documenten/adviezen/2020/10/07/advies-koloniale- 
collecties-en-erkenning-van-onrecht
 12 RMCA, Restitution Policy, January 31, 2020, www.africamuseum.be/en/about_us/ 
restitution. In 2020, the Federation Wallonia-Brussels commissioned an expert report by 
the Belgian Royal Academy on the same issue (L’avenir des collections extra-européennes, to 
be published in 2021).
 13 Annales parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants, June 11, 2002.
 14 Brussels, September 14, 2020.
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THE EUROPEANIZATION OF 
BELGIAN PARTIES
Both near and far?
Louise Hoon and Gilles Pittoors
12.1 Introduction
The process of European integration has forced political parties to reinvent 
and adapt themselves in different ways. Presenting them with a new level of 
competition and governance, national party politicians take part in European 
decision-making and compete in European Parliament elections. Over the 
past two decades, the politicization of European integration and the rise of 
Euroscepticism have forced political parties to take a clear stance on Europe and 
adapt their organizations to the new multilevel context. This adjustment of party 
programs and organizations to the European Union (EU) can be defined as the 
‘Europeanization’ of political parties. This process presents us with many inter-
esting questions. Why, where and how do parties Europeanize, which incentives 
are at play and does the tendency to Europeanize vary across parties?
These questions are even more interesting in the exceptional case of Belgium, 
where Europe is both near and far. The country may rightfully be described as 
the historical, geographical and institutional heart of the EU. Belgium was the 
main battlefield of two world wars that incited political elites to seek integration. 
High-profile Belgian politicians have taken up leading roles in the EU’s history 
and institutions. And obviously, its political capital of Brussels physically hosts 
the European institutions and its community of public officials, civil society rep-
resentatives and other expats from all over the EU.
At the same time, the EU remains remarkably depoliticized. The deep polar-
ization between pro- and anti-European parties that can be observed in most 
other member states, long remained surprisingly absent in Belgium (Brack & 
Hoon, 2017). Whereas both the radical left and right are voicing more critical 
positions toward the EU today, Euroscepticism is still not the warhorse it is for 
ideologically similar parties in other member states.
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Against that background, this chapter studies the organizational and pro-
grammatic Europeanization of Belgian political parties. Through qualitative 
analysis of Belgian party statutes and manifestos, we show how challenger and 
mainstream parties show different patterns to Europeanize in different ways, 
the former showing more programmatic and the latter more organizational 
Europeanization. At the same time, we find patterns of Europeanization specific 
to party family and ideology and to the particular context of Belgium.
The chapter first outlines the literature on party Europeanization, highlight-
ing historical differences in challenger and mainstream parties’ interactions with 
Europe. The second part presents data and methods, followed by the analysis 
that addresses organizational Europeanization before moving on to the party 
programs. The chapter ends with a discussion of our findings, identifying a path 
for further research as well as the shortcomings of the study.
12.2 The Europeanization of political parties
Europeanization is understood as domestic adaptation to European integra-
tion (Caporaso, 2008; Ladrech, 1994; Olsen, 2002; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2008; 
Risse et al., 2001). Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) convincingly argued that 
Europeanization refers to the incorporation of European “ways of doings things” 
in “the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public 
policies” (p. 30). Focusing on the Europeanization of political parties, Ladrech 
(2002) laid out a robust research agenda, outlining five arenas in which national 
parties could feel an impact of European integration—programs, organization, 
competition, government and transnational relations.
On the one hand, most scholarly attention went to the extent to which 
parties incorporated the EU in their party programs and competitive positions 
(programmatic Europeanization). It is well established that so-called challenger 
parties initiated and drive EU politicization. Emphasizing a topic that main-
stream parties long ignored proved a highly effective strategy to restructure 
domestic party competition (Braun et al., 2016; De Vries & Hobolt, 2020; 
Grande & Hutter, 2016; Grande & Kriesi, 2016; Green-Pedersen, 2019; Hobolt 
& de Vries, 2016; Mair, 2000, 2007). Especially those opposing the EU by 
means of Euroscepticism reaped the electoral benefits of this challenger strat-
egy (Meijers & Rauh, 2016). Over the past two decades, Eurosceptic par-
ties became the first or second competitors in all but a few member states 
and entered government in Austria, Italy, Greece and a number of Eastern 
European countries (Brack & Startin, 2015).
On the other hand, although there is a long and extensive literature on 
national parties’ engagement in European party federations (Bomberg, 2002; 
Cole, 2001; Daniels, 1998; Hanley, 2002, 2008; Pridham, 2001; Pridham & 
Pridham, 1981; Van Hecke, 2009, 2010), comparatively little attention was 
given to the extent to which political parties organizationally adapt to the EU 
(organizational Europeanization). Most of the earlier studies on organizational 
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Europeanization presented rather sobering conclusions that parties adapt very 
little to the EU, and that organizational change can hardly be attributed to 
the EU as an external cause (Ladrech, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2007; Raunio, 
2000, 2002). Recent studies slightly alter that image, highlighting variation in 
the way parties organize in the EU context (Mühlböck, 2017; Pittoors, 2020). 
This variation may be explained by contextual factors, such as the degree to 
which national institutions and political practices ‘fit’ the EU’s political struc-
tures or the extent to which the EU is politicized within a country, although 
the jury is still out on what exactly explains this variation (Featherstone & 
Radaelli, 2003; Green Cowles et al., 2001; Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006; 
Schmidt, 2006).
Therefore, we take the opportunity of closely studying the exceptional case 
of Belgium to gain deeper understanding of within-country variation in party 
Europeanization, whereby we expect variation to depend on a party’s status as 
challenger or mainstream party. For one, mainstream and challenger parties 
are presented with different incentives for organizational Europeanization. 
Parties from the three traditional party families (liberal, socialist and 
Christian democrat) have been the main initiators and entrepreneurs of 
European integration. They thus have long-standing traditions of coopera-
tion in European party federations and European Parliament groups. In the 
tradition of Duverger (1954) and Panebianco (1988), we assume this historical 
interlacing with European politics is bound to show in mainstream parties’ 
contemporary organization.
Not only do these politicians inhabit the European institutions and drive 
the EU’s decision-making process, but also given how “decisions made at the 
EU level increasingly shape national policies, and hence directly mold the envi-
ronment within which national parties operate” (Poguntke et al., 2007, p. 2), 
domestic politics also requires attention for the European level. To be efficient 
at navigating this multilevel institutional environment and pursuing their party 
goals—be it votes, offices or policy (Harmel & Janda, 1994)—these parties are 
required to acquire dedicated personnel and to engage in transnational bargain-
ing, cooperation and consensus-seeking.
By contrast, both by choice and by the institutional design and political 
practice of the EU, challengers have historically been sidelined from European 
integration and decision-making processes. This is even true for the European 
Parliament, where about a third of the seats are now taken by Eurosceptic or 
challenger parties. For instance, despite some indications that radical rights are 
increasingly organizing transnationally (McDonnell & Werner, 2019; Startin & 
Brack, 2018), this is still a far cry away from the decades experience with transna-
tional cooperation known to the Christian democrats and the EPP, nor have they 
been at the center of politico-institutional power in Europe, with all the organi-
zational consequences this entails. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that 
challenger parties will exhibit much less organizational Europeanization than 
mainstream parties.
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H1: We expect organizational Europeanization to be more prominent 
with mainstream parties, and less with challengers
When it comes to programmatic Europeanization, we follow the literature in 
our expectation that challenger parties will be more likely to politicize the EU 
(Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). However, our qualitative approach allows us to add a 
meaningful and often overlooked dimension to programmatic Europeanization. 
EU politicization is generally understood and measured as the contestation of 
the EU as such. The contestation of its overall existence, foundations and work-
ings has been at focus of EU politicization. In contrast to this politicization of 
constitutional issues, there is less attention for the politicization of substantial issues, 
i.e. the content, direction and political nature of European policy (De Wilde & 
Zürn, 2012).
For better understanding, we may align this distinction between constitu-
tional and substantial issues to Dahl’s (1969) concepts of polity opposition and 
policy opposition. Whereas polity opposition rejects the political system and its 
legitimacy as a whole, policy opposition is aimed at the content or direction of 
European policy, the division of funds or at EU-level politicians.
The distinction between constitutional and substantial EU politicization allows 
us to nuance the established image of challenger-led EU politicization and of 
mainstream parties anxiously keeping the EU off the political agenda (Kriesi, 
2016; Mair, 2007). Considering their active and prominent role in the European 
integration and decision-making process, mainstream parties seem more likely 
to engage in the politicization of substantial European issues. For example, their 
proposals in a particular policy area or the achievements of their EP party group. 
For challengers, on the other hand, it seems more convenient and effective to 
treat the EU as a monolithic entity that one either entirely rejects or entirely 
supports and is thus a complicit part of.
H2: When it comes to programmatic Europeanization, we expect chal-
lenger parties to stress constitutional issues, and mainstream parties to stress 
substantial issues
12.3 Measuring party Europeanization
Our understanding of programmatic Europeanization predominantly relies on 
large-scale, European wide quantitative survey research. It focuses on voters’ and 
parties’ positions on binary opinion and expert survey scales, most notably the 
ten- or seven-point pro- and anti-EU integration scale introduced by Leonard 
Ray (1999). Inevitably, this approach has favored a focus on polarization on con-
stitutional issues or the pro-/anti-European integration scale (Hooghe & Marks, 
2009, 2018; Jackson & Jolly, 2021; Kriesi, 2016).
In the party organization literature, we find a much wider arrange of qualita-
tive and quantitative methods and approaches to Europeanization. This strand of 
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the literature, however, has so far paid less attention to how parties’ main-
stream or challenger status may present parties with different incentives for 
Europeanization. Combining methods and insights from both strands of the 
literature, we aim to present a more nuanced and understanding of interparty 
variation in Europeanization.
The corpus consists of party statutes and party manifestos from the rel-
evant parties participating in the election. To measure organizational 
Europeanization, we check the latest party statutes for mentions of the EU, 
European integration or EU mandatories. Building on previous work on party 
statutes (Deschouwer & Van Assche, 2003), the statutes are analyzed by looking 
at four indicators: (1) references to Europe in the preambles; (2) reference to the 
representation of EU mandatories in relevant party bodies (e.g. party board or 
council); (3) reference to specific bodies or functions dealing with European 
affairs (e.g. a European secretary or interparliamentary format) and (4) refer-
ences to the Europarty the national party is a member of.
This data are gathered in an ‘old school’ way, meaning not through coding 
but through actual reading and interpreting. The reason for using this method is 
that the aim of this study is not to study the number of ‘mentions’ of Europe in 
the statutes but rather to qualify the concrete organization of a political party. It 
should be noted, however, that statutes do not always fully reflect the practical 
reality of parties’ organization. Still, these documents suggest the way a party 
thinks about itself and one can, hence, assume that if a party “makes the effort 
to mention Europe in its statutes, it is any case, an indication that the European 
level has consequences for the way a party works” (Deschouwer & Van Assche, 
2003, pp. 122–123, own translation).
To identify programmatic Europeanization, election manifestos are the 
most adequate source of information. We use Nvivo Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software to scout references to the EU (using the terms ‘EU’, ‘Europese’ and 
‘Eur*’) and code them according to their substantial or constitutive nature. 
For each reference, we also indicate whether it supports (positively refers to) or 
opposes (negatively refers to) the EU. N-vivo allows us to quantitatively compare 
the different types of references to EU and to closely compare them for each 
party. The election manifestos under study were all presented in the run-up to 
the 2019 regional, federal and European Parliament elections. Some parties pre-
sented separate manifestos for the different levels. But because ‘Europeanization’ 
refers to domestic adaptation to European integration, we choose to include only 
the ‘main’ or federal election manifesto for each party.
Following Hobolt and De Vries (2016), we define challengers as parties that, 
in their style, organization and program, explicitly differentiate themselves 
from the established political elites and/or have never taken part in government 
before and/or ‘own’ political issues that do not belong to the dominant dimen-
sion of political competition. All three criteria apply to the Flemish radical- 
left PTB-PVDA and to the radical-right VB. The Greens and the Flemish 
nationalist N-VA have taken part in government and currently govern either 
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at federal or regional level. N-VA, in addition, has been the largest party of 
Flanders since the 2014 elections. Nevertheless, looking from the federal level, 
these parties also clearly hold a challenger status: N-VA because of its expressed 
Flemish nationalism and overt opposition to the Belgian federal state, and the 
Greens for their adherence to issues alternative to the dominant left-right dimen-
sion. DéFi, lastly, is a small party that—in reaction to Flemish nationalism—
defends the interests of francophone citizens in and around Brussels, and thus, 
despite being in the Brussels regional government, also challenges the Belgian 
political status quo. Table 12.1 lists all parties under study.
12.4 Analysis of party Europeanization
12.4.1 Organizational Europeanization
Assessing the results of the qualitative study of party statutes (Table 12.2), we 
see clear differences between mainstream and challenger parties, with the latter 
on average paying less attention to Europe in their statutes. At the same time, 
significant differences exist within each of these groups; e.g. between the Greens 
and the radical right within the challenger group, or between the mainstream 
social democrats and liberals. This could indicate that organizational differences 
between parties has more to do with their (historical) development and party 
family (Duverger, 1954; Panebianco, 1988), rather than their status as main-
stream or challenger party.
Generally, most Belgian parties make some kind of reference to Europe in 
their preambles. Even the radical right VB refers to the “European peoples, 
TABLE 12.1 List of parties under study
Party Full name Status Ideology
CD&V Christen-Democratisch en 
Vlaams
Mainstream Christian democrat
CDh Centre Démocrate Humaniste Mainstream Christian democrat
OVLD Open Vlaamse Liberalen en 
Democraten
Mainstream Liberal
MR Mouvement Réformateur Mainstream Liberal
sp.a Socialistische Partij Anders Mainstream Social democrat
PS Parti Socialiste Mainstream Social democrat
Groen Groen Challenger Green
Ecolo Ecologistes Confédérés pour 
l’Organisation de Luttes 
Originales
Challenger Green
N-VA Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie Challenger Nationalist
Défi Démocrate Fédéraliste 
Indépendant
Challenger Regionalist
PTB-PVDA Parti du Travail de Belgique-
Partij van de Arbeid van België
Challenger Radical left









TABLE 12.2 Organizational Europeanization of Belgian parties
CD&V N-VA OVLD sp.a Groen VB PTB-PVDA CDH MR PS Ecolo Défi
A. Representation of EU mandataries in party governing bodies
Ex officio members of the party board × × × × × × ×
Ex officio advisory members of the party board; can 
be elected to gain voting rights
× ×
Ex officio advisory members of the party board
Not ex officio members of party board; can be elected ×
Ex officio members of the party council, not of the 
party board
×
Not statutorily represented/No mention ×
B. Mention of Europe/EU in party statute preambles
Explicit mention of EU and Europarty × × ×
General reference to European cooperation × × × × ×
General reference to Europe as a cultural and/or 
geographic area
× ×
Reference only to Europarty membership ×
No reference to Europe ×
C. Mention of bodies specifically dedicated to EU affairs
Specific body exists to manage EU affairs and 
coordination + explicit involvement of party 
board/president
× ×
Specific body exists to manage EU affairs and 
coordination
× × × ×
Coordination is responsibility of nonspecific body 
(e.g. EU mandatories themselves)
× ×
No mention × × × ×
D. Mention of Europarty
Explicit mention of Europarty and ways of interacting × × × ×
General mention of Europarty × ×
No mention × × × × × ×
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civilization and cultural community” (own translation) to which it belongs. 
Surprisingly, the liberal parties—Belgium’s most outspoken pro-EU family—
mention Europe least in their preambles, with OVLD only mentioning their 
ALDE membership and MR not mentioning Europe at all. There are also clear 
differences in the references to Europarty membership, although not particularly 
along the mainstream/challenger axis: while the Greens make references to the 
EGP, none of the other challenger parties mention Europarties but neither does 
the mainstream MR or CDH.
The statutes for the most part also provide ample details about the representa-
tion of EU mandataries in their party bodies. In most parties, MEPs (or the EP 
delegation leader) are ex officio members of an executive body—usually the party 
board or bureau. Parties vary in terms of voting rights for these mandataries: 
in some parties, they have them automatically (e.g. the Green and Christian 
democrat parties), while in others, only advisory membership is guaranteed 
and they need to get elected to attain voting rights (e.g. the Flemish liberals). 
Here, the radical left and right somewhat stand out. Whereas VB MEPs are only 
ex officio welcome in the party council (and not the party board), PTB-PVDA 
even remains silent on the representation of EU mandatories in its bodies.
The differences between challenger and mainstream parties are most obvi-
ous, however, regarding the internal management of European affairs by specific 
bodies or people. With the exception of the N-VA, none the of the challenger 
parties make any reference to them at all (although these do exist in reality, par-
ticularly in the Green parties). By contrast, all mainstream parties mention such 
people or bodies in various forms. For example, the MR statutes describe an 
“intergroupe parlementaire” to organize relations between the party’s national 
and European parliamentarians, while the PS has a whole section dedicated 
solely to how and by whom relations with the PES are managed. Challenger 
parties thus elaborate much less on their organizational ties with the European 
level than mainstream parties.
That the difference between challenger and mainstream parties is most obvi-
ous in their organizational linking of the national and European levels, but 
much less so in their framing of their own activities in European terms, high-
lights how the ‘proximity’ of Belgium to the EU, i.e. being its historical and 
political heart, seems to seep through to party organizations in the sense that 
most Belgian parties cannot seriously claim to act in a purely Belgian context. 
Indeed, it cannot be denied that also the liberal parties, if not in their statutes, 
regularly refer to Europe in their public communication. This particularity of 
Belgium of course requires more comparative study but a quick look at their 
Dutch counterparts already shows a striking difference: with the exception of 
the Europhile D66, not a single Dutch party makes any reference to Europe at 
all in their statutes’ preambles.
Moreover, these findings also support our argument for the importance of 
the historical development of parties and their organizations. Indeed, that the 
main difference between the two should be located in the extent to which they 
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created specific bodies for connecting the national and European governance 
levels falls entirely in line with the idea that mainstream parties historically had 
both more resources and incentives to do so, given their long-term involvement 
in European cooperation and EU decision-making.
That being said, however, one must also recognize that there is significant 
variation within each group, suggesting that (further) differences might be based 
on ideological family. For example, the Greens are just as similar/different to the 
Christian democrats as they are to the radical left and right. Moreover, the liberal 
parties stand out, providing little detail on their parties’ organization regarding 
the EU—in fact doing less so than the Greens. The difference with particu-
larly the social democrat parties could not be greater. Indeed, no other party 
family has statutes that address the EU in such detail; from their EU manda-
tories’ ex officio representation in party bodies, to extensively referring to their 
Europarty membership and multilevel coordination bodies (e.g. the PS’ “Conseil 
des Représentants des Socialistes européens”) and the explicit involvement of the 
party leadership.
These findings qualify the differences between challenger and mainstream 
parties, hinting at the notion that the organization of political parties and their 
Europeanization has to do with their (historical) development and party family 
(Panebianco, 1988), rather than their status as mainstream or challenger party. 
Of course, given how statutes give a distorted view of reality, one should remain 
cautious about such conclusions.
12.4.2 Programmatic Europeanization
As we have coded all text referring to the EU as supportive or opposing and 
as focused either on substantial or constitutional issues, Nvivo allows us to 
calculate the total amount of text that each party attributes to the EU, for each 
one of those categories. For each manifesto, these numbers are presented as a 
percentage of the total length of the manifesto in Table 12.3. In Table 12.4, 
TABLE 12.3 Programmatic Europeanization of Belgian parties
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the average percentage for each party family is calculated, which allows us to 
compare the patterns of programmatic Europeanization with mainstream and 
challenger parties.
First, the amount and detail of the references that we find in the manifes-
tos contradicts the idea that Europe would be a nonissue in Belgium. In total, 
2.29% of mainstream parties’ manifestos refer to the EU or to European policy. 
Contrary to what we might expect from the literature on EU politicization by 
challenger parties, that number is a little lower for challenger parties: 2.41%. 
This programmatic Europeanization is overwhelmingly substantial and positive. 
Most references are supportive of specific EU policies and action in particular 
domains. Repeatedly, parties argue for compliance with one or another EU reg-
ulation, directive or recommendation, or justify their domestic policy proposals 
by mentioning how the EU is already prioritizing them.
The debate over European integration and the EU as a whole (constitutional 
Europeanization) appears less prominent in Belgian manifestos. Overall, it is 
only slightly more negative than positive. It is also remarkable that none of the 
Belgian parties argues for an ‘exit’ from the EU, nor for a referendum on EU 
membership. The low level of polarization on pro-/anti-EU issues might explain 
why Belgium is often (wrongly) perceived as a country where Europe ‘does not 
matter’.
Second, and in line with H2, challenger parties stress constitutional issues 
more than mainstream parties. On average, about 0.85% of the text in challenger 
party programs is dedicated to opposition to the EU as a whole. Radical right 
parties clearly voice the more negative tone of these references, whereas Green 
parties are not outspokenly more positive than the mainstream.
As we expected, mainstream parties spend about two and a half times less text 
on constitutional European issues (0.35%) than challenger parties do. Instead, 
they write about twice as much about substantial European issues (about 3% to 
1.6%), and overwhelmingly in a supportive tone. However, the pattern of pro-
grammatic Europeanization on constitutional issues within the challenger group 
TABLE 12.4 Average programmatic Europeanization per party family
Constitutional Substantial
Negative Positive Negative Positive Total
Mainstream 0.10 0.24 0.14 1.81 2.29
Christian democrat 0.03 0.11 0.15 1.35 1.64
Social democrat 0.16 0.18 0.16 2.51 3.01
Liberal 0.10 0.39 0.10 1.54 2.13
Challenger 0.52 0.32 0.52 1.05 2.41
Radical left 0.31 0.14 0.31 0.71 1.47
Radical right 1.27 0 1.27 0.20 2.74
Green 0.09 0.13 0.09 1.54 1.85
Regionalist 0.67 0.77 0.64 0.67 2.75
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is less outspoken than expected. In fact, once we exclude the radical right, chal-
lenger parties are not that different from the mainstream. The regionalist N-VA 
shows a striking number of positive references to the EU as a whole.
Considering the transnational nature of ecological issues and the established 
idea that GAL or Green-Alternative-Liberal parties are generally outspokenly 
pro-European, we would expect Green parties to express more support for the 
EU as a whole. But the mainstream, social democratic parties spend more text on 
supporting the EU. Taking part in government at several levels, Belgian Green 
parties may not fit the ‘challenger’ category well. But the finding also indi-
cates that, beyond mainstream or challenger status, party family and institutional 
history matter for Europeanization.
A close reading of all coded references to Europe allows us to identify some 
additional patterns. First, what stands out from a close reading of all nega-
tive, constitutional references is that especially the challenger parties tend to 
add suggestions for (radically) alternative models of European integration to 
their opposition to the EU. The N-VA program especially contains plenty 
of equivocal references to the EU, combining support for the general idea 
of EU integration with critical remarks about its practice and proposals for 
improvement regarding its efficiency and democratic legitimacy. But this type 
of reference can also be found with the most Eurosceptic parties in our study, 
the extreme-left PTB and the radical right VB. Both parties praise the Belgian 
and—for VB—Flemish economic, cultural and political interconnectedness in 
the European context.
Second, the regionalist parties in our study (VB, N-VA and Défi) tend to 
use the European context to discard the federal level. VB and N-VA empha-
size Flemish and European culture and identity in these references. For Défi, 
the focus is on institutions and policy. The party repeatedly describes regional 
policies and institutions and their direct interaction with the European context, 
somewhat ‘skipping stresses the embedding of regional policies in their European 
context, as well as the role of Brussels as a European (rather than Belgian) capital. 
Regionalist Euroskepticism appears to balance between opposing Europe and 
supporting it as a vehicle for regional independence.
12.5 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the Europeanization of political parties in the exceptional 
context of Belgium, where Europe is both near and far. Whereas the jury is still 
out on whether the EU is a politicized topic at the national level or not, there is 
no doubt that it is exceptionally low in Belgium (Braun & Grande, 2021; Braun 
et al., 2020; Green-Pedersen, 2019). At the same time, however, there is no 
other EU member state for which Europe is so close by, given the proximity of 
Brussels and the EU institutions. Ever so strikingly, therefore, at the historic and 
political heart of the EU, political parties seem to refrain from competition over 
European integration.
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However, our study shows that this image of EU depoliticization in Belgium 
is incomplete. Our analysis of party statutes and manifestos shows that there 
is definitely domestic adjustment to Europe with Belgian parties. Mainstream 
parties exhibit more organizational Europeanization and are more likely to 
incorporate Europe in a substantial and positive way in their manifestos. 
Challenger parties, by contrast, Europeanize less organizationally, while they 
are slightly more inclined to reject the EU as a whole on the programmatic 
level. However, we also found that there is variation in Europeanization within 
challenger and mainstream categories, highlighting the importance of their 
ideological, party family and historic background (Duverger, 1954; Koskimaa, 
2020; Panebianco, 1988).
As such, despite being often considered a country where Europe doesn’t 
matter, our study highlights that Belgium shows very particular patterns of 
party Europeanization, further supporting the claim of its exceptional status in 
Europe. On the one hand, Belgian parties have adapted markedly to the EU, 
arguably more so than parties in other (Western European) member states. For 
instance, a quick look at the Dutch statutes shows that, with the exception of 
D66, not a single Dutch party refers to the EU in its statute preambles and very 
rarely mentions their Europarty. On the other hand, whereas Belgian parties 
do not compete so much about the EU as a whole, they do integrate substan-
tial European issues in their party programs, voicing not only support but also 
substantial opposition. Associating our findings to the literature, the Belgian 
pattern seems quite exceptional. Existing studies of party positioning and EU 
politicization predominantly show a pattern of polarization on the (constitu-
tional) pro/-anti-European integration dimension in the EU as a whole ( Jackson 
& Jolly, 2021), as well as for particular countries and regions (Charalambous 
et al., 2018; Vachudova, 2019). Comparing these patterns of Europeanization to 
those of other countries provides a path for further research.
Finally, a few shortcomings of this study must be addressed. First, whereas 
Europeanization is a complex and multidimensional process, we have only 
looked at its organizational and programmatic aspects here, leaving other ways 
in which parties can Europeanize, such as their transnational relations and 
behavior in government, unaddressed (Ladrech, 2002). Second, we have only 
analyzed official documents (party statutes and manifestos), which do not nec-
essarily reflect the behavior of party officials, or the reality of party competition 
and internal organization. Third, our focus on variation between parties in 
Belgium prevents us from explicitly generalizing our findings for mainstream 
and challenger parties in the EU. Future research is thus encouraged to engage 
in a comparative study of programmatic and organizational Europeanization in 
several member states.
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BELGIUM IN THE UN  
SECURITY COUNCIL
Still an active player?
Michel Liégeois and Murat Caliskan
13.1 Introduction
Before the Second World War, most of the ‘small states’1 in Europe—including 
Belgium—pursued a hiding strategy. They preferred staying neutral to stay out 
of trouble in the hostile international environment, which was largely in line 
with the realist mindset. Once the two world wars proved that this strategy did 
not work out, the small states turned to the binding strategy, which aims to pre-
vent conflict by supporting international rules and multilateral institutions that 
limit the action space of the great powers (Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010). The binding 
strategy was boosted by the international context that, after the Second World 
War, has increasingly given small states the option to expand their influence 
over the great powers mainly through international organizations (Thorhallsson, 
2019). International norms, rules and institutions have played a greater role in 
determining a state’s behavior.
In many regards, Belgium has been a prominent example of a small state 
that has employed a binding strategy. It was not only a founding member of 
most of the basic international organizations such as the United Nations, the 
EU and NATO but it has also been a staunch supporter of multilateralism. 
As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, multilateralism is in the DNA of 
Belgian foreign policy (Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020a). The fact 
that Belgium hosts both the NATO headquarters and the main bodies of the 
EU can be considered the symbol of the importance it has placed on interna-
tional organizations.
Although other European small states have adopted a similar binding approach, 
Belgian policy, particularly in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
distinguishes itself from other states of similar size. In 2018, Belgium was elected 
as a nonpermanent member (NPM) to the UNSC for the sixth time in its history, 
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which makes it one of the most elected states in the world. Furthermore, it has 
been frequently praised for its active policy instead of being a niche player in the 
Council (Drieskens & Wouters, 2009; Liégeois, 1993, 2009; Zeebroek, 2009). 
Indeed, despite the protracted regional dispute inside the country and its neg-
ative impact on the political life, Belgium appears to have consistently carried 
out an active policy in the UNSC, which merits further research. Focusing on 
the last two terms, this chapter aims to examine the performance of Belgium 
in the Security Council and explore whether Belgium maintains its active 
policy in its latest term (2019–20) as well. While it builds on various sources, 
it is supported by interviews with eight diplomats (four Belgian diplomats and 
four foreign diplomats) who experienced the Belgian presence in the Council. 
This chapter opens with a short description of being an elected member in the 
Security Council. In the following section, five features of successful small states 
are applied to the Belgian case to examine its performance of the last two terms. 
In conclusion, a short assessment of Belgium, as well as what makes Belgium 
different from other states, is discussed.
13.2 Being an elected member in the UN Security Council
The UN Security Council is a “world’s cockpit where the decisions are binding 
upon all member states and are extremely important for those countries in crisis” 
(Simoens, 2019, A seat in the cockpit). This means that being in the Council 
gives an NPM a voice in the international system. However, for an NPM, it is 
like entering a theatrical stage as an actor in which both the script and its chore-
ography have already been outlined by others (Wouters et al., 2009). There is an 
indisputable dominance of permanent members (PM) because, on top of the veto 
power, they also benefit from an institutional memory that has been accumu-
lated throughout decades of practical experience. Such comprehensive knowl-
edge allows PMs to enjoy a clear advantage over elected members, particularly in 
long-lasting diplomatic processes. In this respect, the real power of PMs not only 
stems from preventing things from being said but also from the power over what 
is going to be said (Xavier do Monte, 2016). As Johan Verbeke—Belgian perma-
nent representative to the United Nations between 2004 and 2008—noted, “it is 
the PMs who will decide about your fate in the Security Council, and make or 
break your reputation” (Verbeke, 2018).
Yet, despite this dominance, there is still a leeway for NPMs to exercise influ-
ence in the UNSC. First, the veto is only a negative power; it does not help the 
PMs in any way when they want the UNSC to adopt a resolution. They need the 
votes of at least four elected members as nine affirmative votes are required for 
any resolution to be passed. One should remember that it was the lack of these 
necessary nine votes rather than the threat of French veto that prevented the draft 
US-UK resolution from being endorsed in the lead-up to the Iraq War (Conley 
Tyler & Pahlow, 2014). Second, as the variety and volume of the Council’s tasks 
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have widened since the end of the Cold War, the opportunities and tools that 
elected numbers can use also have increased. Third, small- and middle-sized 
countries have some advantages over PMs resulting from their smallness. For 
instance, they are free from hegemonic baggage and therefore less limited in 
their actions. In some cases, a proposal by an NPM has a greater chance of being 
considered as it allows to avoid biased reaction that would have been triggered 
by a PM. Additionally, small size usually means a much easier process of internal 
consultation, thus much greater flexibility (Liégeois, 2009).
The history of the Security Council confirms that small states can deliver a 
successful performance in the Council when they have certain characteristics. 
For instance, Melissa Conley Tyler and Eleanor Pahlow (2014) identified five 
key factors based on the case studies of New Zealand (1993–94) and Mexico 
(2009–10) memberships. They found that “active participation”, “coalition 
building”, “strong leadership skills”, “confidence-building” and “engagement of 
organizations with real interests” are important factors that determine the abil-
ity of elected members to be influential in the UNSC. Andrea Ó Súilleabháin 
(2014) found seven good practices of effective small states in a report written for 
the International Peace Institute (IPI). His findings that are based on the inter-
views and roundtables with 54 small-state UN missions can be paraphrased as 
the following: “coalition building”, “prioritization”, “diplomatic skills and high- 
quality personnel” and “innovative and creative leadership”. Baldur Thorhallsson 
(2012) suggests that the qualitative variables such as “diplomatic skills”, “knowl-
edge and initiatives”, “image or reputation”, “strong leadership”, “excellent 
coalition-building skills” and “an ability to prioritize heavy workloads” are 
important factors to explain their accomplishments within the UNSC. Based 
on these case studies and wider literature (see also Langmore & Farrall, 2016; 
Langmore & Thakur, 2016; Liégeois, 2009; Schrijver & Blokker, 2020; Verbeke, 
2018), we have identified five key factors that explain the success of an NPM, 
“a commitment to the active participation”, “positive image”, “competence”, 
“coalition-building skills” and “a balanced idealistic pragmatic approach”. In the 
following sections, these five characteristics are applied to Belgium in order to 
evaluate its performance during its last two terms.
Nonetheless, as all interviewees noted, the successful performance of an 
elected member, especially of a small power, does not necessarily translate to a 
substantial impact on the overall policy of the UNSC. One can find numerous 
cases where elected members cannot make any meaningful contribution to the 
resolution of regional crises, as it occurred in the cases of Syria, Ukraine or 
Libya. For instance, it would not be reasonable to expect Belgium to initiate a 
fundamental solution to the Syrian crisis, given that the PMs also have a stake 
in these crises. However, it can be considered a successful bid of Belgium—as a 
penholder of humanitarian issues in Syria—when it paved the way for a Security 
Council Resolution on humanitarian border crossings despite the clear opposi-
tion of Russia and China. That is why this chapter has evaluated Belgium based 
on the premise that an elected member has inherently limited ability to influence 
the overall policy of the Security Council.
Belgium in the UN Security Council 203
13.3  Belgium as an elected member of 
the UN Security Council
13.3.1 Active participation
First and foremost, the government of an NPM has to have an ambition and the 
political will to play an active role in the Council. The meticulous preparation 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the special sessions of the Parliament and the 
strong support of the high-level leadership signal the ambition that Belgium 
has for the membership (Liégeois, 2009). In both mandates, the visits of high-
level leaders, namely the Belgian King, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to the Council and their active participation in the debates, demonstrate 
the political will for active participation. Another sign of Belgian determination 
for being inside the Council is the fact that immediately after the completion 
of its last two mandates, Belgium announced its candidacy for the next man-
date. For instance, just one month after 2019–20 term ended, Sophie Wilmès, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced Belgian candidacy for the term 2037–38 
(Wilmès, 2021). Furthermore, a closer look at its performance in the Council 
reveals that Belgium uses every tool that is important for an NPM, such as the 
chairmanship of subcommittees, the penholder role, the informal meetings and 
the presidency, as discussed in the following paragraphs.
The chairmanship of a subsidiary body is an important instrument for an 
NPM as it allows to increase its visibility and make progress in the existing 
practices of the United Nations. This, of course, requires considerable effort 
as the efficiency of subsidiary bodies mainly relies on the input of the chairs. 
Belgium has always been ambitious in terms of engaging in the work of sub-
sidiary bodies. In its previous term (2007–08), it chaired three sanctions com-
mittees, Al Qaeda/Taliban, Ivory Coast and Iran. It also presided over one 
Informal Working Group on International Tribunals. Its commitment and 
qualitative work, particularly in the chairmanship of the very technical Al 
Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee as well as the Informal Working Group 
on International Tribunals, made Belgium a respected member of the UNSC 
(Vandervelden, 2009). During the last term, Belgium assumed the chair-
manship of the Somalia Sanctions Committee and the Children and Armed 
Conflict Working Group (CACWG). It also served as a facilitator for the issue 
of Iran’s nuclear program implementation. The significant progress achieved in 
each subsidiary body indicates its active participation. For instance, as the chair 
of CACWG, Belgium managed to have a record number of 13 conclusions 
adopted on specific geographical issues, including Myanmar, Yemen and Syria, 
out of 14 files in total. No NPM in the Council has ever achieved as many 
conclusions as Belgium in the course of its mandate (Interview with a Belgian 
diplomat, January 05, 2021).
Another instrument that can be utilized by an NPM is the penholder system. 
The penholder role refers to a member of the Council that leads the negotiations 
and drafts the text of an outcome, whether it is a resolution or a presidential 
statement. It goes beyond “drafting” a text, which has been a regular practice 
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since the inception of the Council. “The penholder takes the initiative on all 
Council activities concerning that situation, such as holding emergency meet-
ings, organizing open debates, and leading visiting missions” (Security Council 
Report, 2018, p. 2). Furthermore, in contrast with the chairmanships of the 
subsidiary bodies, the penholder system has been the domain of the PMs, par-
ticularly the P3 (United States, United Kingdom and France). In theory, “any 
member of the Security Council may be a penholder” (Security Council Report, 
2020a, para. 2); however, in practice, few elected members can assume this role. 
It usually requires an NPM to take initiative in order to grab a penholder role 
(Security Council Report, 2018). As a diplomat of an NPM stated, “an elected 
member needs to fight and convince other members of the fact that it is capa-
ble for this role” (Interview with a Foreign Diplomat3, February 03, 2021). 
Figure 13.1 demonstrates the number of penholder roles that is carried out by 
each NPM in 2020 (Security Council Report, 2020a). Acting as a penholder 
on three topics can be regarded as a sign of Belgian active participation in the 
Council.
Informal meetings are also important tools for NPMs to influence the work 
of the UNSC. These meetings are usually held when there is no Council 
agreement for a formal meeting. In some cases, they may become an opportu-
nity for NPMs to advance their own policies as they usually serve as a prepa-
ration for further debates in the Council. The most notable forms of informal 
meetings are “informal interactive dialogues” and “Arria-Formula Meetings”. 
While both forms are informal with no official records and outcomes, informal 
interactive meetings host high-level participants of non-Council members, 
whereas Arria-Formula Meetings are more flexible meetings convened to hear 
FIGURE 13.1 The number of penholder tasks of NPMs (2020)
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the views of experts and organizations (Daws & Sievers, 2020; Security Council 
Report, 2020b). These meetings usually reflect a member state’s endeavor in 
order to take initiative or contribute to the United Nations’ work. Therefore, the 
number of informal meetings initiated by an NPM can be regarded as an aspect 
of its active performance. As seen in Figure 13.2, Belgium is the NPM that has 
requested the greatest number of informal meetings after Germany, which can 
be seen as another aspect of Belgian active policy.2
The most notable opportunity for the elected members is the presidency. 
According to a foreign diplomat, “elected members pay a lot of attention to the 
presidency. It can be considered as a measure of success for the elected members” 
(Interview, February 1, 2021). Indeed, an NPM can use the presidency to shape 
the program of the month and present a theme that is not formally on the agenda. 
Belgium has been good at using its presidency effectively in terms of putting 
its own stamp on proceedings. As described by a foreign diplomat, “everyone 
accepted that Belgian presidency was very well-planned and organized. If you 
compare it to the other months, they had a lot of external briefers. All their key 
topics, including children and armed conflict, are reflected very well during their 
presidency” (Interview, February 01, 2021).
This can also be recognized by the new themes that Belgium has brought 
into the attention of the Council during its presidencies. For instance, in its pre-
vious term, in June 2007, Belgium introduced a debate for the first time in the 
Council on the delicate topic, “the role of natural resources in conflict areas”, 
which led to a consensus and the adoption of a presidential statement (Wouters, 
Demeyere, et al., 2009). In its second presidency, in August 2008, Belgium 
organized a thematic debate on the “UNSC’s working methods”, which 
FIGURE 13.2 The number of informal meetings initiated by Council members
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had not been debated since 1994 in the Council (Grauls & Verbeke, 2009). 
In its current term, in February 2020, Belgium introduced another important 
theme that has not been discussed in the Security Council. It convened an 
open debate on “Transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict situations” as 
one of the signature events of its presidency, which eventually received a major 
support from the members of the Council (Security Council Report, 2020c). 
This can be seen as a success in terms of setting the Council’s agenda, given the 
difficulty of introducing thematic debates in the UNSC, where the day-to-day 
business usually focuses on geographic areas of work. This review shows that 
Belgium strives to use every instrument possible to actively participate and 
influence the Council.
13.3.2 Positive image
A positive image is also an important source for success and one of the key factors 
that enables an NPM to play a meaningful role in the Council. Belgium has been 
generally known as a “reliable” and “predictable” country as confirmed by all 
interviewees talked in this study, if not a “bridge builder” as claimed by Ministry 
of Affairs (Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020a). Being aware of its own 
image, Belgium chose an official slogan—“Fostering Consensus. Acting for 
Peace”—during the last election campaign (Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2016). The high rate of vote obtained in the elections shows not only the suc-
cess of this strategy but also the international community’s trust in Belgium. A 
foreign diplomat who was in the Council during 2018–19 also confirms Belgian 
role as a bridge builder:
There are few countries that have this image. But I can confirm that a 
common perception in the Council is that Belgium is a bridge-builder. It 
was not only good in its relations with NPMs, but it was also instrumental 
in Middle East issues. It was also very successful to articulate our position 
to Europeans. Belgium achieved a tremendous job in Syrian humanitarian 
issues due to its good relations with other countries. They had ability to 
reach out every actor around the globe, not necessarily to the EU, some-
times they reach out even to Latin America.
(Interview, October 28, 2020)
Having no particular stance on sensitive issues, lack of vested interests in most 
of the current international conflicts, its role as an honest broker and the very 
smallness of Belgium contribute to this positive image (Liégeois, 2009). Yet, 
the positive image and credibility cannot be gained in one day. It is the result 
of years of endeavor and the investment in the United Nations’ work. As one 
senior Belgian diplomat stated, “Belgium is a congenital multilateralist”, which 
supports the interest of the international community and the rule of law since the 
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foundation of the United Nations. This plays an important role for having a good 
standing in the United Nations (Interview, February 06, 2021).
13.3.3 Competence
The competence simply means having the required knowledge and diplo-
matic skills. Belgium traditionally has knowledge and expertise in Central 
Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), that is 
acknowledged by the international community (Grauls & Verbeke, 2009). It is 
regularly consulted on DRC by the PM even at times when it is not a member 
of the UNSC (Zeebroek, 2009). However, in addition to its vast knowledge in 
DRC and Central Africa, Belgium’s active involvement in the UNSC over the 
years appears to have brought expertise on multiple themes. For instance, Belgium 
acted as the chairman of the newly established Iran Sanctions Committee during 
its previous term, for which it was widely praised by other states (Sauer, 2009), 
while in the current term, it acts as a facilitator on the issue of the Iran nuclear 
program. As another example, Belgium has always paid particular attention to 
the independence and the efficient functioning of international tribunals. That is 
why “fighting against impunity” through International Criminal Court (ICC) 
was one of its priorities in the previous term (Grauls & Verbeke, 2009). It now 
acts as a focal point for the ICC and continues to use its expertise on the same 
theme. Another theme that Belgium has gained expertise in is the “protection of 
civilians”, especially women and children, in the conflicts. During the previous 
term, an active performance on the subject already allowed Belgium to distin-
guish itself; yet in the 2019–20 term, it assumed the chairmanship of Children 
and Armed Conflict Working Group.
Besides the expertise on thematic issues, it is essential to demonstrate 
diplomatic skills and capabilities to master ongoing themes in the Council’s 
agenda. Previous terms confirmed that Belgium can feed its representative in 
the Council with information about the most recent developments (Grauls & 
Verbeke, 2009) through a well-established diplomatic network that is spanning 
all five continents (Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020c). Furthermore, 
the high quality of Belgian diplomats is also an important factor that makes 
them competent enough to deliver a successful performance. According to a 
political coordinator of an NPM, Belgian diplomats are “exceptionally good”. 
He describes his counterpart from Belgium as the following:
He was always ready to listen to you, he was very good at articulating del-
icate matters, he was always well-prepared, he knew everybody’s position, 
he even knew what we voted before on the subject. It is not only limited 
to my area of responsibility, what I heard from my colleagues, all Belgium 
team was exceptional.
(Interview, October 28, 2020)
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13.3.4 Coalition building
Competency is not enough on its own to become influential in the Council. 
Since a degree of consensus is essential for the UNSC to function well, collab-
orations with both PMs and NPMs inside the Council, or with other groups 
outside the Council, are crucial to achieve the desired outcomes. Of course, this 
also requires enormous time and effort. Small states, with their limited resources, 
need to strike the right balance between conducting an efficient daily work and 
building coalitions for future outcomes.
In this regard, Belgium benefits from its long-standing partnerships. Brussels 
can lean on its close ties with Benelux countries to the degree that they have 
seconded diplomats in the Council (Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020b). 
Belgium is also a member of the EU and enjoys certain benefits of EU mem-
bership, especially in terms of access to inner circle information (Wouters et al., 
2009). Yet, its endeavor for building coalitions is not limited to the inner circle of 
traditional partners. For instance, it is a member of an informal group of “Like-
Minded States on Targeted Sanctions”3, which advocates fair and clear proce-
dures for a more effective UN sanctions system, which is a theme that Belgium 
has always placed value on. Being part of such a group, which has consistently 
been active at the level of the Security Council, clearly provides leverage for the 
implementation of Belgian policies on sanctions.
Belgium has also been active in strengthening cooperation among the 
elected members. One notable example of this effort was the organization of 
a meeting of elected members (E-10) in Brussels, which was called “Brussels 
Dialogue”, at the end of 2019 (Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). It 
is difficult to measure the impact of such a meeting on the subsequent activities 
of the Council. However, as the Belgian permanent representative Pecsteen 
indicated, consensus among NPMs could lead to a resolution even on a del-
icate matter such as Syria. He further explained the role of cooperation with 
the following example: “A proposed resolution for a cease-fire around Idlib 
(Syria) was struck down by a nyet (‘no’ in Russian) from Russia and China. 
Nonetheless, as non-permanent members, we were able to exert a certain pres-
sure on those two countries. No-one likes to feel isolated. Ultimately, we even 
had an effect on the ground: Syria announced a unilateral cease-fire” (Simoens, 
2019, Right to veto).
13.3.5 A balanced approach
The UNSC certainly does not fully meet its primary responsibility that is to 
“maintain international peace and security”, especially when the interests of PMs 
are at stake. However, the UNSC does matter on many occasions. As Wouters 
et al. (2009) noted, “aside from the symbolism inherent in having a UNSC 
decision on a particular matter, actions that range from mere recommenda-
tions up until the use of armed force have an impact on the ground”. Thus, an 
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NPM should consider the constraints and power struggles within the Council 
and strike a right balance between taking always the high moral ground and 
achieving some tangible outcomes that can make the difference for people in 
conflict-affected areas.
Belgium appears to have adopted an astute balance between an idealistic and 
a pragmatic approach during its terms in the Council. In the words of Grauls 
and Verbeke, former permanent representatives to the Security Council, 
Belgium has chosen a moderate rather than a staunch stance (Grauls & Verbeke, 
2009). One prominent example of Belgium’s moderate stance is its approach 
toward the Security Council reform. It was one of the countries advocating a 
restriction in the range and the use of the veto power at the foundation of the 
United Nations (Loridan, 1946). Since then, it has traditionally supported a 
reform of the UNSC in terms of both its composition and working methods. 
However, knowing that a debate on UNSC reform implies investing one’s 
political capital, it prefers an action in small steps and consultation with other 
members rather than one big reform package (Vandervelden, 2009). According 
to Ambassador Pecsteen, abolishing the veto power, for instance, is a too rad-
ical demand because “without the right to veto, some of the major powers 
might withdraw from the Security Council, but it’s of the utmost importance 
that all the major powers do stay around the table”. Instead, Belgium advo-
cates a limited veto power that would be a more feasible approach (Simoens, 
2019, Right to veto). In short, one can claim that Belgium adopts a balanced 
approach in the Council, which can be summarized as a “principled pragma-
tism” (Rodiles, 2013) or the “use of pragmatism to achieve ideals”.
13.4 Conclusion
Belgium takes a particular role on the international stage. Even though it is 
generally considered a minor player, our analysis of the last two mandates 
in the UNSC reveals that Belgium has been using its terms—including its 
last term—to be influential in the Council, instead of being a niche player. 
Supported by its leadership, Brussels developed a clear policy of being active 
in the Security Council. An image of “reliable partner” that has been gained 
throughout the decades together with diplomatic and coalition-building skills 
has enabled Belgium to play a meaningful role inside the Council. On top of 
this, a pragmatic approach based on the sober assessment of its own position 
made Belgium influential, sometimes even disproportional to its size in power 
politics.
What is more, even though most small states pursue a similar binding strat-
egy, Belgian policy in the UNSC distinguishes it from other states of similar 
size in several aspects. First of all, being active inside the Council appears 
to have become “a state policy” of Belgium rather than a particular govern-
ment’s policy. Starting from the first delegation of Belgium at San Francisco, 
which was headed by Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
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particular importance has been attached to the UN mission. At its foundation, 
supporting United Nations was regarded as a long-standing interest of Belgium due 
to the geographic, economic and political reasons (Loridan, 1946). Furthermore, 
the active participation of Mr. Spaak during the foundation of the United 
Nations made him the president of the first General Assembly (Loridan, 1946). 
This notion of being active in the United Nations in general and the Security 
Council in particular has not changed to date.
The consistency of Belgian active policy has been best tested during the 
world’s longest governmental crisis, which coincided with the last two terms in 
the Council. In the aftermath of both 2007 and 2018 elections, Belgium found 
itself in a political crisis that mainly arises from the growing political gulf 
between two main regions (Chini, 2020). The political parties could not form 
a new government over six months following the elections. Despite a tempo-
rary government formed in March 2008, the crisis continued until the end of 
2011 (“Le nouveau gouvernement belge”, 2011). A similar government crisis 
in the same decade began at the end of 2018, which this time took more than 
16 months for political parties to form a new government (Messoudi, 2020). 
In spite of these two political crises at home, Belgium succeeded in delivering 
an active performance in the Council, which confirms that active policy has 
become a Belgian state policy. This can be better understood when compared 
with other elected members, even with the ones praised for their successful 
membership in the Council such as Australia (2013–14), in which political 
parties support quite different views on the membership and a government 
change might cause serious impact on its policies in the Council (Langmore & 
Farrall, 2016).
A reflection of having a constant policy of being active can also be seen 
in the number of mandates. Belgium has been quite ambitious to be inside 
the Security Council as many times as possible. Having completed its sixth 
mandate, Belgium is one of the most elected countries in the world, and 
arguably, it is the most elected small state.4 As a small power, it has thus 
accumulated the highest level of experience of diplomacy inside the UNSC 
(Liégeois, 2009). Another aspect that distinguishes Belgium from other states 
is the high number of votes it has received in the elections of the Security 
Council. Belgium won all elections in the first round and obtained 43 votes 
out of 51 in 1946, 52 votes out of 58 in 1954, 104 votes out of 113 in 1970, 
142 votes out of 154 in 1990, 180 votes out of 189 in 2006 and 181 votes out 
of 193 in 2018 (Security Council Report, 2020d). This is a remarkable history 
of vote rate when compared with other most elected countries like Canada5 
or the Netherlands, which could win some of their elections in the follow-
ing rounds at a narrow margin. Although it was an unopposed candidate of 
its regional group in the last two terms, this consistent high rate of the vote 
obtained in the General Assembly can be regarded as a sign of the interna-
tional community’s trust in Belgium.
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All in all, given its performance in the last two mandates, it appears that 
Belgium maintains its ambition and active policy in the UNSC as part of its 
broader policy of multilateralism. The aforementioned elements tend to support 
the argument that alongside multilateralism, engaging in the Security Council 
has also become part of Belgian diplomatic DNA. However, one should note that 
it would be illusory to infer from the last two mandates that a lasting political 
crisis does not affect Belgian capacity to weigh on the international stage. What 
makes Belgium exceptional now is the paradox between the success in foreign 
policy and the fragility in domestic policy. However, this paradox also cast a 
shadow on the future of Belgium on the international stage in general and as part 
of the UNSC in particular.
Notes
 1 There is not a common definition of “a small state” in the studies of international rela-
tions. Traditionally, smallness has been measured with quantitative factors such as the size 
of population, territory, economy or military. For the population size, which is the single 
most common feature, the threshold ranges from 1 million to 30 million, with the most 
common threshold at 10 million. However, smallness is contextual and may depend on 
where the state is located, how it is perceived by itself and other states and its relative 
power to other states. In this respect, while it is not easy to make an absolute categori-
zation, Belgium can be considered a small state that partially shows middle power state 
characteristics. For the purpose of this chapter, it is classified as a small power.
 2 The numbers for the previous five elected members belong to the same period of their 
own term. The numbers for the following five elected members, the period is only one 
year (2020). Source: “Annex 2018 Highlights of Security Council Practice”, accessed 
December 21, 2020, https://unite.un.org/sites/unite.un.org/files/app-schighlights- 
2018/doc/Highlights%20Paper%202018%20Annex.pdf; “Annex 2019 Highlights of Secu-
rity Council Practice”, accessed December 21, 2020, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ 
sites/www.un.org.secur itycouncil/files/highlights_2019_annex.pdf#page=3; 
“Arria-Formula Meetings”, Security Council Report Website, accessed December 17, 2020, 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- 
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/working_methods_arria_formula_meetings.pdf; “Informal Inter-
active Dialogues”, Security Council Report Website, accessed August 19, 2020, https://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4F 
F96FF9%7D/working_methods_informal_interactive_dialogue.pdf.
 3 The group consists of Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. See for instance “the 
Statement delivered by Ambassador Olof Skoog of Sweden on behalf of the Group of 
Like-Minded States on Targeted Sanctions at the UN Security Council open debate 
on working methods of the Security Council”, June 6, 2019, available at https://www.
government.se/speeches/20192/06/statement-by-ambassador-olof-skoog-of-sweden-
on-behalf-of-the-group-of-likeminded-states-on-targeted-sanctions/.
 4 Here are the most elected countries: Japan 11; Brazil 10; Argentina 9; Colombia, India, 
Pakistan and Italy 7; Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland 6 times. 
Among these countries, Belgium is the smallest country, both in terms of population and 
size. The Netherlands can be considered the next smallest country, which is frequently 
regarded as a middle power as well.
 5 Canada even experienced the political humiliation of not being elected two times in a 
row (2010 and 2020) despite expensive campaigns and heavy political support.
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